

# NAISKARMYASIDDHI

OF

ŚRĪ SUREŚVARĀCĀRYA

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

*By*

S. S. RAGHAVACHAR, M. A.



UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE  
MYSORE

The Naiṣkarmyasiddhi of Śrī Sureśvarācārya is a masterpiece of an abridgment of the great system of Advaita-vedānta, by a mind at once devout, penetrating and comprehensive. It presents the fundamentals promulgated by Śrī Saṅkarācārya with a competence almost approaching that of the preceptor. While exhibiting philosophic reason at its best in both profound constructiveness and incisive criticism it abounds in moving veneration to the primordial wisdom of the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the great preceptor Śrī Saṅkara. In adequacy and power it ranks as a basic classic of Vedānta.

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S. S. RAGHAVACHAR, M. A.

WITH A FOREWORD

*By*

SWAMI ADIDEVANANDA



UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE  
MYSORE

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## PUBLISHER'S NOTE

It is with very great pleasure that we are presenting to the public Śrī Sureśvarācārya's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. As far as our knowledge goes this is a unique edition of the great ācārya's work with literal translation and copious notes.

It has been possible for us to publish this book because of the generous grant of the University Grants Commission, which has borne the entire cost of publication. We are grateful to the authorities of the U. G. C. for their generous gesture.

Sri S. S. Raghavachar, M. A., Reader in Philosophy, University of Mysore needs no introduction. His great erudition is known to the scholarly world through his translations of the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* and the *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya*. We are very grateful to him for kindly undertaking the work of translating this Advaita classic and adding a very useful introduction and notes. He has executed the work with laudable success.

We are also grateful to Revered Swami Adidevanānda, President, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, Mangalore for his scholarly foreword.

Mysore  
3rd March 1965

Prabhu Shankara  
Director  
Prasārāṅga, University of Mysore



## FOREWORD

Prof. S. S. Raghavachar has already presented to the students of Indian Philosophy the two classics of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita, namely, the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Śrī Rāmānujācārya and the *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* of Śrī Madhvācārya with his masterly English renderings, introduction and notes. Now comes from his pen the English rendering of a famous Advaita classic, the *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi* of Śrī Sureśvarācārya, an immediate disciple of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya, with an exhaustive introduction and valuable notes. In this trilogy a student is now in a unique position to study Vedānta in its triple aspect.

There are four famous *Siddhis* in Advaita: *Brahmasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamīśra, *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi* of Sureśvara, *Iṣṭasiddhi* of Vimuktātman and *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana. Of these, *Brahmasiddhi* expounds a special type of pre-Śaṅkara Advaita; *Iṣṭasiddhi* works out the māyā doctrine comprehensively and *Advaitasiddhi* refutes the objections of *Nyāyāmṛta*, a polemical work of Dvaita. But *Naīṣkarmyasiddhi* is a shorter manual embodying the quintessence of Vedānta. According to Col. G. A. Jacob this work is the best of the author's productions. The work is held in such high esteem in the tradition of Advaita that it is quoted not only by every important Advaita writer but also by the critics of Advaita. The author himself says that the work 'purports to set forth the epitome of the essence of the entire Vedānta' \* (i. 1). The term, *naīṣkarmyasiddhi* occurs for the first time in the *Bhagavadgītā* (xviii. 49). Explaining the meaning of that term Śrī Śaṅkara says: 'The attainment of *naīṣkarmya*, the state in which one remains as the actionless Self.' † It is quite possible that this term might have been taken from the *Gītā* for the title of the work.

The quintessence of this text is that jñāna, pure knowledge is the only means for the attainment of Self-realization (i. 99) and not action, however useful it may be as a secondary means. The

\* अतोऽशेषवेदान्तसारसंग्रहप्रकरणमिदमारभ्यते ।

† नैष्कर्म्यस्य वा निष्क्रियात्मरूपावस्थानलक्षणस्य सिद्धिः निष्पत्तिः ।

author quotes seventeen times from the *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śrī Śaṅkara, not only to emphasize the views of his great master, but also to indicate the authenticity of the tradition.

Sureśvara, apart from refuting the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsakas, has to join issue with three pre-Śaṅkara Advaitins, namely, Brahmadatta, Maṇḍanamīśra and Bhartṛprapañca. The value of the present work lies in the uncompromising position it takes with regard to pre-Śaṅkara Advaita. It not only distinguishes it from the views of Śrī Śaṅkara, but also refutes it without mercy.

Sureśvara does not agree with the Mīmāṃsaka view that the nityakarmas (obligatory duties) could be the means to liberation (i. 21); for their performance has no significance for one who knows himself as the pure Self without a second (i. 96). Nor does he admit the view of the Prābhākaras that all significant propositions should refer to some action, for a word may signify an object unrelated to action.

Based on the commentary, *Vidyāsurabhi* of Jñānāmṛta on the early part of the connecting statement to i. 67, Prof. Hiriyanna thinks that the *prima facie* view in the statement embodies Brahmadatta's position. According to this ancient Vedāntin the Upaniṣads also, like the karmakāṇḍa of the Vedas, are injunctive in character and mere sentence-generated knowledge like 'I am Brahman' does not destroy ignorance; so one has to meditate on this truth for a long time till it develops contemplative force which can destroy ignorance entirely. Some time lapses between the acquisition of Upaniṣadic knowledge and liberation, when the obligation to perform duties continues. This samuccaya, combination of jñāna with karma is rejected by our author, as by his master. The knowledge of scripture immediately destroys the ignorance that takes the form of actions and factors in action (i. 67).

The view of Maṇḍanamīśra is also indicated in the connected statement to i. 67. According to Ānandajñāna, the commentator of the *Vārtika*, this view of Maṇḍana is criticized by Sureśvara in his *Vārtika*.<sup>\*</sup> While agreeing with Brahmadatta that action (upāśana) is the final import of the Upaniṣads, and that knowledge of

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<sup>\*</sup>IV. iv. 786-810

the Upaniṣads cannot directly reveal the nature of Brahman, Maṇḍana adds that the meditation itself cannot be the means to liberation, but a special type of knowledge generated out of meditation. This view of Maṇḍana is altogether rejected by Sureśvara. If knowledge can arise in meditation, asks Sureśvara, how can verbal testimony be true? (iii. 123). Meditation cannot produce right knowledge. It should never be thought that the result of meditation (bhāvanā) and that of action will be permanent (iii. 93). The assertive propositions of the Upaniṣads like 'That thou art' destroy without residue the whole of ignorance. To seek knowledge elsewhere apart from the established authority like *tat tvam asi*, is as ridiculous as 'to ascertain taste through sight' (iii. 117).

The view of Bhartṛprapañca (i. 68-78) is fairly well known. Sureśvara mentions him by name in his *Vārtika*.\* Śrī Śaṅkara himself has given a clear account of his system in his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (v. 1) though he does not mention him by name. According to Bhartṛprapañca the individuals and the world are real, but they are both identical with and different from Brahman. Thus the three constitute a unity in diversity. This is a sort of *bhedābheda*, unity in difference. As might be inferred from this theory of ultimate Reality, Bhartṛprapañca advocates a combination of jñāna with karma as the means of release. While karma recognizes diversity, jñāna realizes the unity. Sureśvara refutes this view on the ground of self-contradiction in the conception of Brahman as unity in differences. Even if this view of Brahman is accepted, combination of action and knowledge is not possible. If Brahman is both identical and different from the individual selfs, it should be surely subjected to misery (i. 78). The combination of dvaita and advaita is impossible.

According to Sureśvara, though Brahman is the only unchangeable reality, world appearance has been made possible through avidyā which veils the nature of Brahman and makes it appear as the manifold. Not only ātman is confounded with non-ātman on account of avidyā, but also ātman is differentiated from Brahman. The illusion has no substratum and is opposed to all

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\*I. iv. 1164, 1188; IV. iv. 412, 741

reason (iii. 60). Reality is one without a second; but plurality is a fact of experience, though it is not a self-established existent. Avidyā has Brahman both for its subject and object. When realization is attained by the Vedāntic texts like 'That thou art', avidyā disappears. Vedāntic texts are competent to give rise to direct immediate realization. Reason cannot give rise to an integral knowledge of ātman, as such an apprehension depends on inference which again rests on empirical experience. Those who disregarded Vedāntic texts and were guided solely by reasoning landed in the unreality of Self (iii. 34). The ātman going beyond existence and non-existence is grasped through Vedāntic propositions (iii. 57). How are we to understand the Vedāntic proposition? In the Vedāntic proposition, 'That thou art', the identity between 'That' and 'Thou' is apprehended. The term 'Thou' does not merely signify the phenomenal self. Its true meaning must be discovered for the purpose of identification. Then it will give up its conventional meaning and will not signify anything contrary to the intended unitary purport (iii. 75). 'Thou' would signify only the immediate self-revealing ātman alone. This is identical with 'That' which stands for the ultimate principle, Brahman. According to Sureśvara verbal testimony can produce unitary experience by the removal of the wrong concept of ātman.

The knower of ātman is established in the experience of his unity with all. The dualism of theory and practice or duty and self-realization is no longer there. Therefore he is not bound by moral obligations. He becomes really amoral. How does such a man of realization behave? Sureśvara condemns the views of those who hold that such a sage can indulge in evil. 'If the man who has awakened to the non-dual Reality behaves as he likes', asks Sureśvara, 'what then is the difference between a dog and a man of knowledge in the matter of eating prohibited food?' (iv. 62). Even in the state of aspiration for release there could be no licentious conduct (iv. 65). Even a hungry man does not like to eat poison, let alone a well-fed person, unless he is an idiot (iv. 66). He transcends even the good in so far as it is a means, an effort for Self-realization. But goodness becomes his very nature without any effort on his part. He has reached the pinnacle of moral dis-



cipline. As *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* conforms to the nature of the inmost Self, he who endeavours to study it must cultivate with effort values like non-conceit and non-hatred; he must be of good character (iv. 70).

Sureśvars's loving devotion to his spiritual teacher, Śrī Śaṅkara equals that to his chosen deity, Viṣṇu. He repeatedly pays to him the highest tributes in the concluding verses of the treatise. He says that he obtained the knowledge of Self from his master, even as Bhagīratha obtained Gaṅgā from Śiva.

The present translation of the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* is scrupulously accurate, succinct and at the same time intelligible. The author must be thanked for avoiding repellent and mechanical renderings though literal. It is hoped that this rendering will be appreciated and found useful by both the eastern as well as western readers.

*Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama*  
*Mangalore*

**Swami Adidevananda**



## PREFACE

With the publication of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* with English translation, notes and introduction, a plan that was hazily conceived some ten years ago but defined itself in the course of execution, reaches fulfilment. Being convinced that the system of Vedānta is the characteristic and completed utterance of the metaphysical and spiritual genius of India I endeavoured to educate myself through intensive apprenticeship, as it were, to the masters of the three outstanding schools of Vedānta. I preferred to work on the independent treatises rather than the commentaries for I thought that in them I could get a concentrated statement of doctrines unburdened with the labours of exegesis. The first fruits of this endeavour were my translation of the *Vedārthasaṅgraha* of Śrī Rāmānuja and a companion volume of an expository introduction. Both the books were favourably received in the world of scholars. Sri D. T. Tatacharya characterized my translation as 'faithful, fine and scholarly' and the introduction was described by Sri V. Kṛṣṇamacharya of Adyar as 'a very valuable and scholarly production'. This encouraged me to feel that I was learning my lessons somewhat in the right direction. The next work undertaken was the *Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya* of Śrī Madhva. The edition of that work, with translation, introduction and notes was duly completed. That work was also well-received and I am particularly happy to record that the late Dr. R. Nagaraja Sarma pronounced it 'remarkably fine and faithful'.

There was considerable difficulty in choosing a corresponding classic in Advaita. Śrī Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* and *Ātmabodha* have already been presented to the modern student by eminent scholars. The other manuals ascribed to Śaṅkara are neither his undisputed works nor reach the required level of intellectual eminence. It occurred to me that a work of the type by a great disciple of Śaṅkara could also meet my need. So the choice inevitably fell on the present text. As Prof. Hiriyanna has given us only a critical edition and Dr. Rashvihari Das has merely paraphrased the work, there was no duplication involved in my undertaking. The present

publication is a product of devoted study for about a period of three years. It is a great satisfaction to contemplate that the three units of study covering the major schools of Vedānta and that in the words of the pioneers, have reached the cherished point of completion and have given shape to the original design. What further labour of love comes to be initiated by this vast perspective of philosophic thought is in the womb of the future. It is a matter of deep thankfulness that the unfailing patronage of Swami Adidevananda presided over the destinies of this threefold research during the entire period. His forewords to my earlier books are justly commended as authoritative and masterly formulation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita standpoints. He is favouring the present work also with a foreword of inestimable value. Though words are very feeble vehicles, I take this opportunity of recording my sense of profound gratitude to him.

In the editing of the text of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* I encountered no major difficulty. Col. Jacob and Prof. Hiriyantha have done all the editorial labour and the result is that Prof. Hiriyantha's edition is satisfactory in every way. I have adopted his text in my work almost wholly and used the commentary of Jñānottama also as brought out by him. I thankfully acknowledge this immense obligation and add my humble homage to the memory of these great scholars.

The translation of the text is no easy matter in view of the special nature of Sureśvara's language and style of argumentation. A mechanical and literal rendering would disfigure the thought and render it wholly unintelligible in its modern garb. I have translated, therefore, striving after fidelity to the thought rather than words and endeavoured to achieve the maximum measure of intelligibility. In this I have taken no liberties except those sanctioned by the remarkably clear and helpful commentary of Jñānottama.

In my introduction I have dealt with the main questions connected with the work and incorporated a summary of the leading discussions of the chapters in proper sequence. The structure of the treatise as a whole and its fundamental direction of thought are indicated so that a comprehensive conception of its substance

may be facilitated. In the notes appended I have avoided all textual problems as they have been handled with superb care and competence by the earlier editors. I have concentrated on the arguments as such and have virtually offered a running exposition of the treatise. It is for this reason that the notes allude to almost all the paragraphs and seek to explain their contents *in extenso*. It is hoped that the method of translation, the introduction and the expository nature of the notes will together bring out the entire philosophy of the difficult work in a clear, bold and intelligible form.

It is a well-known fact that a publication of an old philosophic classic is no easy matter in our country in these days. It is a good fortune that the University Grants Commission readily sanctioned financial assistance to this publication. I offer my grateful appreciation to the authorities of this body. The assistance was routed through the University of Mysore, and the Vice-Chancellor, Dr. K. L. Shrimali, the Registrar, Sri K. R. Ramachandran, I.A.S. and the Director of Prasārāṅga, Dr. Prabhusankara were always sympathetic, encouraging and prompt in solving my problems. It gives me great pleasure to tender my thankfulness for this genuine consideration.

The printing was executed by the well-known Sharada Press, Mangalore. The book has come out expeditiously and in an excellent shape. I thank the proprietors and the management of the press for their fine work and ardent interest in the publication.

The arduous task of guiding, supervising and correcting was graciously undertaken by Swami Adidevananda. To him goes all the credit for the technical merits of the publication; and I thank him in all sincerity. I may as well close this brief preface with the noble words of Suresvara:

न ह्यातिलाभपूजार्थं ग्रन्थोऽस्माभिरुदीर्यते ।

स्वबोधपरिशुद्धयर्थं ब्रह्मविधिकषाड्मसु ॥

University of Mysore  
March, 5, 1965

S. S. Raghavachar



## INTRODUCTION

### 1. The Author

Śrī Sureśvarācārya is the author of the work, *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. We know that he was a disciple of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya. He himself records this fact in the work and acknowledges the gracious gift of spiritual illumination from this great teacher. He compares the teacher to God Śiva, and puts himself down in the place of King Bhagīratha who, according to legend, obtained from the God the sacred river Gaṅgā. He gives pointed expression to his devout admiration for the overpowering greatness of his teacher and expressly tells us that he composed the work in obedience to his instruction.

While so much is certain, we practically know nothing more about his life. That he hailed from the Northern part of India may be gathered from his adverse reference to Dravidians and the reference may also mean that he was not getting on well with the Dravidian disciples of Śaṅkara. That his life was austere and that it was one of passionate dedication to Vedānta are impressions unmistakably communicated by the spirit and style of his work.

A story has gathered round the historical personality of Sureśvara in the comparatively late attempts at the biography of Śaṅkara. We are told that he was a celebrated Mīmāṃsaka and that as a result of a philosophical debate with Śaṅkara was converted into an ardent and fullfledged disciple of Śaṅkara. His former name is supposed to have been Maṇḍana Miśra and he is said to have been named Sureśvara by his Guru after conversion. It is also said that the former disciples of Śaṅkara distrusted the completeness of his conversion and treated him accordingly. In consequence they prevented him from writing a critical exposition of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. But Śaṅkara is said to have had great confidence in the new disciple and hence to have commissioned him to write the great works that have come down in his name. In them he is said to have taken particular pains to repudiate his former positions and thus reveal his unreserved acceptance and thorough understanding of the system of his master,

in answer to the unfair suspicions of his fellow-disciples. There is nothing incredible in the story as such. Such philosophical conversion, the suspicion of new converts on the part of older adherents and the demonstration of greater zeal and fuller grasp on the part of genuine converts are familiar occurrences in the history of faiths and movements of thought.

But the difficulty in this case centres round the identification of Sureśvara with Maṇḍana Miśra, a celebrated philosophical writer. About six works are ascribed to Maṇḍana Miśra, including the highly esteemed *Brahma-siddhi*. *Brahma-siddhi* expounds a powerfully worked out type of Advaita. A perusal of the work presents three points bearing on the question: (a) Its author is no Mīmāṃsaka upholding ritualism against the path of jñāna or knowledge. (b) The philosophical theory formulated exhibits marked points of difference from that of Sureśvara as represented by works of which he is the undisputed author. (c) Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* adopts towards ritualistic action and mental action of the nature of meditation an attitude definitely more favourable than that of Sureśvara. After a thorough examination of the entire data Professor Kuppusvāmi Śāstri in his historic introduction to *Brahma-siddhi* comes to the conclusion that Maṇḍana Miśra is not to be identified with Sureśvara. The traditional view of their identity has not yet received any justification of comparable weight and thoroughness. The possibility remains that Maṇḍana's views underwent appropriate change after his conversion and that such a change could itself adequately account for the doctrinal divergences between the philosophy of *Brahma-siddhi* and the views of Sureśvara. But still the fact remains that the author of *Brahma-siddhi* is a philosopher of great stature and the Advaita he propounds is itself an impressive and well-built structure of thought. The style and method of presentation have a classic quality matching the brilliance of thought. It is impossible not to note the fundamental difference in diction and style between the two authors. The contrast is most marked in the prose of the two writers. The differences seem to indicate two minds rather than two stages of the same mind.\* A

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*Note* \*Sureśvara adopts a tone of derision in his criticism of the position of Maṇḍana, a fact hardly explicable on the hypothesis of identity.



more assertive conclusion is hardly possible on the question and it is wise to set down that Prof. Kuppusvāmi Śāstri's findings still stand.

Fortunately no important philosophical consideration depends on the disentanglement of this complex issue and the personality of Sureśvara stands out in undiminished splendour as a writer and thinker. That Śaṅkara humbled the great Maṇḍana and reshaped him into an ardent disciple is the only pleasure that is denied. The towering stature of the disciple remains, whatever be his antecedents, and that itself is a magnificent tribute to the genius of the teacher.

## 2. Works of Suresvara

Five works are attributed to Sureśvara. Of them, *Mānasollasa* is a running metrical explanation of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti-stotra* ascribed to Śaṅkara. *Pañcīkaraṇa-vārtika* is a similar explanation of the very short work, *Pañcīkaraṇa*, also attributed to Śaṅkara. It is disputed whether the originals are really compositions of Śaṅkara and a similar dispute is possible with regard to the authenticity of the tradition holding Sureśvara to be the author of the *vārtikas* on them. Whatever may be the solution of this problem these works are of a minor character and the solution one way or the other does not very much affect the historical position of the authors in question. Only the prestige and authoritativeness of the works get affected. The other three works ascribed to Sureśvara are undoubtedly his. *Vārtika* is a commentary that elucidates, supplements and sometimes corrects the original treatise commented upon. Sureśvara wrote such a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. It is a very valuable aid to the understanding of the text and Śaṅkara's explanation thereof. The most voluminous and weighty treatise of Sureśvara is his *Vārtika* on Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this work. The *upaniṣad* itself is a big one and the most substantial of the principal *upaniṣads* according to all estimates. Śaṅkara's commentary on it is one of his two greatest works, the other being the *Bhāṣya* on the *Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa*. Sureśvara explains, elaborates and critically

improves upon this masterpiece of his teacher. Naturally it is a lengthy work and is a mine of knowledge setting forth the fundamental insight of Advaita in both its critical and constructive phases. In authority it is second only to the best writings of Śaṅkara and Śaṅkara's meaning has often to be determined in the light of Sureśvara's elucidation. Thus the *Vārtika* is a foundational treatise.

*Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is a very much shorter treatise. It is no commentary on any original. It is an independent work presenting the quintessence of Advaita Vedānta. Being free from the constraining order of any original, the author develops his position in accordance with the logical sequence of his argument. There is scope for concentration on philosophical essentials and a self-chosen mode of presentation. Freed from the burden of exegesis the work thus stands as a self-explaining unfoldment of the central principles of Vedānta. It would not be wrong to say that it articulates the philosophical genius of Sureśvara much better than the *vārtikas* burdened with the double necessity of doing justice to the *upaniṣads* and the commentaries thereon. It is a treatise highly honoured in the tradition of Advaita. One cannot but agree with Colonel Jacob's judgment that it is the best of the author's productions. Almost every important later treatise on Advaita resorts to the authority of *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* at some crucial point or other and adopts its telling expressions to answer some critic or other. Even the critics of Advaita quote from it to authenticate their representation of Advaita for purposes of criticism.

### 3. Title of the Work

The word 'siddhi' means establishment or realisation. 'Naiṣkarmya' means being free from karma. *Naiṣkarmya* might signify the nature of the transcendent self free from any agency or action or the state of release which is freedom from the fetters of karma or knowledge combined with the renunciation of actions that is the ultimate means of release. There is every possibility that all the three meanings are meant. In that case 'Naiṣkarmya' would characterise the eternal and unchanging ātman, the spiritual goal to be sought after and the means to be adopted

for its attainment. It would apply at once to reality, the goal and the endeavour. The term '*Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*'—which, by the way, is taken from the *Bhagvadgītā*—means the ascertainment or establishment of the nature of the ātman, that of mokṣa and that of the sādhana therefor, all the three transcending the realm of karma comprising of both action and the consequences of action. The title stands justified by the very first chapter which upholds the claim of Vedāntic knowledge to be the means of the highest end of life as against that of action or karma. But this criticism of karma is but a part of the theme of the work and for Sureśvara the work is '*Aśeṣa-vedānta-sāra-saṅgraha*', the concentrated substance of the whole of vedānta. From the standpoint of this comprehensive scope of the work, the title is only partially appropriate. It is even likely that the work was started with the limited object of setting forth the argument of the first chapter but it grew into its present dimensions in the course of execution dictated by the intrinsic necessities of the theme.

#### 4. Structure of the Work

The work is divided into four chapters and consists of verses interspersed with prose sections called '*sambandhōkti*' or connecting statements. The verses themselves constitute a complete whole and the prose portion might have been added by the author subsequent to the composition of the verse-material. Each prose section is by way of introduction to a verse and not an elaboration or interpretation of the verse preceding. Sureśvara attaches value to the *sambandhōkti* and considers its study essential for any one who would undertake to interpret and expound the treatise.

That the division of chapters follows a logical scheme of thought is certain. The *Candrikā*, a fine gloss on the work by one Jñānottama, reads<sup>1</sup> in the scheme a reproduction of plan of the *Brahma-sūtras*. To cast one's writings into the mould of the sūtras was very popular with later Advaitic writers. We may mention the *Tattva-pradīpikā* of Citsukha-muni as a good instance of this tendency. But it is hardly possible to see in *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* the structural design of the *Brahma-sūtras*. The first chapter does not

1 See his introduction to Chap. IV.

concern itself with the co-ordinated interpretation of the upaniṣadic texts as the *Sūtras* do. The second chapter is not specifically devoted to a dialectical defence of the system or a dialectical attack on other schools of thought. The third chapter does not concern itself in any special way with the topic of sādhanā. The fourth is not of the nature of a discussion of the phala or mokṣa with any particular emphasis. It does not appear, therefore, right to construe that Sureśvara was endeavouring in the work to follow the pattern of the *Sūtras*.

The actual plan of the work seems to be this: The first chapter discusses the claims of karma and jñāna to be regarded as the means of final liberation and establishes the conclusion that jñāna is the means, however useful karma may be in the preliminary stages of spiritual life. The nature of jñāna is also elucidated and the erroneous identification of it with meditation or with the insight supposed to issue from meditation is discarded. It looks as if the first chapter is meant to determine the nature of sādhanā. The second and third chapters are together devoted to the subject-matter of this jñāna or knowledge. Briefly stated the subject-matter is the identity of the ātman and Brahman as set forth in the mahāvākya, 'Tattvamasi' or 'Aham Brahmāsmi'. If the import of the mahāvākya is not comprehended, the failure is diagnosed as due to not understanding the nature of the ātman. The second chapter is wholly taken up by this question of the nature of the ātman, the meaning of 'Tvam' and 'Aham' in the mahāvākyas mentioned above. It is the author's conviction that the discernment of the real self can be accomplished through mere reason and that no scriptural authority need be depended on in this part of argument. He works out this bold thesis in the second chapter. The third chapter goes on to the task of identifying the ātman, so discerned in the second chapter, with Brahman, the absolute reality. It is contended that this knowledge of identity can be gained only from the upaniṣads. This involves three further questions:

- (a) Why should we admit the authority of scriptures in general and the upaniṣads in particular?
- (b) Cannot reason itself establish the identity in question?

- (c) Do the passages of the upaniṣads signify the identity of ātman and Brahman? What is the legitimate manner or procedure of interpreting them?

The third chapter is utilized for answering these questions. It endeavours to point out the inadequacy of reason and the validity of scripture. It also works out the interpretation of the mahāvākya, 'Tattvamasi' and shows how the understanding of it culminates in the experience recorded in the mahāvākya, 'Aham brahmāsmi'. It may be characterized as a complete interpretation of the statement of identity between 'Tvam' and 'Tat', clarifying the implications of the passage in the upaniṣad. The fourth chapter is expressly stated to be a *resume* of the first three chapters. It fortifies the position taken with the authoritative pronouncements of Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. It concludes with a portrayal of the nature and behaviour of the perfected sage, the enlightened sādḥaka, the river of whose life is taken up by the ocean of fulfilment. The fourth chapter adds no distinct element to the thesis but only rounds it off into a completed whole. Such seems to be the structure of the work as we have it.

## 5. Temper and style of writing

A few words about the temper and style of the work may not be out of place. It is a strongly worded text and does not spare the critics. The author can go to the extent of adopting abusive language. In one place he refers to the purely rationalistic philosophers as dogs. In his denunciation of the body, he sometimes dwells on its filthy character in a vivid way. He ridicules the critics as averse to light like the owls and the ritualistic Mīmāṃsaka's as blinded by the smoke of sacrificial fires. While such is his tone towards critics, he is full of warm and deep reverence to the sacred scriptures, the teachers like Kṛṣṇa, Vyāsa and Gauḍapāda and his devotion to the preceptor, Śaṅkara, is marked by the greatest fervour, affection and veneration. Sureśvara writes with ease and his language shows the characteristics of a living medium. The very spontaneity makes it rugged sometimes and is not free from grammatical difficulties. But the fundamental thoughts are conveyed in a brisk, incisive and arresting manner. The rapidity of the move-

ment of thought often leaves some links insufficiently clear and thereby necessitates a backward movement for clarification. Thus some degree of obscurity and redundancy are found in several places. While the leading propositions are made penetratingly clear, minor issues and digressions are somewhat befogged. We are impressed by the immense power of thought and the sureness of vision but are not aided enough in our efforts to follow with understanding the conquests made. Our reach exceeds our grasp.

## 6. Summary of Chapters

### CHAPTER I

Prof. Hiriyanna has contributed a fine analysis of the first chapter of *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* in the introduction to his edition of the work. The burden of the chapter is to evaluate the claims of vedāntic knowledge and ritualistic works to be adopted as the direct and ultimate means of mokṣa or release. The controversy presupposes the clarification of some primary conceptions with which the work starts.

There is a natural urge in man for the infinite good, for supreme well-being. But this is found thwarted in actual life by privations and afflictions. Their eradication becomes thus a necessity. To effect that an analysis of their cause becomes necessary, Sureśvara formulates the causal chain as consisting of ignorance, ignorance-engendered desires and desire-engendered actions. Thus ignorance is the root of all evil. The precise nature of this ignorance must be grasped. The Self or ātman is itself the infinite good, in eternal actuality. In reality there is nothing other than the Self, and therefore neither desire for something else nor aversion towards anything is metaphysically justified. By ignorance is meant the ignorance of the real nature of the Self as the infinite good and of the fictitious character of the non-Self. It is through this ignorance in its privative and projective aspects, that desires and aversions arise, through which in their turn actions productive of evil are motivated. So the radical remedy for evil lies in the destruction of ignorance. With this preamble it would automatically follow that only enlightenment or knowledge of the Self as perfect and one without

a second could be the way to release from evil. The conclusion is irresistible if the basic metaphysics of the Self and the account of of the causation of evil are admitted.

It is easy work for Sureśvara to demolish views that do not admit the supremacy of knowledge. Taking his stand on the basic metaphysical theory of the ātman, perfect and secondless, he can easily refute the Mīmāṃsaka glorification of karma. It would have been harder to answer the advocate of karma, if he had challenged the metaphysical first principles of Advaita. In our treatise such a thorough-going Mīmāṃsaka opposition is not encountered. Bhartṛ-prapañca seems to have upheld a modified form of monism and argued in favour of a combination of karma and jñāna. Sureśvara points out the self-contradictory character of such a position and dismisses the compromise-formula summarily. Two old Advaitic writers Brahmadatta and Maṇḍanamīśra seem to have admitted the entire metaphysical edifice of Advaita without any modification but still attempted to accommodate karma along with jñāna in spiritual life. They seem to have insisted upon the distinction between knowledge as comprehension of vedāntic texts and knowledge as meditation or the intuitive realization accruing from meditation. This meditation is itself a form of inward and mental karma and is capable of combination with outward karma. The final liberating experience is said to come from the completion of the meditative life. Until that dawns ignorance persists and hence karma does persist. Ritualistic obligations are binding on the unenlightened and hence along with meditation, karma is said to be both possible and necessary. The details of the pūrva-pakṣa are obscure. But the distinction between jñāna as comprehension and jñāna as meditative realization stands out prominently enough. Sureśvara and Śaṅkara's tradition of Advaita in general reject this exaltation of meditation and the realization arising from meditation over the comprehension of vedāntic texts and see in that comprehension itself when it is real and thorough the highest intuitive realization. If between understanding 'Tattvamasi' and meditation upon it, one is to be a means for another, it is meditation that may be a means and never the understanding if it is all that it should be. Sureśvara adopts this attitude and dismisses the theory of Brahmadatta and

Maṇḍana which has come to be known as prasaṅkhyāna-vāda.

No vedāntin could reject the pathway of works wholly. The *Gītā*, one of the pillars of vedānta, would not allow such a total rejection of karma. While prohibited actions are to be given up, meritorious actions even if associated with lower happiness are useful. Sureśvara admits that kāmya-karma may have some purifying and elevating effect on the performer. Even utilitarian practice of virtue may gradually give rise to love of virtue for its own sake. Then the man performs only nitya and naimittika actions, the categorical duties, in a spirit of dedication to God. That life of virtue further purifies and elevates the mind of the agent. Such a pure mind develops the requisite fitness and aspiration for the last step in spiritual life, namely vedāntic knowledge. Thus the life of virtue is conducive to the life of understanding even though it is no direct means to the highest good which is the fruition of only understanding.

## CHAPTER II

The second chapter marks a transition of thought from the sphere of practical spirituality to that of metaphysics which is in reality the presupposition and basis for the discussion of the means of mokṣa. The knowledge said to effect liberation concerns the identity of the inner Self in man with the ultimate substratum of the universe. The identity posited is incredible so long as the nature of the Self is not correctly discerned. Hence the chapter undertakes to investigate into the nature of the Self.

The existence of the Self is not in need of any proof, for it is the presupposition of all proof. The being of consciousness is the basis for the demonstration of the being of everything else, for it is the deliverance of consciousness to that effect that demonstrates the being of everything other than consciousness. Now it is the nature and identity of this conscious principle that call for inquiry. Such an inquiry is all the more necessary as the Self is identified in everyday life and thought with the empirical personality of man. An examination of the essential nature of the Self is necessary for judging the rightness or wrongness of this identification.

The first characteristic of the Self is that it is the principle of



consciousness and therefore it requires no further demonstration of its being. It is the subject of all awareness and hence its existence is not to be established on the ground of its being the object of any awareness. It is self-probative and is epistemically self-established. The second characteristic is that it transcends change and is without origination or destruction. Perception of change requires a perceiver who does not change and if the consciousness perceiving change does itself change, the fact of its change goes unperceived. Origination and cessation are to be apprehended by a consciousness that compares the state of non-being before the origination with the state of being after origination and the state of being before cessation with the state of non-being after cessation. The comparing consciousness must endure through both the states of the being and non-being of what originates and ceases in order to compare them and come to the awareness of the changes in question. If these two determining characteristics of the self, the principle of consciousness, are borne in mind the task of discriminating between the Self and the non-Self becomes easy. Applying this two-fold criterion the physical body can be at once ascertained to be other than the Self. It is not epistemically self-established as its being is known to us on account of its becoming an object of perceptual awareness and in addition to its being liable to perpetual change, there are states of life like dreamless sleep when there is no awareness of its existence.

This work of discrimination must proceed further and disentangle the Self from subtler forms of the non-Self. They are all together named the 'subtle body' and the subtle body consists of the stream of consciousness taking on varied forms like cognition, volition and the feelings such as pleasure and pain. The total complex of the mind undergoing ceaseless change is the subtle body. It is also to be distinguished from the Self because it is also objective as it is open to retrospection and introspection and is of the nature of a flux. Its being is subject to its presentation to consciousness and its modifications are observable because there is an unchanging observer. Thus the distinction between the Self, self-established and abiding and the psychical complex itself an object of consciousness and subject to ceaseless change, has to be admitted.

The hypothesis may be put forward that the Self is an enduring substance and the mental processes are adjectival to it. But this is untenable in the last analysis because the conception of substance and qualities is not free from difficulties and, even if admitted, would apply to objects and not to the subject transcending them. When qualities change, the substance supporting them cannot remain altogether unaltered, if their mutual relation is anything other than external conjunction. The resolution of the difficulties of the hypothesis drives us to the distinction between the Self and its psychical appendage. The Self is often taken to be the ego, what we refer to by the term 'I' and what constitutes individual personality. The distinctive mark of this category is self-cognition or self-affirmation. In it the subject of consciousness identifies itself as the subject as against everything else. Thus in it the subject and object become fused into one. Even this category of the Ego has to be discarded as the non-Self. In the first place it is a self-contradictory category as the same principle, which is bereft of internal distinction of parts or aspects or temporal phases, cannot be both subject and object. In so far as it is object, it is a blend of the transcendent Self with some element of the non-Self. In the second place in the state of dreamless sleep it sinks into oblivion. Both objectivity and transitoriness, the characteristics of the non-Self, distinguish the ego from the real Self.

So far the demarcation of the Self from the non-Self is outlined. Now some important consequences of the distinction drawn are to be indicated. In the first place the Self so distinguished cannot be a plurality. There cannot be many selves. The reason is that all the usual marks of differentiation between individual and individual belong to the gross and subtle bodies and do not characterize the inmost and real self. The principles of individuation and differentiation do serve to establish the plurality of empirical selves, the aggregate of the appendages to the transcendent Self and do not penetrate to the core of its being. By a sound discrimination between the Self and non-Self, we are inevitably driven to the thesis of the fundamental unity of the self. In the second place the ontological status of the realm of the non-Self calls for consideration. From the standpoint of experience, the non-Self is never

encountered apart from its epistemic relation to the self. From the standpoint of the established distinction between the two it has to be looked upon as alien to the Self. The impossibility of seeing the non-Self as either one with or as other than the Self proves that its nature is logically indeterminable between these two logically contradictory and exhaustive alternatives. Such logical indeterminability is the test of the unreal. Moreover the world of objects never presents itself to the pure Self. It is experienced only by the Self conditioned and embodied in the gross and subtle bodies and confounded with the ego. The experience of that conditioned self is a lapse and a perversion. How can the external world of the non-Self open only to such a degraded mode of consciousness be a realm of reality? The source of its revelation is a vitiated mode of experience. It can only be phenomenal and never ultimate.

Thus the discrimination between the Self and non-Self leaves us with a spiritual monism according to which there is only one absolute transcendent Self and the world of non-Self is a fictitious construction of ignorance and delusion.

Such in brief is the substance of the second chapter of the *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*. Several representative old schools of Indian thought stand refuted thereby. The Cārvāka view of the body as the self is cancelled by the distinction between the gross body and the self. The Buddhist notion of the self as the complex flux of the stream of consciousness is dismissed by the contrast drawn between the self and the subtle body or mind. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of the Self as an eternal substance supporting the varied functions of empirical consciousness as its qualities is denied by the exposure of the difficulties of applying the categories of substance and quality to the situation. The Mīmāṃsaka idea of the Self as ego is repudiated by the demonstration of the hybrid character of the ego and its inclusion of an element of the non-Self in itself. The Sāṅkhya view of a plurality of transcendent selves and the independent reality of the physical world stands rejected by the final monism established as a conclusion of the basic analysis of the Self and non-Self.

## CHAPTER III

This chapter starts with the difficult topic of avidyā. Avidyā is ignorance-cum-error. The concept is manifestly important. We have been told in the first chapter that avidyā is the root of all evil. It has been shown in the second chapter that the Self is confounded with the non-Self on account of avidyā. It is again avidyā that displays the apparent plurality of selves and sets up the presentation of the external world. In this chapter we are to be told that it is only avidyā that makes us differentiate between the ātman and Brahman and that the removal of that illusion of difference is the pathway to the highest goal. A clarification of the concept is an unavoidable necessity.

Critics of Advaita often question the necessity for postulating avidyā. Sureśvara answers, somewhat in the style that Swāmi Vivēkānanda was to adopt in his exposition of Advaita, that it is no postulate but a fact of experience. Experience of plurality and all that is connected with it is there even though reality is one without a second. How could it be there without a principle of the obscuration of the real and the exhibition of the unreal.

Now this avidyā is no self-sufficient existent. It must belong to a subject of knowledge and must pertain to some reality to be known. The subject and object of avidyā are to be specified. Sureśvara answers that the ātman is both the subject and object of avidyā. There is no other alternative. The subject of knowledge must be the seat of avidyā. Only that whose existence is indubitably certain however unknown it may be can be the object of avidyā. What is not so certain a reality may be unknown simply because it does not exist. We can be sure about the presence of avidyā only when we are equally sure that the object in question is positively existent. Such certainty can belong only to the Self and hence the only object about which avidyā is possible is the Self. This is an extremely difficult point in the chapter and we have to leave it there. This avidyā is removable according to Sureśvara by the comprehension of the Mahāvākya 'Tattvamasi'. A set of new problems crops up at once.

(a) Why are we to care for the scriptural testimony at all?

(b) Cannot reason itself produce the knowledge capable of removing avidyā?

(c) How are we to understand the mahāvākya?

The third chapter is the longest and the sequence of discussion in it does not make for easy intelligibility. The fundamental positions argued out may be restated in a simpler and straightforward manner.

(a) The case for rejecting śruti in general is not convincing. If it offers some knowledge not obtainable from any other source of knowledge and not contradicted by any other source of knowledge, both the novelty and non-contradiction must command our acceptance of it. If its import is doubtful or confused it could be given up. But we can interpret it coherently and clearly. The only possible ground for doubting it would be that its deliverance is not confirmed by any other type of knowledge such as perceptual or inferential. But such a requirement would go against the theory of 'Swataḥprāmānya', which is absolutely sound.

With a similar epistemological framework the Mīmāṃsaka theorists had sought to defend the śruti by attributing to it a practical import and contended that it proclaims imperatives or 'oughts' not to be derived from other means of knowledge. Sureśvara rejects that expedient and provides scope for śruti in the matter of furnishing knowledge about the supreme reality and its identity with the individual's inmost being. Misguided desertion of śruti can only land philosophy in the soul-less and dark subtleties of Buddhistic sophistry.

(b) Reason can take us up to a point but cannot lead us to the final illumination. In the first place it is tied to some perceptual basis and the ātman transcends perception. In the second place like perception on which it depends it can deal with objects and not with the subject. Thirdly it can give us only mediate and indirect understanding and never immediate realization of the ultimate truth. Fourthly, at its best it can enable us to distinguish the Self from the non-Self. But this knowledge of distinction can never be the final stage of knowledge. The ultimate self is bereft of all distinctions and such an integral principle requires a mode of experience which is integral or unifying in its nature. Lastly a negative

understanding that the Self is other than the non-Self must culminate in a positive experience that the Self is Brahman, the infinitely real. Negation that does not grow into an affirmation is imperfect as knowledge. Sureśvara is very emphatic in his doctrine that though reason is essential for understanding the significance of 'Thou' and though this understanding is equally essential for grasping the import of 'That thou art', the significance of 'That' and the identity of 'That' and 'Thou' are matters that must be apprehended through another mode of experience. That mode of experience is brought about by the comprehension of the mahāvākya, 'That thou art'. Such is the harmonization of reason and the intuitive grasp of the central texts of the upaniṣads that Sureśvara works out in the treatise.

(c) Now we come to what the author himself considers as the core of the theme of the third chapter. It is the interpretation of the mahāvākya, 'Tattvamasi'. The sentence consists of three words i.e., 'Tvam' (thou), 'Tat' (that) and 'Asi' (art). The verb 'Asi' asserts identity of being between the meanings of 'Tvam' and 'Tat'. 'Thou' is the logical subject and 'That' is the logical predicate. Syntactical apposition of two terms which have an initial divergence of meanings is called *sāmānādhikaraṇya*.

By the force of the identity affirmed in the sentence, we are to take the meaning of 'Thou' as qualified by the meaning of 'That' and the meaning of 'That' as qualified by the meaning of 'Thou'. This relation between the imports of the two terms is called '*Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva*'. Now let us go to the actual meanings of these two terms. The term 'Thou' signifies the individual self, that is immediate and self-revealing and is also associated with all the finitude and imperfections of mundane life. However self-luminous it may be it is associated with the experience of confrontation by other objects and beings and it is that experience that constitutes the essence of finitude and evil. The word 'That' stands for the ultimate metaphysical principle, all-encompassing and one without a second. The word also signifies that it is something transcending experience, something remote and mediately cognized. A simple identification of the two, the self and the Absolute, is impossible on account of the incompatibility of the characteristics attributed to

the two. Brahman cannot be one without a second and still be one with the individual self which is supposed to be one entity among many entities limiting it by their very being. Nor can the individual self which is immediate and self-manifesting in all experience be one with Brahman supposed to be transcendent of immediate experience.

In the interests of the identity affirmed the significance of the two terms must be revised and pruned down to meet the requirements of identification. Such a radical reduction of connotation is also warranted by the consideration of what is essential and adventitious in the connotation of the two terms. The immediacy of the Self is certainly fundamental to its being and its limitation and the experience of confrontation by non-selves is due to its adjuncts like the ego, inner sense and body. Infinite being is the essential nature of Brahman and its mediacy is due to the misconstruction of the nature of the immediate Self. In the revised and altered interpretation, 'Thou' would signify only the self as immediate and self-revealing and 'That' would only signify the Absolute as infinite and ultimate. The Self's association with evil and the mediate cognizability of the Absolute stand cancelled by the new interpretation. The one-ness of the Self which is immediate with the Absolute which is infinite and ultimate is the final impartite import of the teaching. This last stage of interpretation is what is termed *lakṣaṇa* or signification through implication.

It is not as if immediacy and infinitude are attributed to the absolute self as two different co-inhering characteristics. A comprehension of the implications of immediacy itself will lead to the conclusion that what is immediate really must be infinite and secondless. Similarly what is one and infinite absolutely must be one with the immediately real. It is an insufficient appreciation of the meaning of immediacy that is responsible for the belief in the finiteness of the immediate self. It is again a failure to understand the total import of the absoluteness of Brahman that is responsible for the idea that Brahman is other than the Self. The realization of the immediate and absolute *Ātman-Brahman* is an experience in which all distinctions, whether of subject and predicate or of predicate and predicate or of subject and object are utterly dissolved.

At this stage a question may be posed as to how the mere understanding of the text 'Tattvamasi' liberates the individual from the all-enveloping avidyā. Are we not attributing to it an incredible efficacy? If avidyā is a basic fact of experience as supposed, how can this grasp of a sentence which can at best give us only a mediate form of knowledge, sublimate it?

In answer to this some characteristic points in the Advaitic theory are set forth. In the first place the ātman is ever manifesting itself in all experience and there is no necessity or possibility of its being revealed afresh by any pramāṇa, be it pratyakṣa, anumāna or śabda. All that is required is that wrong conceptions of it or superimpositions of the non-self on it must be removed. In the second place, this is what śruti does even by its mahāvākyas. Even the sentence 'I am Brahman' does not convey the positive information that the 'I' is the absolute reality but that the 'I' is an illusory construction and that Brahman is the only reality. The identity-propositions aim at the elimination of the unreal presentations masquarding as real. It would appear that the author of *Vivaraṇa* would modify this statement but Sureśvara is clear on the point. (See *Pañcadaśī* 8, chap. from 42 to 47). Thirdly by a simple removal of such delusion even verbal testimony can produce apprehension of the most direct type. After all it merely clears up obstacles to the full awareness of what eternally is the only immediate reality.

#### CHAPTER IV

This chapter occupies itself with a recapitulation of the argument of the treatise up to this point and the recapitulation besides being a brilliant improvement in statement in many points is a fine summary. With a view to persuade the faithful that the thesis presented, however sound intrinsically and sustained by the keenest logic, is founded on the great tradition of Advaita promulgated by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, the author proceeds to substantiate its cardinal principles with the authoritative pronouncements of the two venerable teachers. That brings us almost to the close of the chapter. The last sections concern themselves with a question, whose discussion is a fitting conclusion to the entire exposition of



vedānta. The person who attains the final illumination is established in the consciousness of his unity with all and in him divine life abides in all its universality with unveiled effulgence.

He becomes assimilated to his ideal and the ideal becomes incarnated in him perfectly. The dualism of the actual and ideal, or of fact and value is obliterated. Therefore the conflict between impulse and obligation, pleasure and duty is no longer there. Therefore there are no more moral obligations for him. He becomes truly super-moral.

There is need for elucidating this transcendence of the moral sphere. It does not mean that the perfected sage can indulge in evil with impunity. Evil springs from desire which is itself an effect of ignorance. The enlightened sage has these springs of evil destroyed once for all. Even the seeker after enlightenment shuns evil even though he is yet liable to temptation. How can, then, the enlightened and perfected personality be inclined to evil? His transcendence of evil is final and complete. He transcends the good also. But in relation to the good, the transcendence has a different significance. Goodness that implies a moral struggle, is the fruition of a moral effort and is sought after as a necessity is superseded. But goodness is there as a spontaneous expression of nature, not involving either a struggle or a heroic endeavour. The aspect of inner warfare implied in the ordinary notion of morality is left far behind. But the purpose of moral life is fulfilled to perfection. There is the transmutation of the good will into the holy will. In the former the lower nature persists though over-powered and subjugated. The holy will emerges after the extinction of the lower nature, and in it the good exercises undivided power and sway.

This is the state of the jīvanmukta, of him whose liberation is not eschatological hope but an attained blessedness.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

B.U.	Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad
C.U.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
GĪTĀ	Bhagavadgītā
I.U.	Īsopaniṣad
J.S.	Jaimini-sūtras
K.U.	Kaṭha Upaniṣad
M.K.	Māṇḍūkya-kārikā
M.U.	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
U.S.	Upadeśa-sāhasrī

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## नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिः

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तैः सर्वप्राणिभिः सर्वप्रकारस्यापि दुःखस्य स्वरसत एव जिहासितत्वात्तन्निवृत्त्यर्था प्रवृत्तिरस्ति स्वरसत एव । दुःखस्य च देहोपादानै-  
कहेतुत्वाद्देहस्य च पूर्वोपचितधर्माधर्ममूलत्वादनुच्छिन्तिः । तयोश्च विहितप्रतिषिद्ध-  
कर्ममूलत्वादनिवृत्तिः । कर्मणश्च रागद्वेषास्पदत्वाद्वागद्वेषयोश्च शोभनाशोभनाध्या-  
सनिबन्धनत्वादध्यासस्य चाविचारितसिद्धद्वैतवस्तुनिमित्तत्वाद्देहस्य च शुक्तिकारज-  
तादिवत्सर्वस्यापि स्वतस्सिद्धाद्वितीयात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानत्वादव्यावृत्तिः ।  
अतः सर्वानर्थहेतुरात्मानवबोध एव । सुखस्य चानागमापायिनोऽपरतन्त्रस्यात्मस्व-  
भावत्वात्तस्यानवबोधः पिधानम् । अतस्तस्यात्यन्तोच्छित्तावशेषपुरुषार्थपरि-  
समाप्तिः । अज्ञाननिवृत्तेश्च सम्यग्ज्ञानस्वरूपलाभमात्रहेतुत्वात्तदुपादानम् ।  
अशेषानर्थहेत्वात्मानवबोधविषयस्य चानागमिकप्रत्यक्षादिलौकिकप्रमाणाविषयत्वा-  
द्वेदान्तागमवाक्यादेव सम्यग्ज्ञानम् । अतोऽशेषवेदान्तसारसंग्रहप्रकरणमिदमारभ्यते ।  
तत्राभिलषितार्थप्रचयाय प्रकरणार्थसंसूत्रणाय चायमाद्यः श्लोकः ।

खानिलाग्न्यब्धरित्र्यन्तं स्रक्फणीवोद्गतं यतः ।

ध्वान्तच्छिदे नमस्तस्मै हरये बुद्धिसाक्षिणे ॥ १ ॥

## NAIŠKARMYASIDDHI

As all creatures from Brahmā down to the lowest species desire to avoid every kind of pain by the law of their nature, there is an equally natural effort on their part to effect its termination. But pain originates solely through the fact of embodiment and as embodiment is brought about by merit and demerit accumulated in the past, pain does not cease. Merit and demerit, in their turn, arise from deeds good and bad and therefore do not cease. Those deeds themselves spring from desire and aversion, desire and aversion are

due to the ascription of goodness and badness (to external objects and situations), such ascription is caused by the presentation of duality, which presentation occurs owing to the absence of due inquiry, and as all duality arises out of the ignorance of the self-established and secondless ātman, even as silver presents itself owing to the non-observation of the shell in the shell-silver illusion, it does not cease. Therefore the cause of all evil is non-apprehension of the Self. Happiness, unoriginated, imperishable and not dependent on anything else, is the very nature of the Self. This is covered up by ignorance of the Self. Therefore in the total destruction of this ignorance lies the attainment of the *summum bonum*. The destruction of ignorance is accomplished only by the attainment of perfect knowledge and hence such knowledge must be sought. As the object to which the ignorance of self constituting the cause of all evil pertains does not fall within the range of ordinary modes of knowledge like sensory-perception, perfect knowledge could be acquired only through the authority of statements in the scriptures of Vedānta. Therefore this work, purporting to set forth the epitome of the essence of the entire Vedānta, is undertaken. The first verse serves as a prayer for the fulfilment of the desire in this matter and to indicate in a nutshell the theme of the work:

1. I offer obeisance to that Hari, the witness of the intellect, who annihilates darkness (of ignorance) and from whom arises the world consisting of ether, air, fire, water and earth, even as the illusory snake arises from the rope.

स्वसंप्रदायस्य चोदितप्रमाणपूर्वकत्वज्ञापनाय विशिष्टगुणसंबन्धसंकीर्तनपूर्विका  
गुरोर्नमस्कारक्रिया ।

अलब्ध्वातिशयं यस्माद्व्यावृत्तास्तमबादयः ।

गरीयसे नमस्तस्मा अविद्याग्रन्थिभेदिने ॥ २ ॥

To intimate that his (author's) tradition proceeds from sound authority as required by the scriptures, obeisance to the preceptor is recorded through a tribute to his exalted excellences.



2. I bow down in reverence to the great preceptor who cuts the knot of ignorance and whose greatness is unsurpassed.

नमस्कारनिमित्तस्वाशयाविष्करणार्थः ।

वेदान्तोदरसंगूढं संसारोत्सारि वस्तुगम् ।

ज्ञानं व्याकृतमप्यन्यैर्वक्ष्ये गुर्वनुशिक्षया ॥ ३ ॥

The motive behind this reverence is brought out:

3. The knowledge revelatory of Reality, which is contained in the heart of Vedānta and which puts an end to the life of transmigration, I expound herein in obedience to my preceptor's commandment, though it has been explained by others also.

किंविषयं प्रकरणमिति चेत्तदुपन्यासः ।

यत्सिद्धाविदमः सिद्धिर्यदसिद्धौ न किञ्चन ।

प्रत्यग्धर्मैकनिष्ठस्य याथात्म्यं वक्ष्यते स्फुटम् ॥ ४ ॥

The theme of the work is enunciated as follows:

4. Herein will be expounded clearly the essential nature of the Self, which is the sole inmost Reality and whose presence is presupposed by the presentation of the objective world and whose non-manifestation would mean the non-presentation of everything.

विवक्षितप्रकरणार्थप्ररोचनायानुक्तदुरुक्ताप्रामाण्यकारणशङ्काव्युदासेनस्वगुरोः  
प्रामाण्योपवर्णनम् ।

गुरुक्तो वेदराद्धान्तस्तत्र नो वक्ष्यशक्तितः ।

सहस्रकिरणव्याप्ते खद्योतः किं प्रकाशयेत् ॥ ५ ॥

With a view to create interest in the subject-matter of the work, the authoritativeness of the preceptor is brought out by a repudiation of the possibility of there being any defect of omission or commission invalidating the system.

5. On the philosophy of the Veda, presented by my preceptor, I say nothing because of my incompetence. What can a glowworm do towards illumining what has already been flooded by the light of the thousand-rayed sun?

गुरुणैव वेदार्थस्य परिसमापितत्वात्प्रकरणोक्तौ ख्यात्याद्यप्रामाण्यकारणाशङ्केति  
चेत्तन्व्युदासार्थमाह ।

न ख्यातिलाभपूजार्थं ग्रन्थोऽस्माभिरुदीर्यते ।

स्वबोधपरिशुद्धयर्थं ब्रह्मविन्निकषाश्मसु ॥ ६ ॥

It may appear then, as the preceptor himself has completed the exposition of the import of the Vedas, the work on hand proceeds from invalidating motives like love of fame,. Such a supposition is ruled out in what follows:

6. This work is not composed by us for the sake of fame, gain and reverential consideration; it is for purposes of purifying our own understanding by the testimony of those who know Brahman.

अनर्थनिर्णहेतुपुरुषार्थतद्वेतुप्रकरणार्थसंग्रहज्ञापनायोपन्यासः ।

ऐकात्म्याप्रतिपत्तिर्या स्वात्मानुभवसंश्रया ।

साऽविद्या संसृतेर्बीजं तन्नाशो मुक्तिरात्मनः ॥ ७ ॥

What follows aims at stating the burden of the work concerning evil, the cause of evil, the end of life and the means therefor.

7. Nescience, which consists of the non-apprehension of the unity of the self and which is a matter

of our direct experience, is the ultimate seed of saṁ-sāra. Annihilation of it is the emancipation for the self.

पुरुषार्थहेतोरवशिष्टत्वात्तदभिव्याहारः ।

वेदावसानवाक्योत्थसम्यग्ज्ञानाशुशुक्षणिः ।

दन्दहीत्यात्मनो मोहं न कर्माप्रतिकूलतः ॥ ८ ॥

Of the four factors, the means of the end of life remains to be specified and hence the following:

8. The perfect knowledge that arises from the words of the closing portion of the Vedas is the fire that burns away the ignorance concerning the Self and not any action, for action is not opposed to ignorance.

प्रतिज्ञातार्थसंशुद्धयर्थं पूर्वपक्षोक्तिः । तत्र ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्य तावदुपन्यासः ।

मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वाज्ज्ञानं तत्र करोति किम् ।

कथं चेच्छृणु तत्सर्वं प्रणिधाय मनो यथा ॥ ९ ॥

अकुर्वतः क्रियाः काम्या निषिद्धास्त्यजतस्तथा ।

नित्यनैमित्तिकं कर्म विधिवच्चानुतिष्ठतः ॥ १० ॥

किमतो भवति ।

काम्यकर्मफलं तस्माद्देवादीमं न ढौकते ।

निषिद्धस्य निरस्तत्वान्नारकीं नैत्यधोजनिम् ॥ ११ ॥

Now with a view to establish firmly the position thus stated, *prima facie* views are brought forward. Among them, the one that admits knowledge is stated in what follows:

9-11. As release is effected by actions, what is there for knowledge to accomplish? How is that? Listen with an attentive mind. One who abstains from

actions proceeding from desires for earthly or heavenly happiness, discards actions prohibited in the scriptures and performs properly the actions unconditionally enjoined for daily and occasional observance, does not attain states like heavenly existence which are the fruits of the actions from desire and does not descend to low births or hell which are the results of prohibited actions, as he has discarded them.

देहारम्भकयोश्च धर्माधर्मयोर्ज्ञानिना सह कर्मिणः समानौ चोद्यपरिहारौ ।

वर्तमानमिदं याभ्यां शरीरं सुखदुःखदम् ।

आरब्धं पुण्यपापाभ्यां भोगादेव तयोः क्षयः ॥ १२ ॥

As for good and bad actions responsible for present embodiment the objection as well as the answer are common to both the advocate of knowledge and that of action:

12. Those merits and demerits that have caused the present body which gives pleasures and pains to the individual, are to be liquidated through the experience of their effects.

काम्यप्रतिषिद्धकर्मफलत्वात्संसारस्य तस्मिन्नासेनैवाशेषानर्थनिरासस्य सिद्धत्वात्किं नित्यानुष्ठानेनेति चेत्तन्न । तदकरणादप्यनर्थप्रसक्तेः ।

नित्यानुष्ठानतश्चैनं प्रत्यवायो न संस्पृशेत् ।

अनादृत्यात्मविज्ञानमतः कर्माणि संश्रयेत् ॥ १३ ॥

If it be asked as to why the obligatory actions should be performed, as the transmigratory existence is due to the performance of actions through desire and the prohibited actions and as all evil ceases through the renunciation of those two types of action, we reply that evil can accrue from their (i.e. obligatory actions) non-performance also:

13. By the performance of obligatory actions, the retribution due to their non-performance is averted. Therefore ignoring comprehension of the Self, let one resort to actions.

अभ्युपेत्यैवमुच्यते न तु यथावस्थितात्मवस्तुविषयं ज्ञानमस्ति । तत्प्रतिपादक-  
प्रमाणाभावात् ।

यावन्त्यश्वेह विद्यन्ते श्रुतयस्स्मृतिभिस्सह ।

विदधत्युस्यत्नेन कर्मातो भूरिसाधनम् ॥ १४ ॥

This has been said admitting knowledge. But in reality there is no such thing as knowledge about the real nature of the Self. There is no authority teaching the knowledge of the Self.

14. Whatever śrutis are there, along with the smṛtis, they all enjoin with great effort action; hence it is productive of much, including liberation.

स्यात्प्रमाणासंभवो भवदपराधादिति चेत्तन्न । यतः ।

यत्नतो वीक्षमाणोऽपि विधिं ज्ञानस्य न क्वचित् ।

श्रुतौ स्मृतौ वा पश्यामि विश्वासो नान्यतोऽस्ति नः ॥ १५ ॥

It may be contended that this absence of evidence for knowledge is due to our fault. We deny the contention for the following reason:

15. Neither in śruti nor in smṛti do I see anywhere injunction with reference to knowledge inspite of looking for it a great deal. We have no faith in any other authority.

स्यात्प्रवृत्तिरन्तरेणापि विधिं लोकवदिति चेत्तन्न । यतः ।

अन्तरेण विधिं मोहाद्यः कुर्यात्साम्परायिकम् ।

न तत्स्यादुपकाराय भस्मनीव हुतं हविः ॥ १६ ॥

It may be said that there can be undertakings without any injunctions to that effect as in ordinary life. We deny that possibility for the following reason:

16. He who undertakes anything through delusion independent of scriptural injunction for securing spiritual objectives, gains no help thereby. His work is futile like pouring oblations into ashes.

अभ्युपगतप्रामाण्यवेदार्थविज्जैमिन्यनुशासनाच्च ।

“आम्नायस्य क्रियार्थत्वादानर्थक्यम्” इतोऽन्यथा ।

इति साटोपमाहोच्चैर्वेदविज्जैमिनिः स्वयम् ॥ १७ ॥

This follows also from the authority of Jaimini who is acknowledged as a reliable guide and who has comprehended the import of the Vedas:

17. Jaimini, who understands the Vedas, has himself said loudly, as it were, and with gusto that ‘as the scriptures signify actions to be done, statements that do not inculcate actions are of no significance and value’ (J. S. I. ii. 1).

मन्त्रवर्णान्च ।

“कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः” ।

इति मन्त्रोऽपि निश्शेषं कर्मण्यायुरवासृजत् ॥ १८ ॥

The hymn also lays down the same thing:

18. The hymn ‘doing actions let him desire to live for a hundred years’ (I. U. 2) consigns the entire life to actions.

ज्ञानिनश्च वस्तुनि वाक्यप्रामाण्याभ्युपगमाद्वाक्यस्य च क्रियापदप्रधानत्वात्त-  
श्चाभिप्रेतज्ञानाभावः ।

विरह्य क्रियां नैव संहन्यन्ते पदान्यपि ।

न समस्त्यपदं वाक्यं यत्स्याज्ज्ञानविधायकम् ॥ १९ ॥

The desired knowledge can never arise, for the advocate of knowledge seeks it from scriptural statements, and statements have, as their central element, the verbs (which signify actions):

19. The words do not come together in a sentence independent of an action signified by a verb. There can be no sentence, other than the words integrated by the focal point of action, which could enjoin knowledge.

ज्ञानाभ्युपगमेऽपि न दोषः । यतः ।

कर्मणोऽङ्गाङ्गिभावेन स्वप्रधानतयाऽथवा ।

संबन्धस्येह संसिद्धेर्ज्ञानि सत्यप्यदोषतः ॥ २० ॥

There is no difficulty in this position even if knowledge is admitted as a possibility:

20. Admission of knowledge causes no difficulty, for it may stand in relation to action as means or end or as equally important.

यस्माज्ज्ञानाभ्युपगमानभ्युपगमेऽपि न ज्ञानान्मुक्तिः ।

अतः सर्वाश्रमाणां हि वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभिः ।

स्वनुष्ठितैर्यथाशक्ति मुक्तिः स्यान्नान्यसाधनात् ॥ २१ ॥

Thus whether knowledge is admitted or not, it does not follow that liberation is attained only through knowledge:

21. Therefore, to conclude, actions well-performed through speech, mind and body, pertaining to the

recognized stages of life, in accordance with one's powers, bring about release. There is no other means for it.

असदर्थप्रलापोऽयमिति द्वेषणसंभावनायाह ।

इति हृष्टधियां वाचः स्वप्रज्ञाऽऽध्मातचेतसाम् ।

घुष्यन्ते यज्ञशालासु धूमानद्धधियां किल ॥ २२ ॥

The author starts his criticism to show that this is the statement of a wrong position:

22. Such indeed is the speech made in places of sacrifice, by people who are pleased with themselves, whose intellect is nourished by their own constructions and whose vision is enveloped by smoke.

द्वेषणोपक्रमावधिज्ञापनायाह ।

अत्राभिदध्महे दोषान् क्रमशो न्यायवृंहितैः ।

वचोभिः पूर्वपक्षोक्तिघातिभिर्नातिसंभ्रमात् ॥ २३ ॥

The scope of the criticism launched is indicated by the following:

23. Now we will state the objections in an orderly manner in words supported by logic which will destroy the *prima facie* views and that not in the spirit of sophistry.

चतुर्विधस्यापि कर्मकार्यस्य मुक्तावसंभवाच्च मुक्तेः कर्मकार्यत्वम् ।

अज्ञानहानमात्रत्वान्मुक्तेः कर्म न साधनम् ।

कर्मापमाष्टि नाज्ञानं तमसीवोत्थितं तमः ॥ २४ ॥

Release cannot be the effect of action, for it cannot fall into any of the four categories of effects that action can bring into existence:



24. As release is nothing but the elimination of ignorance, action cannot be the means thereof. Just as the error engendered in darkness cannot put an end to darkness, action does not eradicate ignorance.

कर्मकार्यत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि दोष एव ।

एकेन वा भवेन्मुक्तिर्यदि वा सर्वकर्मभिः ।

प्रत्येकं चेद्वृथान्यानि सर्वेभ्योऽप्येककर्मता ॥ २५ ॥

Even if release is admitted as following from action, there is a further difficulty:

25. Is release the effect of one action or of all actions? If of one action, the other actions are useless, and if of all, they have all to be construed as constituting one action (which would be contrary to the strict division of actions into various kinds accepted by the theorists of karma).

सर्वप्रकारस्यापि कर्मण उत्पत्तिर एव विशिष्टसाध्याभिसंबन्धान्न पारिशेष्य-  
न्यायसिद्धिः ।

दुरितक्षपणार्थत्वाच्च नित्यं स्याद्विमुक्तये ।

स्वर्गादिफलसंबन्धात्काम्यं कर्म तथैव न ॥ २६ ॥

All the diverse kinds of actions are associated with diverse effects by the initiating injunctions themselves and as such, there is no residual action to which the effectuation of release may be ascribed:

26. The obligatory action cannot lead to release for it is assigned the function of removing sins. Similarly action prompted by desire is associated with ends like the conducting of the agent to heaven, and hence it also cannot lead to release.

प्रमाणासंभवाच्च ।

साध्यसाधनभावोऽयं वचनात्पारलौकिकः ।

नाश्रौषं मोक्षदं कर्म श्रुतेर्वक्त्रात्कथंचन ॥ २७ ॥

Further, there is no scriptural testimony in support:

27. The means-and-end relation between actions and their fruits of the nature of objectives beyond the present life, is to be ascertained through scriptures. From the mouth of the śruti we have heard of no action as leading to release.

अभ्युपगताभ्युपगमाच्च श्वश्रूनिर्गच्छोक्तिवद्भवतो निष्प्रयोजनः प्रलापः ।

निषिद्धकाम्ययोस्त्यागस्त्वयापीष्टो यथा मया ।

नित्यस्याफलवत्त्वाच्च न मोक्षः कर्मसाधनः ॥ २८ ॥

Moreover, you are repeating what the advocate of knowledge also holds and hence your talk is superfluous. It is like the mother-in-law calling back the guest refused by the daughter-in-law, so that she may exercise the privilege of refusing:

28. Like me you also desire the renunciation of prohibited and desire-prompted actions. Obligatory action is said to produce no result. Hence release is not effected by any action.

एवं तावत् “मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वात्” इति निरस्तोऽयं पक्षः । अथाधुना सर्वकर्मप्रवृत्तिहेतुनिरूपणेन यथावस्थितात्मवस्तुविषयकेवलज्ञानमात्रादेव सकलसंसारानर्थनिवृत्तिरिति पक्षं ब्रूयितुकाम आह । इह चेदं परीक्ष्यते । किं यथा प्रतिषिद्धेषु यादृच्छिकेषु च कर्मसु स्वाभाविकस्वाशयोत्थनिमित्तवशादेवं हितमिवमहितमिति विशेषान् परिकल्प्य मृगतृष्णिकोदकपिपासुरिव लौकिकप्रमाणप्रसिद्धान्येव साधनान्युपादाय हितप्राप्तयेऽहितनिरासाय च स्वयमेव प्रवर्तते निवर्तते च तथैवादृष्टार्थेषु काम्येषु नित्येषु च कर्मसु किं वान्यदेव तत्र प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति । किंचातः । यद्येवं शृणु । यदि तावद्यथावस्थितवस्तुसम्यग्ज्ञानं प्रमाणभूतं लौकिकमागमिकं वा

प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति निश्चीयते निवृत्तिशास्त्रं च नाभ्युपगम्यते तदा हताः कर्मत्यागिनो भ्रान्तिविज्ञानमात्रावष्टम्भादलौकिकप्रमाणोपात्तकर्मानुष्ठानत्यागित्वाच्च । अथ मृगतृष्णिकोदकपिपासुप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तवदयथावस्तुभ्रान्तिविज्ञानमेव सर्वप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं तदा वर्द्धामहे वयं हताः स्थ यूयमिति ।

हितं संप्रेप्सतां मोहादहितं च जिहासताम् ।

उपायान्प्राप्तिहानार्थान् शास्त्रं भासयतेऽर्कवत् ॥ २९ ॥

Thus the position that release is effected by actions (9) stands refuted. Now, with a view to strengthen the position, that all the evils of transmigratory existence are subject to elimination only through the knowledge of the real nature of the Self by an account of the cause of all actions, the author proceeds to say the following:

Here this has to be examined. There are well-known instinctive actions and bad actions. Men distinguish good and bad in the light of their natural empirical reason. Even as a deluded person goes to a mirage to quench his thirst, they endeavour by themselves to attain or avoid what they thus regard as good and bad, through the adoption of means regarded as conducive to the respective ends by common sense. In the matter of actions supposed to lead to higher goods, those prompted by desire and the obligatory ones, is the situation the same? Or is there any other source of motivation? If the question is answered in the affirmative the following consequence arises. If, on the one hand, the source of motivation is true knowledge of reality acquired through empirical modes of knowledge or the scriptural, and if the scripture preaching renunciation of action is not admitted, then those who renounce actions stand condemned, for depending on false authorities they discard actions enjoined by the transcendent authority of the scriptures. If, on the other, it is conceded that all their actions are actuated by false understanding as that of the man seeking to quench his thirst in the mirage, we triumph and you stand condemned.

29. The scripture is like the sun. It sheds light on the means of attaining and of avoiding ends, which men seek or hate through delusion

एवं तावत्प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमप्रमाणावष्टम्भादात्मनो निरतिशयसुखहिताव्यतिरेक-  
सिद्धेरहितस्य च षष्ठगोचरवत्स्वत एवानभिसंबन्धादेवंस्वाभाव्यात्मानवबोधमात्रादेव  
हितं मे स्यादहितं मे मा भूदिति मिथ्याज्ञानं तूषरशुक्तिकानवबोधोत्थमिथ्याज्ञान-  
वत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमिति निर्धारितम् । शास्त्रं च न पदार्थशक्त्याघानकृदिति ।  
अथैतस्यैवोत्तरत्र प्रपञ्च आरभ्यते ।

न परीप्सां जिहासां वा पुंसः शास्त्रं करोति हि ।

निजे एव तु ते यस्मात्पञ्चादावपि दर्शनात् ॥ ३० ॥

Thus it is determined, on the basis of perception, inference and scripture, that the Self is of the nature of infinite bliss and ultimate good while evil, like what is non-existent, cannot in any way affect it, and that wrong understanding based on the non-comprehension of this nature of the Self takes the forms, 'Let good befall me', 'Let not evil come to me' and thus furnishes the motives for all action, even as the misconception of the shell leads to coveting it as silver. The scripture does not confer any power on anything. Therefore, the explanation of this principle follows:

30. Desire or aversion is not put into men by the scripture. They are natural, as they are found in animals also.

उक्तं तावदनवबुद्धवस्तुयाथात्म्य एव विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रेष्वधिक्रियत इति ।  
अथाधुना विषयस्वभावानुरोधेन प्रवृत्त्यसंभवं वक्तुकाम आह ।

लिप्सतेऽज्ञानतोऽलब्धं कण्ठे चामीकरं यथा ।

वर्जितं च स्वतो भ्रान्त्या छायायामात्मनो यथा ॥ ३१ ॥

भयान्मोहावनद्धात्मा रक्षः परिजिहीर्षति ।

पञ्चापरिहृतं वस्तु तथालब्धं च लिप्सते ॥ ३२ ॥

It has been laid down that only he who has not understood the nature of Reality, is addressed by scriptural commandments and prohibitions. Now with a view to show that action is impossible in the light of the nature of the object, the author proceeds:

31-32. Forgetting that the gold necklace is there in the neck already, the wearer searches for it. Similarly the man mistaking in fright his own shadow for a demon, runs to avoid the demon, which in fact is not there. There are, of course, cases in which one seeks to avoid what is really there to be avoided and wants to appropriate what is not really in his possession already.

तत्रैतेषु चतुर्षु विषयेषु प्राप्तये परीहाराय च विभज्य न्यायः प्रदर्श्यते ।

प्राप्तव्यपरिहार्येषु ज्ञात्वोपायाञ्छुतेः पृथक् ।

कृत्वाथ प्राप्नुयात्प्राप्यं तथानिष्टं जहात्यपि ॥ ३३ ॥

Among these four cases in the matter of attaining and avoiding, the principle is exhibited through analysis:

33. In relation to what is to be got and got rid of in reality, one should find out from the śruti the appropriate means in a clear manner and get what is to be got and get rid of what is to be got rid of.

अथावशिष्टयोः स्वभावत एव ।

परिहृतावाप्तयोर्बोधाद्भानप्राप्ती न कर्मणा ।

मोहमात्रान्तरायत्वात्क्रियया ते न सिध्यतः ॥ ३४ ॥

In the remaining two cases:

34. Through enlightenment he must get rid of the illusion that what is accomplished already is unaccomplished and that what is really non-existent is there to be got rid of. This twofold achievement is through enlightenment and not through any action. So these ends cannot be gained by any exertion by way of action.

कस्मात्पुनरात्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यावबोधमात्रादेवाभिलषितनिरतिशयसुखावाप्तिनि-  
शेषदुःखनिवृत्ती भवतो न तु कर्मणेति । उच्यते ।

**कर्माज्ञानसमुत्थत्वाज्ञालं मोहापनुत्तये ।**

**सम्यग्ज्ञानं विरोध्यस्य तामिस्रस्यांशुमानिव ॥ ३५ ॥**

What is the ground for holding that the attainment of infinite bliss and the complete cessation of misery is brought about only by the knowledge of the real nature of the Self and not by action? The reply follows:

35. Action itself arises from ignorance and hence it cannot remove the latter. Perfect knowledge is the antithesis of ignorance, even as the sun is in relation to darkness.

नन्वात्मज्ञानमप्यविद्योपादानम् । न हि शास्त्रशिष्याचार्याद्यनुपादायात्मज्ञानमा-  
त्मानं लभत इति । नैष दोषः । यत आत्मज्ञानं हि स्वतस्सिद्धपरमार्थात्मवस्तु-  
स्वरूपमात्राश्रयादेवाविद्यातदुत्पन्नकारकग्रामप्रध्वंसि स्वात्मोत्पत्तावेव शास्त्राद्यपेक्षते  
नोत्पन्नमविद्यानिवृत्तौ । कर्म पुनः स्वात्मोत्पत्तादुत्पन्नं च । न हि क्रिया कारकनि-  
स्पृहा कल्पकोटिव्यवहितफलदानाय स्वात्मानं बिभर्ति साध्यमानमात्ररूपत्वात्तस्याः ।  
न च क्रियात्मज्ञानवत्स्वात्मप्रतिलम्भकाल एव स्वर्गादिफलैर्न कर्तारं संबध्नाति ।  
आत्मज्ञानं पुनः पुरुषार्थसिद्धौ नोत्पद्यमानस्वरूपव्यतिरेकेणान्यद्रूपान्तरं साधनान्तरं  
वापेक्षते । कुत एतत् । यतः

**बलवद्धि प्रमाणोत्थं सम्यग्ज्ञानं न बाध्यते ।**

**आकाक्षन्ते न चाप्यन्यद्बाधनं प्रति साधनम् ॥ ३६ ॥**

'But', it may be objected, 'surely the knowledge of the Self does not occur independent of diverse factors like the scripture, teacher and disciple. Thus even the knowledge of the Self is a product of ignorance.'

This is not right. The knowledge of the Self rests only on the essential nature of the Self, which is Self-established and the ultimate Reality. It is destructive, therefore, of ignorance and the operative

factors emerging from it. Moreover it depends on factors like the scriptures for coming into being and not for destroying ignorance after coming into being. But the position is different in the case of action. It depends on ignorance both for origination and the subsequent efficacy. Action cannot continue in being to produce its results in the remote future without the sustaining help of other factors in the interval, for its very essence lies in the productivity of future results. It cannot put the agent in possession of the results aimed at like heaven in the very moment of his execution of it (unlike knowledge which is effective instantaneously). On the contrary the knowledge of the Self does not require the assumption of any other form or use of any other means, apart from its emergence into being in the matter of effectuating the good sought through it. How is that? This is the reason:

36. Perfect knowledge, which is strong being based on the right evidences, is not liable to be cancelled. In its work of cancelling errors, it needs the help of no other factor.

स्वपक्षस्य हेत्ववष्टम्भेन समर्थितत्वान्निराशङ्कमुपसंह्रियते ।

तस्माद्दुःखोदधेर्हेतोरज्ञानस्यापनुत्तये ।

सम्यग्ज्ञानं सुपर्याप्तं क्रिया चेन्नोक्तहेतुतः ॥ ३७ ॥

As the position taken is fully defended by reason, the author concludes without any hesitation and uncertainty:

37. Therefore, perfect knowledge is sufficient for eradicating the ignorance that is the cause of the ocean of misery and not action for reasons already stated.

ननु बलवदपि सम्यग्ज्ञानं सदप्रमाणोत्थेनासम्यग्ज्ञानेन बाध्यमानमुपलभामहे यत् उत्पन्नपरमार्थबोधस्यापि कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरगद्वेषाद्यनवबोधोत्थप्रत्यया आविर्भवन्ति । न ह्यबाधिते सम्यग्ज्ञाने तद्विरुद्धानां प्रत्ययानां संभवोऽस्ति । नैतदेवम् । कुतः ।

बाधितत्वादविद्याया विद्यां सा नैव बाधते ।

तद्वासना निमित्तत्वं यान्ति विद्यास्मृतेर्ध्रुवम् ॥ ३८ ॥

‘But’, it may be said, ‘even if perfect knowledge is strong, we have cases in which it is cancelled by erroneous knowledge originating from false sources. It is for this reason that even a person enlightened about Reality is subject to feelings of being an agent of actions and of being an experiencer of pleasure and pains, and to desires and aversions, all of which originate from ignorance. If perfect knowledge had not been stultified such impressions contrary to it would not at all arise.’ This is not true. ‘Why?’ The reply follows:

38. As ignorance has been stultified, it cannot cancel enlightenment. The impressions left by enlightenment arouse the remembrance of knowledge, which does remove the impressions of ignorance.

“कर्मज्ञानसमुत्थत्वात्” इत्युक्तो हेतुस्तस्य च समर्थनं पूर्वमेवाभिहितं “हितं सम्प्रेप्सताम्” इत्यादिना । तदभ्युच्चयार्थमविद्यान्वयेन च संसारान्वयित्वं प्रदर्शयिष्यामीत्यत आह ।

ब्राह्मण्याद्यात्मके देहे लात्वा नात्मेति भावनाम् ।

श्रुतेः किङ्करतामेति वाङ्मनःकायकर्मसु ॥ ३९ ॥

The argument stated that ‘action born of ignorance cannot remove ignorance’ (35) has been strengthened in advance by the consideration of motives of actions etc. (29). In order to supplement it, it is now proposed to show that action involves ignorance and so involves transmigratory existence:

39. °A man entertaining the belief that he is the body belonging to a certain caste, order, etc., becomes obedient to the śruti in his actions of speech, mind and body.



यस्मात्कर्मज्ञानसमुत्थमेव तस्मात्तद्व्यावृत्तौ निवर्तत इत्युच्यते ।

**दग्धाखिलाधिकारश्चेद्ब्रह्मज्ञानाग्निना मुनिः ।**

**वर्तमानः श्रुतेर्मूर्ध्नि नैव स्याद्वेदकिङ्करः ॥ ४० ॥**

As action originates from ignorance, it terminates on the removal of ignorance. The following verse enunciates this principle:

40. If a sage's sense of identity with the body of a particular caste etc. is burnt up by the knowledge of Brahman, such a one dwells above the śruti and he is no longer a servant of Vedic injunctions.

अथेतरो घनतराविद्या पटलसंवीतान्तःकरणोऽङ्गीकृतकर्तृत्वाद्यशेषकर्मधिकार-  
कारणो विधिप्रतिषेधचोदनासंदंशोपवृष्टः कर्मसु प्रवर्तमानः ।

**शुभैः प्राप्नोति देवत्वं निषिद्धैर्नारकीं गतिम् ।**

**उभाभ्यां पुण्यपापाभ्यां मानुष्यं लभतेऽवशः ॥ ४१ ॥**

The other man whose inner sense is enveloped by the dense darkness of ignorance and who accepts conditions leading to action like that of being an agent gets stung, as it were, by commandments and prohibitions and engages in actions:

41. He, not being a master of himself, becomes a god by virtuous actions or goes to hell as a result of unrighteous deeds or becomes a human being if the two kinds of actions are evenly mixed in his life.

आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्ते घोरे दुःखोदधौ घटीयन्त्रवदारोहावरोह्न्यायेनाधममध्य-  
मोत्तमसुखदुःखमोहविद्युच्चपलसंपातदायिनोर्विचित्रयोनीश्चण्डोत्पिञ्जलकश्चसतवेगा-  
भिहताम्भोधिमध्यवर्तिशुष्कालाबुवच्छुभाशुभव्यामिश्रकर्मवायुसमीरितः ।

**एवं चङ्क्रम्यमाणोऽयमविद्याकामकर्मभिः ।**

**पाशितो जायते कामी म्रियते चासुखावृतः ॥ ४२ ॥**

The world consisting of creatures from Brahmā down to the lowest species is an ocean of terrible misery. Births in it are like the

going up and going down of a pot in a water-wheel, placing us in positions high, low and middle, in respect of pleasures, pains and delusions momentary like flashes of lightning. The creature is tossed about by the terrific wind of good, bad and mixed deeds of the past like a dry gourd in the middle of an ocean agitated by a stormy wind.

42. Thus the creature is in constant movement owing to the force of ignorance, desire and action. He takes birth, bound and overcome by desire and dies, enveloped all through in misery.

यथोक्तेऽर्थ आदरविधानाय प्रमाणोपन्यासः ।

श्रुतिश्चेमं जगादार्थं कामस्य विनिवृत्तये ।

तन्मूला संसृतिर्यस्मात्तन्नाशोऽज्ञानहानतः ॥ ४३ ॥

Concerning the matter thus enunciated, with a view to create interest in the student, some authorities are adduced:

43. Śruti has stated this principle for purposes of eradicating desire, for desire is at the root of trans-migratory existence and it is destroyed by the elimination of ignorance.

का त्वसौ श्रुतिरिति चेत् ।

“यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्त ” “इति नु ” इति च वाजिनः ।

कामबन्धनमेवेदं व्यासोऽप्याह पदेपदे ॥ ४४ ॥

Which is this śruti?

44. ‘When the desires are extinguished, the mortal becomes immortal and he attains Brahman here’ (B. U. IV. iv. 7). The text of the vājins says, ‘He who is freed from desires . . . being already Brahman, attains Brahman.’ Vyāsa also says again and again that this life is one of bondage through desire.

एष संसारपन्था व्याख्यातः । अथेदानीं तद्व्यावृत्तये कर्माण्यारादुपकारकत्वेन यथा मोक्षहेतुतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते तथाभिधीयते ।

तस्यैवं दुःखतप्तस्य कथंचित्पुण्यशीलनात् ।

नित्येहाक्षालितधियो वैराग्यं जायते हृदि ॥ ४५ ॥

Thus the pathway of transmigration is explained. Now with a view to put an end to it, how actions become distant and mediate means for release is going to be explained:

45. In the heart of the creature, tormented by sorrow, as a result of some unexpected cultivation of merit and the purification of the mind through the consequent observance of obligatory duties, the spirit of renunciation arises.

कीदृग्वैराग्यमुत्पद्यत इति । उच्यते ।

नरकाद्भीर्यथास्याभूत्तथा काम्यफलादपि ॥

यथार्थदर्शनात्तस्मान्नित्यं कर्म चिकीर्षति ॥ ४६ ॥

What kind of renunciation arises thus is mentioned:

46. As formerly he was afraid of hell, now, as he sees through it, he is afraid of the fruit of the desire-prompted meritorious deeds also. Therefore he desires to engage himself in obligatory duties.

एवं नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानेन ।

शुध्यमानं तु तच्चित्तमीश्वरार्पितकर्मभिः ।

वैराग्यं ब्रह्मलोकादौ व्यनक्त्यथ सुनिर्मलम् ॥ ४७ ॥

Thus by the performance of obligatory actions, enjoined for daily observance and special occasions, the results mentioned below are effected:

47. The mind, purified by the actions dedicated to God, manifests pure renunciation even with regard to high rewards like the attainment of the world of Brahmā.

यस्माद्भजस्तमोमलोपसंसृष्टमेव चित्तं कामबडिशोनाकृष्य विषयदुरन्तसूनास्थानेष निक्षिप्यते तस्मान्नित्यनैमित्तिककर्मानुष्ठानपरिमार्जनेनापविद्धरजस्तमोमलं प्रसन्नमना-  
कूलं संमार्जितस्फटिकशिलाकल्पं बाह्यविषयहेतुकेन च रागद्वेषात्मकेनातिग्रहबडिशोना-  
नाकृष्यमाणं विधूताशेषकल्मषं प्रत्यङ्मात्रप्रवर्णं चित्तदर्पणमवतिष्ठते । अत इदमभिधीयते ।

व्युत्थिताशेषकामेभ्यो यदा धीरवतिष्ठते ।

तदैव प्रत्यगात्मानं स्वयमेवाविविक्षति ॥ ४८ ॥

Because the mind, only as tainted by rajas and tamas, gets attracted by desires as by a bait and is thrown into the slaughter-house of sense-objects, when it is cleansed by the observance of obligatory actions, and its rajas and tamas are expelled, it becomes clear and tranquil, like a well-washed crystal-block; then it does not get attracted by desires and aversions engendered by sense-objects; in that state, the mind wholly purified of all taint, remains like a clean mirror, with an inclination towards only the inmost Self. Therefore the following is stated:

48. When the mind abides purged of all desires, it is then that it spontaneously inclines to merge into the inmost Self.

अतःपरमवसिताचिकाराणि कर्माणि प्रत्यक्प्रवणत्वसूनौ कृतसंप्रप्तिकानि चरितार्थानि सन्ति ।

प्रत्यक्प्रवणतां बुद्धेः कर्माण्युत्पाद्य शुद्धितः ।

कृतार्थान्यस्तमायान्ति प्रावृडन्ते घना इव ॥ ४९ ॥

After this, the actions, having fulfilled their function and having transferred their responsibility to the inclination in the mind towards the Self, reach the completion of their purpose, as it were.

49. The actions having generated in the mind through its purification the inclination towards the Self, and having fulfilled their purpose thus, disappear, like the clouds after the rainy season.

यतो नित्यकर्मानुष्ठानस्यैव महिमा ।

तस्मान्मुमुक्षुभिः कार्यमात्मज्ञानाभिलाषिभिः ।

नित्यं नैमित्तिकं कर्म सदैवात्मविशुद्धये ॥ ५० ॥

As such is the greatness of performance of obligatory actions:

50. Aspirants after liberation seeking the knowledge of the Self must always perform, for purposes of self-purification, actions obligatory everyday and on special occasions.

यथोक्तेऽर्थे सर्वज्ञवचनं प्रमाणम् ।

“आरुरुक्षोर्मुनेर्योगं कर्म कारणमुच्यते ।

योगारूढस्य तस्यैव शम” एवेति च स्मृतिः ॥ ५१ ॥

On the matter thus stated, the words of the omniscient Lord constitute the authority:

51. ‘For one who wants to ascend to yoga, action is said to be the means. To the same person, when he has ascended to yoga, ‘sama (renunciation of action) is said to be the means’ (*Gītā* V. 3). Such is the *smṛti* passage.

नित्यकर्मानुष्ठानाद्धर्मोत्पत्तिर्धर्मोत्पत्तेः पापहानिस्ततश्चित्तशुद्धिस्ततः संसार-  
याथात्म्यावबोधस्ततो वैराग्यं ततो मुमुक्षुत्वं ततस्तदुपायपर्येषणं ततः सर्वकर्मतत्सा-  
धनसंन्यासस्ततो योगाभ्यासस्ततश्चित्तस्य प्रत्यक्षप्रवणता ततस्तत्त्वज्ञस्याविवाक्यार्थ-  
परिज्ञानं ततोऽविद्योच्छेदस्ततश्च स्वात्मन्येवावस्थानं “ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति”  
“विमुक्तश्च विमुच्यते” इति ।

पारम्पर्येण कर्मैवं स्यादविद्यानिवृत्तये ।

ज्ञानवन्नाविरोधित्वात्कर्माविद्यां निरस्यति ॥ ५२ ॥

From the performance of obligatory actions righteousness arises. From the arising of righteousness sins are destroyed. Purity of mind follows from the destruction of sins. From that follows the comprehension of the real nature of transmigratory existence. From that originates renunciation. From that emerges the desire for liberation. Then the search for the means of liberation ensues. Then follows the renunciation of all actions and their means. From that follows the practice of contemplation. From it originates the inclination of the mind towards the Self. From that arises the understanding of the import of the propositions like 'Tat Tvam Asi'. From it follows the elimination of ignorance. Then the Self remains in itself. 'Being Brahman, he attains Brahman' (*B. U. IV. iv. 6*) and 'The freed one is freed' (*K. U. II. ii. 1*).

52. Thus through such a series of links action contributes to the removal of ignorance. But it cannot directly remove ignorance, for it is not opposed to it.

न च कर्मणः कार्यमण्वपि मुक्तौ संभाव्यते नापि मुक्तौ यत्संभवति तत्कर्म-  
पेक्षते । तदुच्यते ।

उत्पाद्यमाप्यं संस्कार्यं विकार्यं च क्रियाफलम् ।

नैवं मुक्तिर्यतस्तस्मात्कर्म तस्या न साधनम् ॥ ५३ ॥

It is impossible that action could do anything directly to bring about release. Nor does that which brings about release require the aid of action. This is going to be brought out now:

53. The result of action must be either the production or attainment or improvement or alteration of something. Release cannot come under any of these four. Therefore action is not the means of release.

एवं तावत्केवलं कर्म साक्षाद्विद्यापनुत्तये न पर्याप्तमिति प्रपञ्चितम् । मुक्तौ च मुमुक्षुज्ञानतद्विषयस्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन सर्वप्रकारस्यापि कर्मणोऽसंभव उक्तो "हितं संप्रेप्सताम्" इत्यादिना । यादृशश्चारादुपकारकत्वेन ज्ञानोत्पत्तौ कर्मणां समुच्चयः संभवति तथा प्रतिपादितम् । अविद्योच्छित्तौ तु लब्धात्मस्वभावस्यात्मज्ञानस्यैवासाधारणं साधकतमत्वं नान्यस्य प्रधानभूतस्य गुणभूतस्य चेत्येतदधुनोच्यते । तत्र ज्ञानं गुणभूतं तावदहेतुरित्येतदाह ।

संनिपत्य न च ज्ञानं कर्मज्ञानं निरस्यति ।

साध्यसाधनभावत्वादेककालानवस्थितेः ॥ ५४ ॥

Thus it has been explained that mere action is not competent to remove ignorance directly. In the argument beginning with the statement 'the scripture sheds light on the means of attaining ends etc.' (29) it has been pointed out that no action of whatever description can be effective in bringing about release in view of the nature of the seeker after liberation, of knowledge and of the Self. How it can mediately and indirectly contribute to the process of liberation has also been brought out. Now it is going to be stated that in the matter of removing ignorance the full-fledged knowledge of the Self is the unique and the best means and nothing else has this potency as a subsidiary or principal factor. First of all it is urged that knowledge as instrumental to something else cannot be the means of release:


54. Action, appropriating knowledge as an accessory to itself, cannot remove ignorance, because action is the means and knowledge is the end and the two, being means and end, cannot be simultaneously operative.

समप्रधानयोरप्यसंभव एव ।

बाध्यबाधकभावाच्च पञ्चास्योरणयोरिव ।

एकदेशानवस्थानान्न समुच्चयता तयोः ॥ ५५ ॥

Nor can the two be combined as equal partners:



55. Because one is the stultified and the other stultifies it, they cannot be co-existent and joined together, even as a lion and a sheep cannot work together in partnership.

कुतो बाध्यबाधकभावः । यस्मात् ।

अयथावस्त्वविद्या स्याद्विद्या तस्या विरोधिनी ।

समुच्चयस्तयोरेवं रविशर्वरयोरिव ॥ ५६ ॥

How is one of them the stultifier and the other stultified? It is this way:

56. Ignorance is contrary to the nature of Reality and knowledge is opposed to ignorance. The two cannot be combined even as the sun and darkness cannot be combined.

तस्मादकारकब्रह्मात्मनि परिसमाप्तावबोधस्याशेषकर्मचोदनानामचोद्यस्वाभाव्यात्कुण्ठता । कथं तत् । अभिधीयते ।

बृहस्पतिसवे यद्वत्क्षत्रियो न प्रवर्तते ।

ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यहंमानी विप्री वा क्षत्रकर्मणि ॥ ५७ ॥

Therefore, he who has comprehended the nature of Brahman-Ātman, which never forms a factor in the context of action, transcends liability to injunctions of all action. How is that? It is explained:

57. Even as a kṣatriya does not engage in the sacrifice *bṛhaspati-sava* and as a person believing himself to be a brāhmaṇa does not undertake the duties of a kṣatriya. . .

यथायं दृष्टान्त एवं दार्ष्टान्तिकोऽपीत्येतदाह ।

विदेहो वीतसंदेहो नेतिनेत्यवशेषितः ।

देहाद्यनात्मद्वक्तद्वत्तत्क्रियां वीक्षतेऽपि न ॥ ५८ ॥



Similar to these illustrations is the case on hand. That is brought home in the next verse:

58. The person who has transcended the body, whose doubts have all been dispelled and who has apprehended his own essential nature by discarding all superimpositions by the method of 'not this, not this', and does perceive the body etc. as non-self, does not even glance at the actions executed by the body.

तस्यार्थस्याविष्करणार्थमुदाहरणम् ।

मृत्स्नेभके यथेभत्वं शिशुरध्यस्य वल्गति ।

अध्यस्यात्मानि देहादीन्मूढस्तद्वद्विचेष्टते ॥ ५९ ॥

In order to explain this, an analogy is offered:

59. Just as a child, taking a clay-elephant to be an elephant, plays accordingly with it, the unenlightened man imagines himself to be the body etc., and behaves accordingly.

न च वयं ज्ञानकर्मणोः सर्वत्रैव समुच्चयं प्रत्याचक्ष्महे । यत्र प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावो ज्ञानकर्मणोस्तत्र नास्मत्पित्रापि शक्यते निवारयितुम् । तत्र विभागप्रदर्शनायोदाहरणं प्रदर्श्यते ।

स्थाणुं चोरधियालाय भीतो यद्वत्पलायते ।

बुद्ध्यादिभिस्तथात्मानं भ्रान्तोऽध्यारीप्य चेष्टते ॥ ६० ॥

We do not discard the combination of action and knowledge everywhere. Where the two stand in the relation of cause and effect, not even our father can repudiate the combination. To bring out the distinction, an analogy is presented:

60. Just as a man taking a post for a robber, runs away in fright, similarly a man engages in action wrongly identifying the Self with the intellect etc.

एवं यत्रयत्र ज्ञानकर्मणोः प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकभावस्तत्र सर्वत्रायं न्यायः । यत्र तु न समकालं नापि क्रमेणोपपद्यते समुच्चयः स विषय उच्यते ।

स्थाणोः सतत्त्वविज्ञानं यथा नाङ्गं पलायने ।

आत्मनस्तत्त्वविज्ञानं तद्वन्नाङ्गं क्रियाविधौ ॥ ६१ ॥

Thus wherever knowledge and action are related as cause and effect, this principle applies. The principle involved in the cases where the two cannot be combined simultaneously or in succession is brought out in the next verse:

61. Just as the understanding of the post as such cannot incite to the action of running away, so also the understanding of the Self in its real nature, cannot be instrumental to any action.

यस्माद्गुणस्यैतत्स्वाभाव्यम् ।

यद्धि यस्यानुरोधेन स्वभावमनुवर्तते ।

तत्तस्य गुणभूतं स्यान्न प्रधानाद्गुणो यतः ॥ ६२ ॥

For what is instrumental has always this nature:

62. That which conforms in nature to another can be instrumental to it and not that which destroys that principal factor itself.

यस्मात् ।

कर्मप्रकरणाकाङ्क्षि ज्ञानं कर्मगुणो भवेत् ।

यद्धि प्रकरणे यस्य तत्तदङ्गं प्रचक्षते ॥ ६३ ॥

स्वरूपलाभमात्रेण यत्त्वविद्यां निहन्ति नः ।

न तदङ्गं प्रधानं वा ज्ञानं स्यात्कर्मणः क्वचित् ॥ ६४ ॥

This is so because:

63-64. The knowledge that belongs to the context of action does naturally serve it as a subsidiary.

What belongs to the context of anything, does become subsidiary to it. Knowledge which, by merely emerging into being, removes ignorance, does not combine with action either as an accessory or as an equal partner.

समुच्चयपक्षवादिनाप्यवश्यमेतदभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । यस्मात् ।

अज्ञानमनिराकुर्वज्ज्ञानमेव न सिध्यति ।

विपन्नकारकग्रामं ज्ञानं कर्म न ढौकते ॥ ६५ ॥

This has necessarily to be admitted by the advocates of the combination of action and knowledge also, for:

65. Knowledge does not arise at all without cancelling ignorance and action does not even touch the knowledge which annihilates all the factors involved in action, for it itself stands annihilated.

इदं चापरं कारणं ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयनिर्बाह ।

हेतुस्वरूपकार्याणि प्रकाशतमसोरिव ।

विरोधीनि ततो नास्ति साङ्गत्यं ज्ञानकर्मणोः ॥ ६६ ॥

The following is another reason for rejecting the combination of action and knowledge:

66. When we examine the source, nature and effect of knowledge, we find that they are all opposed to the source, nature and effect of action and therefore action and knowledge cannot be joined together, as light and darkness cannot be.

एवमुपसंहृते केचित्स्वसंप्रदायबलावष्टम्भादाहुयदेतद्वेदान्तवाक्यादहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं समुत्पद्यते तन्नैव स्वोत्पत्तिमात्रेण ज्ञानं निरस्यति । किं तर्हि । अहन्यहनि द्राघीयसा कालेनोपासीनस्य सतो भावनोपचयान्निशेषमज्ञानमपगच्छति “देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येति” इति श्रुतेः । अपरे तु ब्रुवते वेदान्तवाक्यजनितमहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं

संसर्गात्मकत्वादात्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यावगाह्येव न भवति । किं तर्हि । एतदेव गङ्गास्रो-  
तोवत्सततमभ्यस्यतोऽन्यदेवावाक्यार्थात्मकं विज्ञानान्तरमुत्पद्यते । तदेवाशेषाज्ञानति-  
मिरोत्सारीति “विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः” इति श्रुतेरिति । अस्य पक्षद्वयस्य  
निवृत्तय इदमभिधीयते ।

सकृत्प्रवृत्त्या मृद्नाति क्रियाकारकरूपभृत् ॥

अज्ञानमागमज्ञानं साङ्गत्यं नास्त्यतोऽनयोः ॥ ६७ ॥

After concluding thus, we may notice two other theories. Some, drawing strength from their own tradition, maintain that the know-  
ledge of the form ‘I am Brahman’ which arises from the sentences  
of Vedānta does not dispel ignorance by its mere coming into being.  
What then? One who meditates on this truth every day and for a  
long time develops inward contemplative force, by which ignorance  
in its entirety is removed. The śruti says ‘Becoming a god, he attains  
the gods’ (*B. U. IV. i-2*). Others, again, hold that the knowledge of the  
form ‘I am Brahman’ signifies a complex whole of associated parts  
and therefore does not constitute a correct apprehension of the  
Self at all. What then? In the mind of an aspirant, who practises  
continuously this knowledge itself like the flow of the Gaṅgā, a  
new type of knowledge arises, which is an integral apprehension,  
transcending verbal cognition. It is this new knowledge that expells  
all darkness of ignorance. The śruti says, ‘The brāhmaṇa after  
understanding must proceed to apprehend in a direct manner’.

What follows is in refutation of these two positions:

67. The understanding of the scripture at once  
(without repetition) destroys the ignorance that bears  
the forms of action and the factors involved in action.  
There is no combination of these two.

एवं तावदनानात्वे ब्रह्मणि ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चयो निराकृतः ॥ अथाधुना  
पक्षान्तराभ्युपगमेनापि प्रत्यवस्थाने पूर्ववदनाश्वासो यथा तथाभिधीयते ।

अनुत्सारितनानात्वं ब्रह्म यस्यापि वादिनः ।

तन्मतेनापि दुस्साध्यो ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयः ॥ ६८ ॥

Thus, the combination of knowledge and action, is denied on the theory that Brahman is one divested of all plurality. Now, even if another point of view is entertained, that the rejected combination remains unsatisfactory as before is going to be shown:

68. Even according to the view of the theorist, for whom Brahman does not exclude diversity, the combination of action and knowledge remains equally impossible.

तस्य विभागोक्तिर्दूषणविभागप्रज्ञप्तये ।

ब्रह्मात्मा वा भवेत्तस्य यदि वानात्मरूपकम् ।

आत्मानापत्तिर्भवेन्मोहादितरस्याप्यनात्मनः ॥ ६९ ॥

This position is further analysed so that the criticism also may be presented analytically:

69. Either Brahman is the ātman or it is other than the ātman. If it is the ātman, then its non-attainment is only through illusion. If it is other than the ātman, it ever remains a non-self and neither by knowledge nor by action it becomes one with the ātman.

तत्र यदि तावद्वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेन ब्रह्म प्राप्तमात्मस्वाभाव्यात्केवलमासुरमोहापि-  
धानमात्रमेवानापत्तिनिमित्तं तस्मिन्पक्षे ।

मोहापिधानभङ्गाय नैव कर्माणि कारणम् ।

ज्ञानेनैव फलावाप्तेस्तत्र कर्म निरर्थकम् ॥ ७० ॥

If in reality Brahman is ever attained as one with one's self, on that view, only the demoniac misconception must present it as un-attained:

70. For removing the misconception action can never be the means. As knowledge produces the required result, action in that situation is useless.

अनात्मरूपके तु ब्रह्मणि न कर्म साधनभावं प्रतिपद्यते नापि ज्ञानं कर्मसमुच्चितमसमुच्चितं वा यस्मादन्यस्य स्वत एव साधकस्य ब्रह्मणोऽप्यन्यत्वं स्वत एव सिद्धम् । तत्रैवम् ।

अन्यस्यान्यात्मताप्राप्तौ न क्वचिद्धेतुसंभवः ।

तस्मिन् सत्यपि नो नष्टः परात्मानं प्रपद्यते ॥ ७१ ॥

If Brahman is other than the Self, neither action, nor knowledge combined or uncombined with action can lead to identity with it, for the aspirant is inherently other than Brahman. And again:

71. There can be no means which could bring about the transformation of one entity into another. If it abides as such it cannot become even another and if it gets destroyed in the process then also it cannot be said to have become another.

अपरस्मिन्स्तु पक्षे विधिः ।

परमात्मानुकूलेन ज्ञानाभ्यासेन दुःखिनः ।

द्वैतिनोऽपि प्रमुच्येरन्न परात्मविरोधिना ॥ ७२ ॥

On the other view, the following injunction would be reasonable:

72. Even the dualists undergoing suffering, will attain liberation, by continued meditative knowledge of God in conformity to his nature. They will not gain the result by engaging in anything contrary to the true relation to him.

इतरस्मिन्स्तु पक्षे विधेरेवानवकाशत्वम् । कथम् ।

समस्तव्यस्तभूतस्य ब्रह्माण्येवावतिष्ठतः ।

ब्रूत कर्मणि को हेतुः सर्वानन्यत्वदर्शिनः ॥ ७३ ॥

On the other view, there is no scope whatever for any injunction. How?

73. What is the ground for any action on the part of one who is the microcosm of the totality, has perceived the unity of all beings and who abides only in Brahman?

सर्वकर्मनिमित्तसंभवासंभवाभ्यां सर्वकर्मसङ्कुरश्च प्राप्नोति । यस्मात् ।

सर्वजात्यादिमत्त्वेऽस्य नितरां हेत्वसंभवः ।

विशेषं ह्यनुपादाय कर्म नैव प्रवर्तते ॥ ७४ ॥

Further, as there is jointly the possibility as well the impossibility of grounds of all action, confusion of actions results; for:

74. If one sees himself as belonging to all castes etc. there is no ground for action. Unless one specifically identifies oneself with one particular (caste or station) no action can be initiated.

स्याद्विधिरध्यात्माभिमानादिति चेन्नैवम् । यस्मात् ।

न चाध्यात्माभिमानोऽपि विदुषोऽस्त्यासुरत्वतः ।

विदुषोऽप्यासुरश्चेत्स्यान्निष्फलं ब्रह्मदर्शनम् ॥ ७५ ॥

If it is said that action is possible as the agent identifies himself with one particular body etc., we deny that possibility. The reason is as follows:

75. Since such identification with the body is demoniac in nature, an enlightened man cannot have it. If an enlightened man also can be demoniac, the vision of Brahman would be futile.

अज्ञानकार्यत्वाच्च समकालं नापि क्रमेण ज्ञानकर्मणोर्वस्त्ववस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्सङ्गति-  
रस्तीत्येवं निराकृतोऽपि काशं कुशं वावलम्ब्याह ।

अथाध्यात्मं पुनर्यायादाश्रितो मूढतां भवेत् ।

स करोत्येव कर्माणि को ह्यज्ञं विनिवारयेत् ॥ ७६ ॥

As action is the effect of ignorance, knowledge and action depending on reality and not so depending on it respectively cannot be combined either at the same time or in succession. Though this position has been already refuted it presents itself as if catching at straws:

76. If, by some chance, the enlightened one identifies himself with the body, he is lapsing into stupidity. He certainly performs actions. Who can prevent a fool?

सिद्धत्वाच्च न साध्यम् । यतः ।

सामान्येतररूपाभ्यां कर्मात्मैवास्य योगिनः ।

निश्श्वासोच्छ्वासवत्तस्मान्न नियोगमपेक्षते ॥ ७७ ॥

The ideal is already accomplished and it is not something to be attained afresh. This is so, because:

77. In the yogin, action must be his very Self as universal or particular. It must be so independent of his effort, like respiration. Such being the case, it would need no injunction to that effect.

अस्तु तर्हि भिन्नाभिन्नात्मकं ब्रह्म । तथा च सति ज्ञानकर्मणी संभवतो भेदाभेदविषयत्वात्तयोः । तत्र तावदयं पक्ष एव न संभवति । किं कारणम् । न हि भिन्नोऽयमित्यभेदबुद्धिमनिराकृत्य भेदबुद्धिः पदार्थमालिङ्गते । एवं ह्यनभ्युपगमे भिन्नाभिन्नपदार्थयोरलौकिकत्वं प्रसज्येत । अथ निष्प्रमाणकमप्याश्रीयते तदप्यु-  
भयपक्षाभ्युपगमादभेदपक्षे दुःखि ब्रह्म स्यादत आह ।

भिन्नाभिन्नं विशेषैश्चेद्दुःखि स्याद्ब्रह्म ते ध्रुवम् ।

अशेषदुःखिता च स्यादहो प्रज्ञात्मवादिनाम् ॥ ७८ ॥

Then, let Brahman be looked upon as being both one and diversified. In that case knowledge and action can very well be combined for they involve unity and diversity respectively. In the first place this theory itself is untenable. What is the reason? Nothing can be



conceived as 'different' without denying the conception that it is 'non-different'. If this principle is not admitted the signification of terms 'different' and 'non-different' must be construed in some extraordinary sense. If even this consequence that they are to be conceived in a sense not supported by proper grounds is accepted, the fact that both unity and diversity are affirmed, would imply by virtue of the unity (between jiva and Brahman) that Brahman itself would be subject to misery. Therefore it is said:

78. Your Brahman should be surely subject to misery if Brahman is both identical with and different from the individuals. What is more, all the misery should affect Brahman itself. This is indeed wonderful wisdom on your part!

तस्मात्सम्यगेवाभिहितं न ज्ञानकर्मणोः समुच्चय इत्युपसंह्रियते ।

तमोऽङ्गत्वं यथा भानोरग्नेश्शीताङ्गता यथा ।

वारिणश्चोष्णता यद्वज्ज्ञानस्यैवं क्रियाङ्गता ॥ ७९ ॥

Therefore it is being concluded that the contention that knowledge and action cannot be combined is perfectly sound:

79. Just as the sun cannot be a contributory part of darkness, fire cannot have cold as its part, and water cannot be combined with heat, knowledge cannot be integrated with action.

यथोक्तोपपत्तिबलेनैव पूर्वपक्षस्योत्सारितत्वाद्द्वक्तव्यं नावशेषितमित्यतः प्रतिकर्मवत्पूर्वपक्षपरिहाराय यत्किञ्चिद्द्वक्तव्यमित्यत इदमभिधीयते ।

“मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वात्” इत्याद्यनुचितं बहु ।

यदभाणि तदन्याय्यं यथा तदधुनोच्यते ॥ ८० ॥

By these arguments the *prima facie* view stands refuted (in substance). Nothing more remains to be said. But still the points raised by the *pūrvapakṣin* are answered now (formally) for completing the refutation:

80. Commencing with the statement that 'release is attained by actions' (9) many inappropriate assertions have been made. Now it is going to be demonstrated that all that is unreasonable.

योऽयं काम्यानां प्रतिषिद्धानां च त्यागः प्रतिज्ञायते सा प्रतिज्ञा तावन्न शक्यतेऽनुष्ठातुम् । किं कारणम् । कर्मणो हि निर्वृत्तात्मनो द्वाभ्यां प्रकाराभ्यां निवृत्तिः संभवत्यारब्धफलस्योपभोगेनारब्धफलस्याशुभस्य प्रायश्चित्तैरिति । तृतीयोऽपि त्यागप्रकारोऽकर्त्रात्मावबोधात् स त्वात्मज्ञानानभ्युपगमाद्भवता नाभ्युपगम्यते । तत्र यान्यनुपभुक्तफलान्यनारब्धफलानि तानीश्वरेणापि केनचिदपि न शक्यन्ते परित्यक्तुम् । अथारब्धफलानि त्यज्यन्ते तान्यपि न शक्यन्ते त्यक्तुम् । किं कारणम् । अनिवृत्तेः । अनिवृत्तं हि चिकीर्षितं कर्म शक्यते त्यक्तुं प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्ती प्रति कर्तुः स्वातन्त्र्यात् । निर्वृत्ते तु कर्मणि तदसंभवादुरनुष्ठेयः प्रतिज्ञातार्थः । अशक्यप्रतिज्ञानाच्च । न च शक्यते प्रतिज्ञातुं यावज्जीवं काम्यानि प्रतिषिद्धानि च कर्माणि न करिष्यामीति सुनिपुणानामपि सूक्ष्मापराधदर्शनात् । प्रमाणाभावाच्च । न च प्रमाणमस्ति मोक्षकामो नित्यनैमित्तिके कर्मणि कुर्यात्काम्यप्रतिषिद्धे च वर्जयेदारब्धफले चोपभोगेन क्षपयेदिति । आनन्त्याच्च । न चोपचितानां कर्मणामित्यास्ति त्रसारस्यानादित्वात् । न च काम्यैः प्रतिषिद्धैर्वा तेषां निवृत्तिरस्ति शुद्धचशुद्धिसाम्ये सत्यविरोधादित्याह ।

न कृत्स्नकाम्यसंत्यागोऽनन्तत्वात्कर्तुमिष्यते ।

निषिद्धकर्मणश्चेत्तु व्यतीतानन्तजन्मसु ॥ ८१ ॥

The renunciation of actions prompted by desires and the prohibited actions, which has been advocated, is impossible of observance. What is the reason? Actions that have already been performed can be given up in one of two ways. If the actions in question have already begun to produce their results, they are to be worked out by simply undergoing their results. If they have not begun to be operative in that fashion, they can be liquidated by expiatory rituals. A third way is also there and that is by the realization of the ātman who is no agent of actions. But this is not admitted by you, as you do not admit the knowledge in question. The actions, whose results are not yet experienced and which have not yet begun to

produce the results, cannot be renounced even by a god. If it be said that actions which have begun to be productive of their results, are to be renounced, that is also impossible. When once the actions have been performed, there can be no termination of them except by going through their results or by expiation. What can be renounced is the actions not yet performed but contemplated, for in relation to them the agent is free either to do them or abstain from them. In the case of actions already performed, the renunciation advocated is impossible. Further, the maxim recommends the impracticable. It is impossible to fulfil the resolve that one will abstain from desire-prompted and prohibited actions all through his life; subtle failures are noted even in the wisest of men. Again, there is no authority for this position. There is no scriptural statement to the effect that 'an aspirant after liberation must perform obligatory actions perpetual and occasional, must give up desire-prompted and prohibited actions, and must exhaust the actions already productive of results by undergoing those results'. Moreover, there are infinite actions. There is no limit to the actions awaiting fructification, for the empirical life of transmigration has been there without a beginning. They are not to be put an end to by desire-prompted or prohibited actions, for in the matter of purity and impurity, there is equality between the actions of the past and new ones to be resorted to and hence there is no opposition between them as required. So it is stated:

81. There is no possibility of throwing out in their entirety the numberless desire-prompted and prohibited actions performed through numberless lives of the past.

स्यान्मतं व्यतीतानन्तजन्मोपात्तानां कर्मणाम् ।

क्षयो नित्येन तेषां चेत्प्रायश्चित्तर्यथैनसः ।

निष्फलत्वान्न नित्येन काम्यादेर्विनिवारणाम् ॥ ८२ ॥

It may be suggested that the actions performed in our numberless past lives—

82. Can be exhausted through the observance of obligatory duties, just as sins are removed through expiatory rites. But as the obligatory duties do not produce any fruits, the actions like the desire-prompted ones cannot be nullified by them.

प्रमाणाभावाच्च । कथम् ।

पापापनुत्तये वाक्यात्प्रायश्चित्तं यथा तथा ।

गम्यते काम्यहानार्थं नित्यं कर्म न वाक्यतः ॥ ८३ ॥

There is no scriptural support for this position; for:

83. Scripture lays down that sin is to be removed by expiatory rites. There is no similar scriptural statement to the effect that the desire-prompted actions are to be nullified by obligatory actions.

अथापि स्यात्काम्यैरेव काम्यानां पूर्वजन्मोपचितानां क्षयो भविष्यतीति । तन्न । यतः ।

पाप्मनां पाप्मभिर्नास्ति यथैवेह निराक्रिया ।

काम्यैरपि तथैवास्तु काम्यानामविरोधतः ॥ ८४ ॥

It may be said that the performance of desire-prompted actions themselves in the present life will neutralise the desire-prompted actions of the past lives. This is inadmissible; for:

84. Just as sins cannot destroy sins, even so desire-prompted actions cannot destroy desire-prompted actions, for there is no opposition between the two sets of the said actions.

एवं तावत् “मुक्तेः क्रियाभिः सिद्धत्वात्” इति निराकृतम् ॥ अथात्मज्ञानस्य सद्भावे प्रमाणासंभव उक्तस्तत्परिहारायाह ।

श्रुतयस्स्मृतिभिस्साकमानन्त्यात्कामिनामिह ।

विदधत्युस्यत्नेन कर्मातो बहुकामदम् ॥ ८५ ॥

Thus it is refuted that release is attained through actions (9). It was said by the pūrvapakṣin that there is no scriptural evidence in favour of the knowledge of the Self. That is going to be criticized now:

85. It is true that the śrutis along with the smṛtis enjoin elaborately actions productive of manifold satisfaction of desires. That is because the world abounds in men of desire.

न च बाहुल्यं प्रामाण्ये कारणभावं प्रतिपद्यते । अत आह ।

प्रामाण्याय न बाहुल्यं न ह्येकत्र प्रमाणताम् ।

वस्तुन्यटन्ति मानानि त्वेकत्रैकस्य मानता ॥ ८६ ॥

But quantity is no criterion of truth:

86. Preponderance is no test of validity. The several modes of valid knowledge do not all converge to establish any one truth. Each mode of valid knowledge is confined to its specific subject-matter.

यत्तूक्तं "यत्नतो वीक्षमाणोऽपि" इति-तत्रापि भवत एवापराधः । कस्मात् । यतः ।

"परीक्ष्य लोकान्" इत्याद्या आत्मज्ञानविधायिनीः ।

नैष्कर्म्यप्रवणास्साध्वीः श्रुतीः किं न शृणोषि ताः ॥ ८७ ॥

'That you find,' (15) as you say, 'no injunction with reference knowledge in spite of looking for it a great deal' is due to your own fault. For:

87. Do you not hear the excellent śruti texts enjoining knowledge of the Self and oriented to freedom from karma like the one which says, 'After examin-

ing the worlds secured by merit, a brāhmaṇa should cultivate dispassion, as the eternal is not gained by the transitory works . . . . and let him approach a preceptor for enlightenment etc.'? (*M.U. I. ii. 12*).

ननु “आत्मेत्येवोपासीत” “आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः” इत्यपूर्वविधिश्रुतेः पुरुषस्यात्मदर्शनक्रियायां नियोगोऽवसीयत इति । नैवम् । अपुरुषतन्त्रत्वाद्वस्तु-याथात्म्यज्ञानस्य सकलानर्थबीजात्मानवबोधोत्सारिणो मुक्तिहेतोरिति । विध्यभ्युपग-मेऽपि नापूर्वविधिरयम् । अत आह ।

**नियमः परिसंख्या वा विध्यर्थोऽपि भवेद्यतः ।**

**अनात्मादर्शनेनैव परात्मानमुपास्महे ॥ ८८ ॥**

But passages like ‘Let Brahman be meditated upon as ātman (*B.U. I. iv. 7*) and ‘Ātman is to be seen’ (*B.U. II. iv. 5*) embody injunctions of what is not a matter of ordinary life and thus they inculcate action of the character of meditation. It is not so. The knowledge of Reality which destroys the ignorance of the Self, the root-cause of all evil, and which is the means of release is not dependent on human effort to be the theme of injunction. Even if it is admitted that we have an injunction here, it is not an injunction of something novel.

88. The injunction of exclusive specification between two alternatives or choice among many alternatives may be the case here. We meditate upon the higher Self by the exclusion of the perception of the non-Self.

यच्चोक्तं “विश्वासो नान्यतोऽस्ति नः” इति—तदपि निद्रानुरचेतसा त्वया स्वप्नायमानेन प्रलपितम् । किं कारणम् । न हि वयं प्रमाणबलेनैकात्म्यं प्रतिपद्यामह एकात्म्यस्य स्वत एवानुभवमात्रात्मकत्वात् । अत एव सर्वप्रमाणावतारासंभवं वक्ष्यति । प्रमाणव्यवस्थायाश्चानुभवमात्राश्रयत्वात् । अत आह ।

**वाक्यैकगम्यं यद्वस्तु नान्यस्मात्तत्र विश्वसेत् ।**

**नाऽप्रमेये स्वतस्सिद्धेऽविश्वासः कथमात्मनि ॥ ८९ ॥**

Your statement, 'We have no faith in anything else' (15) is like the talk of one in dream while asleep. Why? We do not uphold the unity of the Self on the strength of authorities, for it is a matter of intrinsic and immediate experience. That is the reason it is going to be shown that it is beyond all proofs and the order of proofs is itself solely dependent on immediate experience. Therefore the text proceeds:

89. What is solely ascertainable through the words of the scripture is not such that it calls for faith on other grounds. How can one refuse to believe in the Self which is beyond all proof and is self-evident?

यदप्युक्तं "अन्तरेण विधिम्" इति—तदप्यबुद्धिपूर्वकमिव नः प्रतिभाति । यस्मात्कालान्तरफलदायिषु कर्मस्वेतद्घटते । आत्मलाभकाल एव फलदायिनि त्वात्मज्ञाने नैतत्समञ्जसमित्याह ।

ज्ञानात्फले ह्यवाप्तेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षे भवधातिनि ।

उपकाराय तन्नेति न न्याय्यं भाति नो वचः ॥ ९० ॥

The statement, 'Anything undertaken independent of injunction, for securing spiritual objectives is like pouring oblations into ashes' (16) seems to us to be due to lack of understanding. That would apply only to actions productive of their fruits at a future date. It would not apply to the case of the knowledge of the Self which produces its result simultaneous with itself.

90. When this consummation of knowledge destructive of bondage can be attained as a matter of immediate perception, to speak of knowledge as being of no help as it is without any supporting injunction (16), does not seem to us to be in accordance with any reason.

यदपि जैमिनीयं वचनमुद्धाटयसि—तदपि तद्विवक्षापरिज्ञानादेवोद्भाव्यते । किं कारणम् । यतो न जैमिनेरयमभिप्राय आम्नायः । सर्व एव क्रियार्थं इति । यदि

ह्ययमभिप्रायोऽभविष्यत् “अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा । जन्माद्यस्य यतः” इत्येवमादि-  
ब्रह्मवस्तुस्वरूपमात्रयाथात्म्यप्रकाशनपरं गम्भीरन्यायसंदृब्धं सर्ववेदान्तार्थमीमांसनं  
श्रीमच्छारीरकं नासूत्रयिष्यत् । असूत्रयच्च । तस्माज्जैमिनेरेवायमभिप्रायो यथैव  
विधिवाक्यानां स्वार्थमात्रे प्रामाण्यमेवमैकात्म्यवाक्यानामप्यनधिगतवस्तुपरिच्छेद-  
साम्यादिति । अत इदमभिधीयते ।

अधिचोदनं य आन्नायस्तस्यैव स्यात्क्रियार्थता ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां ब्रूत कर्मार्थता कथम् ॥ ९१ ॥

The reference to Jaimini's statement appears to be due to not comprehending his intention (17). To Explain: it cannot be the opinion of Jaimini that the entire Veda subserves action. If this were his opinion he would not have composed the sacred *Śārīraka-sūtras* beginning with the aphorisms, ‘Then, therefore, inquiry into Brahman,’ ‘Brahman is that from which the origin etc. of this world proceed’, which embody inquiry into the import of the whole of Vedānta, enshrine a profound logic and which aim at setting forth the essential nature of the Brahman-reality. But he has composed that treatise. Therefore the idea of Jaimini must have been that, just as Vedic injunctions have validity in their sphere of application, the passages of Vedānta speaking of the unity of the ātman must be recognized as valid in their sphere, for there is similarity between the two in so far as both propound what transcends other modes of knowledge. Therefore the following is stated.

91. Whatever is affirmed as supplementary to injunctions subserves the purpose of action. How can statements like ‘That thou art’, which do not belong to this category, be construed as contributory to action?

अपि च । ऐकात्म्यपक्ष इवावृष्टार्थकर्मसु भवत्पक्षेऽपि प्रवृत्तिर्दुर्लभ्या । यतः ।

स्वर्गं यियासुर्जुहुयादग्निहोत्रं यथाविधि ।

देहान्द्युत्थापितस्यैवं कर्तृत्वं जैमिनेः कथम् ॥ ९२ ॥



And again, just as the theory of the unity of the Self precludes action, even on your theory actions productive of unseen results become inconceivable, for:

92. How can on Jaimini's theory, an agent of action of the kind enjoined in the passage, 'He who wants to reach heaven must perform agnihotra-sacrifice in the proper order', perform it when he transcends adjuncts like the body?

न च प्रत्याख्याताशेषशरीरादिकर्मसाधनस्वभावस्यात्ममात्रस्य कर्मस्त्वधिकारः ।  
यस्मात् ।

सर्वप्रमाणासंभाव्यो ह्यहंवृत्त्यैकसाधनः ।

युष्मदर्थमनादित्सुर्जैमिनिः प्रेर्यते कथम् ॥ ९३ ॥

And surely the pure Self, which is devoid of all instruments of action like the body, cannot be the fit subject to undertake action. Further:

93. How can Jaimini, who (as pure self) is incomprehensible through the ordinary modes of valid knowledge, is to be approached only through ego-consciousness, and is separated from every non-Self, be enjoined to act by any injunction?

प्रवृत्तिकारणाभावाच्च । यस्मात् ।

सुखदुःखादिभिर्योग आत्मनो नाहमेक्ष्यते ।

पराक्त्वात्प्रत्यगात्मत्वाज्जैमिनिः प्रेर्यते कथम् ॥ ९४ ॥

And again, there is no cause for action; for:

94. Pleasures and pains are not associated with the Self. They affect the ego. As they are external and objective and as Jaimini is the inner self-luminous principle, how can he be actuated to act?

किञ्च ।

न तावद्योग एवास्ति शरीरेणात्मनः सदा ।

विषयैर्दूरतो नास्ति स्वर्गादौ स्यात्कथं सुखम् ॥ ९५ ॥

And again:

95. In the first place there is no association between the body and the Self. From the objects, the self is farther removed. Then how can the self undergo pleasure in conditions like heaven?

यस्मादन्यथा नोपपद्यते ।

नराभिमानिनं तस्मात्कारकाद्यात्मदर्शिनम् ।

मन्त्र आहोररीकृत्य “कुर्वन्” इति न निर्द्वयम् ॥ ९६ ॥

As it is thus impossible of explanation otherwise:

96. The hymn (*I.U.I.* 2 in 18) ‘Doing actions let him live for a hundred years’ is addressed to one who imagines himself to be a human being and sees factors involved in action as the Self itself and not to one who understands himself as the pure Self without a second.

यच्चोक्तं “विरह्य” इति तदपि न सम्यगेव । तथापि तु न या काचित्क्रिया यत्र क्व चाध्याहरणीया किं तु या यत्राभिप्रेतसंबन्धं घटयितुं शक्नोत्याकाङ्क्षां च वाक्यस्य पूरयति सैवाध्याहरणीया । एवंविशिष्टा च क्रियास्माभिरभ्युपगतैव । सा तूपादित्सितवाक्यार्थविरोधिन्येव नाभूतार्थप्रादुर्भावफलेति । षड्भावविकाररहितात्मवस्तुनो निर्धूताशेषद्वैतानर्थस्यापराधीनप्रकाशस्य विजिज्ञापयिषितत्वादस्यस्मीत्यादिक्रियापदं स्वमहिमसिद्धार्थप्रतिपादनसमर्थमभ्युपगन्तव्यं न विपरीतार्थप्रतिपादनपरमिति ।

धावेदिति न दानार्थे पदं यद्वत्प्रयुज्यते ।

एधीत्यादि तथा नेच्छेत्स्वतः सिद्धार्थवाचिनि ॥ ९७ ॥

What has been further argued *i.e.*, ‘Words do not come together, independent of an action signified by a verb etc’ (19), is not right.

Even admitting the contention, we are not to construe any verb indiscriminately. Only such a verb that can fit into the context of meaning on hand and can answer the requirements of the sentence must be construed. Such a verb we surely recognise. It does not contradict the meaning of the sentence in question and does not signify any action productive of something new. As the subject to be understood is the ātman without the sixfold modifications, that is free from all evil constituted of duality and is self-revealing, verbs like 'am' and 'art', that are capable of signifying self-accomplished actualities are to be admitted and not those of a contrary import.

97. Just as an expression, 'Let him run' is not to be used to indicate the sense, 'Let him give', verbs like '(You) be' are not to be used in connection with the self-existing reality.

न च यथोक्तवस्तुवृत्तप्रतिपादनव्यतिरेकेण तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं वाक्यार्थान्तरं वक्तुमिच्छति शक्यमध्यवसातुमित्याह ।

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां स्वतस्सिद्धार्थबोधनात् ।

अर्थान्तरं न संद्रष्टुं शक्यते त्रिदशैरपि ॥ ९८ ॥

It is not possible to understand sentences like, 'That thou art' as signifying the sense of some other sentence and as not signifying accomplished entities as pointed out:

98. Even the very gods cannot discern in sentences like, 'That thou art' any import other than the revelation of an accomplished reality.

यस्मादेवम् ।

अतः सर्वाश्रमाणां तु वाङ्मनःकायकर्मभिः ।

स्वनुष्ठितैर्न मुक्तिः स्याज्ज्ञानादेव हि सा यतः ॥ ९९ ॥

Such being the case—

99. That release is attained by the proper performance through speech, body and mind, of duties

pertaining to the agents' āsrama etc. (21) is not true; for it is to be attained only by knowledge

तस्मान्च कारणादेतदप्युपपन्नम् ।

स्वमनोरथसंकल्पप्रज्ञाध्मातधियामतः ॥

श्रोत्रियेष्वेव वाचस्ताः शोभन्ते नात्मवेदिषु ॥ १०० ॥

For this reason, the following is also sound:

100. This argument advocated by those whose intellect is nourished by their own wishful ratiocination becomes those who simply go by the Vedas. It does not become those who comprehend the ātman.

## द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

प्रत्यक्षादीनामनेव विषयत्वात्तेषां स्वारम्भकविषयोपनिपातित्वादात्मनश्चाशेषप्रमेयवैलक्षण्यात्सर्वानर्थकहेत्वज्ञानापनोदिज्ञानदिवाकरोदयहेतुत्वं वस्तुमात्रयाथात्म्य-प्रकाशनपटीयसस्तत्त्वमस्यादेवंचस एवेति बह्वीभिरुपपत्तिभिः प्रदर्शितम् । अतस्तदर्थ-प्रतिपत्तौ यत्कारणं तदपनयनाय द्वितीयोऽध्याय आरभ्यते ।

श्रावितो वेत्ति वाक्यार्थं नचेत्तत्त्वमसीत्यतः ।

त्वंपदार्थनिभिज्ञत्वादतस्तत्प्रक्रियोच्यते ॥ १ ॥

## CHAPTER II

It has been demonstrated through much reasoning that only scriptural texts like 'That thou art', capable of revealing Reality as such, can be the source of knowledge, destructive of ignorance which is the sole cause of all evil, because ordinary instruments of knowledge like perception do not pertain to this subject-matter as they are capable of revealing only the elements of which they are the products and also because the Self is altogether different from every object of knowledge. This second chapter is undertaken for removing the cause of the failure to understand the significance of the text.

1. If a person does not understand the import of the proposition 'That thou art' when it is imparted to him, it is because he has not grasped the meaning of 'Thou'. Therefore we will now propound its meaning.

योज्यमहंब्रह्मोति वाक्यार्थस्तत्प्रतिपत्तिर्वाक्यादेवेति प्रत्यक्षादीनामनेव विषयत्वादित्यवादिषं तस्य विज्ञुद्धर्थमनैकान्तिकत्वं पूर्वपक्षत्वेनोपस्थाप्यते ।

कृत्स्नानात्मनिवृत्तौ च कश्चिदाप्नोति निर्वृतिम् ।

श्रुतवाक्यस्मृतेश्चान्यः स्मार्यते च वचोऽपरः ॥ २ ॥

We have declared that the import of the proposition 'I am Brahman' is to be gained from that proposition itself, because ordinary means of knowledge like perception do not apply to this sphere. With a view to establish that position clearly, a *prima facie* view that the proposition is not the necessary means of knowledge in the case is set up for consideration:

2. A man of pure intellect gets satisfactory understanding when the whole realm of non-Self is eliminated through reasoning. Another person understands when he remembers the proposition. Still another person understands when he is reminded by the preceptor of the proposition.

एतत्प्रसङ्गेन श्रोत्रन्तरोपन्यासमुभयत्रापि संभावनायाह ।

वाक्यश्रवणमात्राच्च पिशाचकवदाप्नुयात् ।

त्रिषु यादृच्छिकी सिद्धिः स्मार्यमाणे तु निश्चिता ॥ ३ ॥

In this connection, the case of the fourth person is brought forward, to show that the understanding may be either through or independent of the scriptural proposition:

3. As in the case of the *piśācaka*, merely hearing the proposition brings illumination to the fourth class of persons. In the other three cases the result seems to be a coincidence, but in the case of a man being made to remember, the result is certain and sure.

नायमनैकान्तिको हेतुः । यतः ।

सर्वोऽयं महिमा ज्ञेयो वाक्यस्यैव यथोदितः ।

वाक्यार्थं न ह्यृते वाक्यात्कश्चिज्जानाति तत्त्वतः ॥ ४ ॥

It is urged in reply that the role of the proposition in giving rise to knowledge is not a mere coincidence:

4. All this is the glory of the proposition itself. No one can really grasp the import of the proposition independent of the proposition.

वाक्यं च प्रतिपादनाय प्रवृत्तं सत्प्रतिपादयत्येव सर्वप्रमाणानामप्येवंवृत्तत्वात् ।

नाहंग्राह्ये न तद्वीने न प्रत्यङ्गापि दुःखिनि ।

विरोधः सदसीत्यस्माद्वाक्याभिज्ञस्य जायते ॥ ५ ॥

The proposition, purporting to convey knowledge, does so positively. Such is the nature of all means of knowledge.

5. There is no contradiction for one who understands the sentence 'Thou art that being' in connection with either the ego or the factors other than the ego like the senses or the pure Self or the individual subject to misery.

नाविरक्तस्य संसारान्निविवृत्ता ततो भवेत् ।

न चानिवृत्ततृष्णस्य पुरुषस्य मुमुक्षुता ॥ ६ ॥

6. In one who has not developed dispassion towards the world, no inclination to renounce it will arise. One, in whom the desires are not quenched, does not develop the urge towards release.

न चामुमुक्षोरस्तीह गुरुपादोपसर्पणम् ।

न विना गुरुसंबन्धं वाक्यस्य श्रवणं भवेत् ॥ ७ ॥

तथा पदपदाथौ च न स्तो वाक्यमृते क्वचित् ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ च तावृते स्तां किमाश्रयौ ॥ ८ ॥

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विना वाक्यार्थबोधनम् ।

न स्यात्तेन विनाज्ञानप्रहाणं नोपपद्यते ॥ ९ ॥

विनाज्ञानप्रहाणेन पुरुषार्थः सुदुर्लभः ।

तस्माद्यथोक्तसिद्धयर्थं परो ग्रन्थोऽवतार्यते ॥ १० ॥

7-10. One who has no urge towards release, will not approach a preceptor. Apart from a preceptor there is no hearing of the sacred text. Without hearing the sacred text, there are no words and meanings to be enquired into. In the absence of words and their meanings on what should rational inquiry rest? Without such an inquiry there is no comprehension of the significance of the sacred sentence. Without that comprehension there is no termination of ignorance. Without the termination of ignorance, the attainment of the supreme good is impossible. Therefore, with a view to establish the import of 'Thou' in 'That thou art' the subsequent part of the work starts.

वर्चस्कं त्वन्नकार्यत्वाद्यथा नात्मेति गम्यते ।

तद्भागः सेन्द्रियो देहस्तद्वत्किमिति नेक्ष्यते ॥ ११ ॥

11. Just as faeces, a product of food, is regarded as other than the Self, even so the body along with the senses, being the product of food in the same way, must be regarded as other than the Self. Why is it not so understood?

आद्यन्तयोरनात्मत्वे प्रसिद्धे मध्येऽपि कः प्रतिबन्धः ।

प्रागनात्मैव जग्धं सदात्मतामेत्यविद्यया ।

स्रगालेपनवद्देहं तस्मात्पश्येद्विविक्तधीः ॥ १२ ॥

The food is recognized as a non-Self before consumption and after excretion. What makes it otherwise in the interval?



12. What is non-Self before, is identified as the Self after being eaten through misconception. Therefore a man of discrimination must see it as other than the Self like a garland and a fragrant unguent.

अथैवमपि मद्बचनं नाद्रियसे स्वयमेवंतस्माच्छरीरादशुचिराशोनिराशो भविष्यसि ।

मन्यसे तावदस्मीति यावदस्मान्न नीयसे ।

श्वभिः क्रोडीकृते देहे नैवं त्वमभिमंस्यसे ॥ १३ ॥

शिर आक्रम्य पादेन भर्त्सयत्यपरान् शुनः ।

दृष्ट्वा साधारणं देहं कस्मात्सक्तोऽसि तत्र भोः ॥ १४ ॥

If you are not inclined to accept my words even then, you yourself will develop aversion to it, the storehouse of filth, on scrutiny.

13-14. As long as you are not conducted out of it, you think you are the body. When it is appropriated by dogs as belonging to them, you do not identify yourself with it. One dog takes possession of the dead body by standing on the head and fights with other dogs to drive them away. Seeing that the body is the common possession of you and the dogs, why do you take a special interest in it?

श्रुतिपरिप्रापितोऽयमर्थोऽनात्मा बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्त इतीदमाह ।

बुसव्रीहिपलालांशैर्बोजमेकं त्रिधा यथा ।

बुद्धिमांसपुरीषांशैरन्नं तद्वदवस्थितम् ॥ १५ ॥

This point, that everything from the mind down to the body is the non-Self, is proclaimed by the śruti also. This is pointed out now:

15. Food that is taken in becomes transformed into three parts as the mind, muscle and faeces, just

as the self-same seed exists in a threefold form as husk, bran and grain.

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तौ सत्यां न रागद्वेषाभ्यां विक्रियते विपश्चिदित्यस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये दृष्टान्तः ।

वर्चस्के संपरित्यक्ते दोषतश्चावधारिते ।

यदि दोषं वदेत्तस्मै किं तत्रोच्चरितुर्भवेत् ॥ १६ ॥

तद्वत्सूक्ष्मे तथा स्थूले देहे त्यक्ते विवेकतः ।

यदि दोषं वदेत्ताभ्यां किं तत्र विदुषो भवेत् ॥ १७ ॥

If this truth is realized, a man of knowledge does not get affected by attachments and hatreds. To drive home this implication, an illustration is offered:

16-17. When faeces is excreted and its filthy character is noted, does that finding anger the person whose faeces it is? In the same way, if the gross and subtle bodies are discarded as other than the Self through discrimination and if their defects are noted, can that affect a wise man?

एतावदेव ह्यहं ब्रह्मास्मीति वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ कारणं यदुत बुद्ध्यादौ देहान्ते ह्यहंममेति निस्सन्धिबन्धनो ग्रहः । तद्व्यतिरेके हि न कुतश्चिद्विभज्यत एकल एव प्रत्यगात्मन्यवतिष्ठत इत्याह ।

रिपौ बन्धौ स्वदेहे च समैकान्त्यं प्रपश्यतः

विवेकिनः कुतः कोपः स्वदेहावयवेष्विव ॥ १८ ॥

Just this, the delusion concerning adjuncts from mind down to the body of the form 'I am that' and 'That belongs to me', a delusion that fastens itself close, is the cause of the non-comprehension of the import of the dictum 'I am Brahman'. If that were to be eradicated, one ceases to be divided from anyone whatever, and abides in the integral inner reality. This is said now:

18. How can the discerning seer who sees equally the self-same ātman in the enemy and the kindred and in his own body also, be angry with any one? Can one be angry with parts of his own body? The cases are exactly similar.

इतश्चानात्मा देहादिः ।

घटादिवच्च दृश्यत्वात्तरेव करणैर्दृशेः ।

स्वप्ने चानन्वयाज्ज्ञयो देहोऽनात्मेति सूरिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

For these further reasons also the body etc. are not the Self.

19. Just as the objects admittedly other than the Self like a jar are objects of perception through the senses, the body is also an object perceived through the same senses. In dreams the body of the waking state does not persist. Therefore it must be judged by the wise as other than the Self.

देहादिकार्यकरणसंघातव्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकदर्शिनः प्रत्यक्षत एव विरुद्धं कार्यमुपलभ्यते ।

चतुर्भिरुह्यते यत्तत्सर्वशक्त्या शरीरकम् ।

तूलायते तदेवाहंधियाघ्रातमचेतसाम् ॥ २० ॥

By simple observation we can study the differences that follow from the immanence and the separation of Self in relation to the complex aggregate of effects and instruments that is the body etc.:

20. A body is carried by four persons with all their strength. But the same body is light to a foolish person who lives in it with the sense of identity.

प्रसिद्धत्वाप्रकरणार्थोपसंहारायाह ।

स्थूलं युक्त्या निरस्यैवं नभसो नीलतामिव ।

देहं सूक्ष्मं निराकुर्यादतो युक्तिभिरात्मनः ॥ २१ ॥

As this is a familiar matter, the conclusion is sought to be drawn:

21. Thus through reasoning the gross body must be differentiated from the Self as we differentiate blueness from the sky. In a similar fashion the subtle body must also be discriminated by reasoning.

कथं देहं सूक्ष्मं निराकुर्यादिति । उच्यते ।

अहंममत्वयत्नेच्छा नात्मधर्माः कृशत्ववत् ।

कर्मत्वेनोपलभ्यत्वादपायित्वाच्च वस्त्रवत् ॥ २२ ॥

How is the subtle body to be distinguished from the Self? On these lines:

22. The ego-consciousness, the feeling of mine-ness, will and desire are not the attributes of the Self just as leanness, for example, is not the attribute of the Self, for they are experienced as objective and they are subject to cessation. In the latter respect they are like the garment one may wear.

वैधर्म्ये दृष्टान्तः ।

नोष्णिमानं दहत्यग्निः स्वरूपत्वाद्यथा ज्वलन् ।

तथैवात्मात्मनो विद्यादहं नैवाविशेषतः ॥ २३ ॥

To indicate the distinction, an analogy is offered:

23. The blazing fire does not burn up its own heat, for heat is its very nature. In the same way the Self could never objectify the ego etc., if they were constitutive of its very nature.

एकस्यात्मनः कर्मकर्तृभावः सर्वथा नोपपद्यत इति श्रुत्वा मीमांसकः प्रत्य-  
वतिष्ठते । अहंप्रत्ययग्राह्यत्वाद्ग्राहक आत्मेति तन्निवृत्त्यर्थमाह ।

यत्कर्मको हि यो भावो नासौ तत्कर्तृको यतः ।

घटप्रत्ययवत्तस्मान्नाहं स्याद्द्रष्टृकर्मकः ॥ २४ ॥

The Mīmāṃsaka, hearing that the Self can never be both the subject and the object, raises his objection. He holds that the self is cognized through the notion of the ego and is also the cognizing Self. That is refuted now:

24. No idea, which has a particular object, can have that object itself as the subject. Just like the notion of, say, a jar, the notion of the ego cannot have as its object the seer himself.

अत्राह प्रत्यक्षेणात्मनः कर्मकर्तृत्वाभ्युपगमे तत्पादोपजीविनानुमानेन प्रत्यक्षोत्सारणमयुक्तमिति चोद्यं तन्निराकरणाय प्रत्यक्षोपन्यासः ।

यत्र यो दृश्यते द्रष्टा तस्यैवासौ गुणो न तु ।

द्रष्टृस्थं दृश्यतां यस्मान्नैवेयाद्द्रष्टृबोधवत् ॥ २५ ॥

Here it may be objected: Perception reveals the ego as both the subject and the object. The other ways of knowing are subordinate to perception as they rest on its support. How can they negate the deliverance of perception? To answer this, perception is considered:

25. That which is perceived in some locus, is a quality of that locus and not that of the perceiver. What belongs to the perceiver himself is never an object of perception, even as consciousness belonging to the perceiver never becomes the object of perception.

प्रत्यक्षेणैव भवदभिमतस्य प्रत्यक्षस्याभासीकृतत्वात्तुस्थमेवानुमानम् । अतस्तदेव प्रक्रियते तत्र च विकल्पद्वेषणाभिधानम् ।

नात्मना न तदंशेन गुणः स्वस्थोऽवगम्यते ।

अभिन्नत्वात्समत्वाच्च निरंशत्वादकर्मतः ॥ २६ ॥

As perception itself falsifies your perception, the reasoning distinguishing the Self from the ego is quite secure. Therefore, the same is supported in another way and alternative formulations of the *prima facie* view are criticized:

26. A quality residing in the Self is not grasped either by the Self as a whole or by a part of it, for, there is no difference between what grasps and what is grasped, the 'grasper' and 'grasped' are homogeneous in nature, the Self is not composite and it is not an object.

न युगपन्नापि क्रमेणोभयथा चैकस्य धर्मिणो ग्राह्यग्राहकत्वमुपपद्यत इति प्रतिपादनायाह ।

द्रष्टृत्वेनोपयुक्तत्वात्तदेव स्यान्न दृश्यता ।

कालान्तरे चेद्दृश्यत्वं न ह्यद्रष्टृकमिष्यते ॥ २७ ॥

To demonstrate that the same substantive entity cannot be both the cognizer and cognized either simultaneously or in succession or both ways, the following is stated:

27. As the Self is taken up wholly in being the cognizer, it cannot fall outside itself and be at the same time the cognized also. If it becomes the cognized at a different time, the act of that cognition must take place without a subject to cognize.

सन्तु काममनात्मधर्मा ममत्वादयो यथोक्तन्यायबलादनात्मतयैव च तेषु व्यवहारावहंरूपस्य तु प्रत्यगात्मसंबन्धितयैव प्रसिद्धेरहं ब्रह्मास्मीति श्रुतेश्चानात्म-धर्मत्वमयुक्तमिति चेत्तन्न ।

अहंधर्मस्त्वभिन्नश्चेदहंब्रह्मेति वाक्यतः ।

गौरोऽहमित्यनैकान्तो वाक्यं तद्व्यपनेतुं तत् ॥ २८ ॥

Let qualities like 'mineness' be ascribed to the non-Self on the argument stated as they are perceived as non-self. But the 'I' (ego)

presents itself as integral to the inner cognizing Self itself. Śruti also says 'I am Brahman'. As such to relegate the ego to the non-Self is untenable. This argument is rejected as follows:

28. On the authority of the text 'I am Brahman' if the ego is identified with the Self, the same should hold in the case of the idea 'I am fair'. But the sentence 'I am Brahman' removes that supposition.

कथं वाक्यं तन्व्यपनेतुं तदिति । उच्यते ।

योऽयं स्थाणुः पुमानेष पुंश्रिया स्थाणुधीरिव ।

ब्रह्मास्मीतिश्रियाशेषा ह्यहंबुद्धिर्निवर्त्यते ॥ २९ ॥

How does the sentence remove that supposition? As follows:

29. When one says, 'This post is a man' the idea of the post is cancelled by the idea of man. Similarly the sentence, 'I am Brahman' sets up the idea that sublates the whole idea of the 'I'.

अहंपरिच्छेदव्यावृत्तौ न किञ्चिदव्यावृत्तं द्वैतजातमवशिष्यते द्वितीयसंबन्धस्य तन्मूलत्वात् । अत आह ।

निवृत्तायामहंबुद्धौ ममधोः प्रविलीयते ।

अहंबीजा हि सा सिध्येत्तमोऽभावे कुतः फणी ॥ ३० ॥

When once the determination of oneself as the 'I' is sublated, no duality whatever remains unsublated, for all relation to an 'other' is rooted in that. Therefore it is said:

30. When the idea of 'I' is removed, the idea of 'mine' dissolves. The latter idea emanates from the I-consciousness. When there is no darkness, how can there be the (illusory) snake?

विवक्षितदृष्टान्तशिक्षापनाय दृष्टान्तव्याख्या ।

तमोऽभिभूतचित्तो हि रज्ज्वां पश्यति रोषणम् ।

भ्रान्त्या भ्रान्त्या विना तस्मान्नोरगं स्रजि वीक्षते ॥ ३१ ॥

The analogy is interpreted to bring out the intended point in it:

31. He whose intelligence is hampered by darkness sees the snake in the rope in illusion. In the absence of the illusion the snake would not be seen.

अनन्वयाच्च नात्मधर्मोऽहंकारः ।

आत्मनश्चेदहंधर्मो यायान्मुक्तिसुषुप्तयोः ।

यतो नान्वेति तेनायमन्यदीयो भवेदहम् ॥ ३२ ॥

The ego is not the character of Self, for it does not attach itself to the Self always:

32. If the ego characterizes the Self, it must persist in deep sleep and the state of liberation. Since it does not so persist it must be construed as belonging to something alien.

आत्मधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपरिहार्यदोषप्रसक्तिश्च ।

यद्यात्मधर्मोऽहंकारो नित्यत्वं तस्य बोधवत् ।

नित्यत्वे मोक्षशास्त्राणां वैयर्थ्यं प्राप्नुयाद्भ्रुवम् ॥ ३३ ॥

If it is regarded as belonging to the Self inherently, unavoidable difficulties issue therefrom:

33. In case the ego inheres in the Self, it will have to be considered eternal like consciousness. If it is eternal, the scriptures preaching liberation would all be futile.



स्यात्परिहारः स्वाभाविकधर्मत्वाभ्युपगमेऽप्याम्नादिफलवदिति चेत्तन्न ।

आम्नादेः परिणामित्वाद्गुणहानिर्गुणान्तरैः ।

अविकारि तु तद्ब्रह्म “न हि द्रष्टुरि”ति श्रुतेः ॥ ३४ ॥

The difficulty may be sought to be solved by supposing that though a natural character of the Self, the ego-hood, can be subject to cessation like the passing, though natural, qualities of fruits like the mango. It cannot be so:

34. The fruits like the mango are subject to change and hence the taste of one condition may be replaced by other tastes in other conditions. But Brahman is unchanging and the śruti says ‘the seer’s seeing is inextinguishable’ (B. U. IV. iii. 23).

अहंकारस्य चागमापायित्वात्तद्धर्मिणश्चानित्यत्वं प्राप्नोति ।

आगमापायिनिष्ठत्वादनित्यत्वमियाहृदिः ।

उपयन्नापयन्धर्मो विकरोति हि धर्मिणम् ॥ ३५ ॥

Since the ego appears and disappears, the Self in which it is supposed to inhere, would not be eternal:

35. Consciousness, if it contains what comes in-to being and goes out of being, would not be eternal. A quality, if it could arise and cease to be in its substratum, would infect the latter with change.

अस्त्वनित्यत्वं कमुपालभेमहि प्रमाणोपपन्नत्वादिति चेत्तन्न ।

सदाविलुप्तसाक्षित्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं न पार्यते ।

अपह्नोतुं घटस्येव कुशाग्रीयधियात्मनः ॥ ३६ ॥

Let the Self be non-eternal. Whom can we reproach about it, if it is a hard fact established by unimpeachable evidence? This is not so:

36. The self-evident fact of the Self being a time-less observer cannot be denied. Even the subtlest intellect cannot prove that the Self is subject to change like objects such as a jar.

एतस्माच्च हेतोरहंकारस्यानात्मधर्मत्वमवसीयताम् ।

प्रमाणैश्चावगम्यत्वाद्घटादिवदहंशेः ।

यतो राद्धिः प्रमाणानां स कथं तैः प्रसिध्यति ॥ ३७ ॥

On this further ground also, let it be understood that the ego is the character of something other than the Self:

37. The ego is to be cognized like a jar through means of knowledge like perception and hence in relation to the Self stands on the same footing. But that which is presupposed by such means of knowledge as their very foundation is not to be established through them. (The Self is not dependent on proofs for all proofs depend on it.)

धर्मधर्मिणोश्चेतरेतरविरुद्धात्मकत्वादसङ्गतिः ।

धर्मिणश्च विरुद्धत्वान्न दृश्यगुणसङ्गतिः ।

मारुतान्दोलितज्वालं शैत्यं नाग्निं सिसृप्सति ॥ ३८ ॥

Further, the Self and ego are mutually opposed in nature and therefore they cannot be really related as substance and attribute:

38. Even as cold cannot belong to fire blazing by the aid of wind, the attribute that belongs to the realm of the seen, cannot belong to the seer, for they are mutually opposed in nature.

तस्माद्विन्नवधमुपगम्यताम् ।

दृष्टृत्वं दृश्यता चैव नैकस्मिन्नेकदा क्वचित् ।

दृश्यदृश्यो न च दृष्टा दृष्टुर्दृशी दृशिर्न च ॥ ३९ ॥

Therefore, let this be confidently acknowledged:

39. The self-same principle cannot be at once the seer and the seen. The seer is not seen by what is itself seen by him. The seeing cannot see its own seer.

सर्वसंख्यवहारलोपश्च प्राप्नोति । यस्मात् ।

द्रष्टापि यदि दृश्याया आत्मेयात्कर्मतां धियः ।

यौगपद्यमदृश्यत्वं वैयर्थ्यं चाप्नुयाच्छ्रुतिः ॥ ४० ॥

If the position stated is not accepted, life becomes impossible. Why?

40. If the seer were to be objectified by the intellect, which itself is the seen in relation to the seer, then both the seeing self and the seen intellect, should simultaneously be both seeing and seen. As both are seers, there should be no object of seeing. And śruti would be useless in that case.

कुतः । यस्मात् ।

नालुप्तद्रष्टेर्दृश्यत्वं दृश्यत्वे द्रष्टृता कुतः ।

स्याच्चेद्दृष्टेर्निरुद्धं जगद्वा स्यादसाक्षिकम् ॥ ४१ ॥

The reason for this follows:

41. What is characterized by inextinguishable seeing, can never be an object to be seen. If it is an object to be seen, how can it be the seer? Either there should be only the seer with nothing to be seen, or the world should be seer-less.

उक्तयुक्तिं दृढीकर्तुमागमोदाहरणोपन्यासः ।

आर्तमन्यदृशेः सर्वं “नेति नेती”ति चासकृत् ।

वदन्ती निर्गुणं ब्रह्म कथं श्रुतिरुपेक्ष्यते ॥ ४२ ॥

To confirm the reasoning formulated, scriptural statements are advanced:

42. How can the śruti be ignored which repeatedly asserts the attributeless Brahman and denies everything other than the seeing consciousness as insubstantial by saying 'Not this, not this' (*B. U. II. iii. 6*).

“महाभूतान्यहंकार” इत्येतत्क्षेत्रमुच्यते ।

न दृशेद्वैतयोगोऽस्ति विश्वेश्वरमतादपि ॥ ४३ ॥

43. The Lord says that the gross element, the the ego, etc, are constitutive of the field (*Gītā, XIII. 5-6*). Even in his view the ultimate consciousness does not get mixed up with the realm of duality.

अधुना प्रकृतार्थोपसंहारः ।

एवमेतद्विरुद्धज्ञेयं मिथ्यासिद्धमनात्मकम् ।

मोहमूलं सुदुर्बोधं द्वैतं युक्तिभिरात्मनः ॥ ४४ ॥

Now the discussion on hand is being concluded:

44. Thus this world of duality, falsely presenting itself, phenomenal in nature, rooted in error and eluding rational scrutiny, must be clearly distinguished from the Self through reason.

कुतो मिथ्यासिद्धत्वं द्वैतस्येति चेत् ।

न पृथङ्नात्मना सिद्धिरात्मनोऽन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।

आत्मवत्कल्पितस्तस्मादहंकारादिरात्मनि ॥ ४५ ॥

How is it established that duality is a false presentation?

45. Nothing that is other than the Self, is found apart from the Self, nor in the Self. Therefore pheno-

mena like the ego are fictitious constructions wrongly imagined to be the Self.

तस्मादज्ञानविजृम्भितमेतत् ।

दृश्याः शब्दादयः क्लृप्ता द्रष्टृ च ब्रह्म निर्गुणम् ।

अहं तदुभयं बिभ्रद्भ्रान्तिमात्मनि यच्छति ॥ ४६ ॥

Therefore, all this is the display of ignorance:

46. The objects are false constructions. The seer of them, namely, the Brahman, is attributeless. The ego, which bears within itself both of them, sets up illusions within the Self.

तत एवेयमभिन्नस्यात्मनो भेदबुद्धिः ।

दृगेका सर्वभूतेषु भाति दृश्यैरनेकवत् ।

जलभाजनभेदेन मयूखस्रग्विभेदवत् ॥ ४७ ॥

It is by virtue of this that there is the idea of plurality with reference to the Self, though intrinsically it is absolutely one and undivided:

47. Consciousness, which is one, appears as manifold owing to association with the multiplicity of objective phenomena. It is like the same sun appearing many owing to reflection in many vessels of water.

यथोक्तार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये दृष्टान्तः ।

मित्रोदासीनशत्रुत्वं यथैकस्यान्यकल्पनात् ।

अभिन्नस्य चित्तेस्तद्वद्भेदोऽन्तःकरणाश्रयः ॥ ४८ ॥

To facilitate the understanding of the principle enunciated, an analogy is offered:

48. The same individual becomes a friend, a stranger and an enemy in relation to three classes of

other individuals. Even so the same undivided consciousness appears divided owing to association with a plurality of minds.

अपहारो यथा भानोः सर्वतो जलपात्रकैः ।

तत्क्रियाकृतिदेशाप्तिस्तथा बुद्धिभिरात्मनः ॥ ४९ ॥

49. Just as the sun is taken possession of, as it were, by several vessels of water and seems to enter into the place, form and operations of each of them, so it seems to happen to the Self in relation to the minds.

न च विरुद्धधर्मणामेकत्रानुपपत्तिः । किं कारणम् ।

कल्पितानामवस्तुत्वात्स्यादेकत्रापि संभवः ।

कमनीयाशुचिः स्वाद्वीत्येकस्यामिव योषिति ॥ ५० ॥

There is no impossibility in contradictory attributes co-inhering in the same substratum. Because:

50. Fancied constructions, even if contradictory, can very well be referred to the same locus. The same maiden may be looked upon as charming, impure and delicious.

न चायं क्रियाकारकफलात्मक आभास ईषदपि परमार्थवस्तु स्पृशति तस्य मोहमात्रोपादानत्वात् ।

अमृताभिनिवेशेन स्वात्मानं वञ्चयत्ययम् ।

असत्यपि द्वितीयेऽर्थे सोमशर्मपिता यथा ॥ ५१ ॥

This fictitious presentation of the nature of action, factors involved in action and the result of action, does not affect ultimate reality even in the least, being solely the product of delusion.

51. Even though there is nothing second to the Self, the world deceives itself by interesting itself in the unreal, just as the father of Somaśarman did.

वस्तुयाथात्म्यानवबोधपटलावनद्धाक्षः सन् ।

सुभ्रूः सुनासा सुमुखी सुनेत्रा चारुहासिनी ।

कल्पनामात्रसंमोहाद्रामेत्यालिङ्गतेऽशुचिम् ॥ ५२ ॥

One whose vision is blocked by the non-apprehension of Reality—

52. Embraces, under the delusion born of mere fancy, a thing impure, calling it a beautiful woman, with eyebrows, nose, face, eyes and smiles, all charming.

सर्वस्यानर्थजातस्य जिहासितस्य मूलमहंकार एव तस्यात्मानात्मोपरागात् ।  
न तु परमार्थत आत्मनोऽविद्यया तत्कार्येण वा संबन्धोऽभूदस्ति भविष्यति वा तस्या-  
परिलुप्तदृष्टिस्वाभाव्यात् ।

दृश्यानुरक्तं तद्द्रष्टृ दृश्यं द्रष्टृनुरञ्जितम् ।

अहंवृत्त्योभयं रक्तं तन्नाशेऽद्वैततात्मनः ॥ ५३ ॥

The root-cause of all the evil in the world, hated by creatures, is the ego, for it brings together in itself the Self and the non-Self. In reality, the Self transcends all connection with nescience and its effects, in the past, present and future, for the self has as its essential nature pure consciousness that is eternal and inextinguishable.

53. That seer is conjoined to the seen and the seen is conjoined to the seer. Both of them are conjoined in and through the functioning of the ego. On the elimination of the ego, the Self abides in perfect non-duality.

इह केचिच्चोदयन्ति योऽयमन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामनात्मतयोत्सारितोऽहंकारो वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तये सोऽयं विपरीतार्थः संवृत्तो यस्मादहं ब्रह्मास्मीति ब्रह्माहंपदार्थयोः सामानाधिकरण्यश्रवणादनात्मार्थेन सामानाधिकरण्यं प्राप्नोति । वक्तव्या च प्रत्यगात्मनि तस्य वृत्तिरिति सोच्यते प्रसिद्धलक्षणागुणवृत्तिभिः ।

नाज्ञासिषमिति प्राह सुषुप्तादुत्थितोऽपि हि ।

अयोदाहादिवत्तेन लक्षणं परमात्मनः ॥ ५४ ॥

प्रत्यक्त्वादतिसूक्ष्मत्वादात्मदृष्टचनुशीलनात् ।

अतो वृत्तीर्विहायान्या ह्यहंवृत्त्योपलक्ष्यते ॥ ५५ ॥

आत्मना चाविनाभावमथवा विलयं व्रजेत् ।

न तु पक्षान्तरं यायादतश्चाहंधियोच्यते ॥ ५६ ॥

Here some raise this objection: The ego has been discarded as the non-Self by reasoning for the sake of comprehending the meaning of the Vedāntic sentence, 'I am Brahman'. But the upshot comes to be contrary to the purpose on hand. In the sentence, 'I am Brahman' the imports of 'I' and 'Brahman' are identified and that would amount to an identification of Brahman with what is other than the Self. For clearing the position, how the term 'I' signifies the inmost Self must be explained, by a consideration of the three types of signification, i.e., the primary reference, reference through implication and reference through attributive affinity. That is going to be done now:

54-56. One who wakes up from deep sleep says, 'I did not know anything in sleep'. Here the term 'I' signifies the pure Self as the ego is suspended in sleep. When we say that the iron burns, we mean that fire by which the iron has become red-hot burns and not the iron as such. Similarly in the sentence, 'I am Brahman', the term 'I' signifies the self and not the Ego. Secondly, as the ego is inwardly felt, is very subtle and is blended with the conception of the Self, the Self is



conveyed by the concept of the ego, abandoning the concepts of 'that' (and 'thou'). Thirdly, the ego either fuses with the Self or simply disappears (unlike other presentations which may occur apparently independent of the Self). The ego has no third alternative and hence the ego-sense signifies the Self.

कीदृक्पुनर्वस्तु लक्ष्यम् ।

नामादिभ्यः परो भूमा निष्कलोऽकारकोऽक्रियः ।

स एवात्मवतामात्मा स्वतस्सिद्धः स एव नः ॥ ५७ ॥

What is the nature of the principle thus signified indirectly?

57. The principle, that transcends the empirical determinations like name, is infinite, partless, not involved in any action as a factor therein and is actionless, is the Self for those who have mastered themselves. It is self-established for us.

अज्ञानोत्थबुद्ध्यादिकर्तृत्वोपाधिमात्मानं परिगृह्यैवान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामहं सुखी दुःखी चेत्यहंकारादेरनात्मधर्मत्वमुक्तं केवलात्माभ्युपगमेऽशक्यत्वात्फलाभावाच्च । अथेदानीमविद्यापरिकल्पितं साक्षित्वमाश्रित्य कर्तृत्वाद्यशेषपरिणामप्रतिषेधायाह ।

एष सर्वधियां नूतमविलुप्तैकदर्शनः ।

वीक्षतेऽवीक्षमाणोऽपि निमिषत्तद्ध्रुवोऽध्रुवम् ॥ ५८ ॥

Accepting the Self as conditioned by the mind, agency, etc., which are emanations of ignorance, that the ego and such other phenomena involved in feelings like pleasure and pain, are other than the self has been demonstrated through reasoning. Such a procedure would be impossible and purposeless if only the unconditioned Self were attended to. Similarly now, taking our stand on the fact that the self is the witness, which fact itself is a projection of nescience, we are going to deny of the Self all the transformations of the nature of being an agent in action etc.

58. This seer of inextinguishable and undivided awareness witnesses the insentient dance of the operations of all minds, though in reality there is no such thing as the act of witnessing on his part. He is the abiding spectator of phenomena that are transient.

ननु सर्वसिद्धान्तानामपि स्वस्वदृष्ट्यपेक्षयोपपन्नत्वादितरेतरदृष्ट्यपेक्षया द्रुस्स्थितसिद्धिकत्वान्नैकत्रापि विश्वासं पश्यामो न च सर्वतार्किकैरदूषितं समर्थितं सर्वतार्किकोपद्रवापसर्पणाय वर्त्म संभावयामः । उच्यते । विस्रब्धैः संभाव्यतामनुभव-  
मात्रशरणत्वात्सर्वतार्किकप्रस्थानानाम् । तदभिधीयते ।

इमं प्राश्निकमुद्दिश्य तर्कज्वरभृशानुराः ।

त्वाच्छिरस्कवचोजालैर्मोहयन्तीतरेतरम् ॥ ५९ ॥

Here it may be objected: But all theories are reasonable from their own respective points of view. They exhibit themselves as untenable when viewed from other points of view. We see no pathway that has not been refuted by any logician and is defended by all logicians and is competent to repulse the onslaught of all logicians. Therefore we have no confidence in any school of thought. This charge is refuted now: Let experience be admitted with confidence, for the theories of all the logicians ultimately take refuge in experience. This is explained now:

59. By an appeal to this impartial witness (*i.e.*, experience), all theorists, in the grip of the fever of dialectics, weave webs of arguments and confound each other in consequence.

अत्रापि चोदयन्ति । अनुभवात्मनोऽपि विक्रियाभ्युपगमेऽनभ्युपगमेऽपि दोष एव । यस्मादाह ।

“वर्षतिपाभ्यां किं व्योन्नश्चर्मण्येव तयोः फलम् ।

चर्मोपमश्चेत्सोऽनित्यः खतुल्यश्चेदसत्समः” ॥ ६० ॥

बुद्धिजन्मनि पुंसश्च विकृतिर्यदनित्यता ।

अथाविकृतिरेवायं प्रमातेति न युज्यते ॥ ६१ ॥

Concerning even this experience a further objection is raised: There are fallacies, whether the Self, of the nature of experience, is admitted to be changing or unchanging. Therefore this point is brought forward:

60-61. What is it to the sky, whether there is rain or sunshine? Their effects are seen on the skin, the organ of touch. If the Self is analogous to the skin, it must be non-eternal and if analogous to the sky, it is as good as non-existent. When an intellectual operation arises in a man, if he changes, he is non-eternal and if he does not change, he is not the knower of the knowledge in question.

अस्य परिहारः ।

ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति धूमे खं भिद्यते स्विन्न भिद्यते ।

न भिद्यते चेत्स्थान्त्वं भिद्यते चेद्भ्रुदास्य का ॥ ६२ ॥

This charge is answered in what follows:

62. When a column of smoke ascends upwards in the sky, is the sky cut up thereby or does it remain one and unbroken? If it remains unbroken, it means that the smoke is not rising up at all; and if it is broken up, what is the nature of the division that has taken place?

इत्येतत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थमाह ।

अविक्रियस्य भोक्तृत्वं स्यादहंबुद्धिविभ्रमात् ।

नौयानविभ्रमाद्यद्वन्नेषु गतिकल्पनम् ॥ ६३ ॥

This is rendered intelligible by the following:

63. The unchanging Self becomes the experienter of pleasures and pains through the illusion of ego-hood even as one going in a boat becomes subject to the illusion that the trees on the banks are moving.

यथोक्तार्थाविष्करणाय दृष्टान्तान्तरोपादानम् ।

यथा जात्यमणेः शुभ्रा ज्वलन्ती निश्चला शिखा ।

संनिध्यसंनिधानेषु घटादीनामविक्रिया ॥ ६४ ॥

To make the point stated clearer, another analogy is given:

64. The brilliance of a natural diamond is pure and steady whether objects like a jar be near it or not. Similarly the light of consciousness in the Self remains changeless whether objects are in its proximity or not.

अयमत्रांशो विवक्षित इति ज्ञापनायाह ।

यदवस्था व्यनक्तीति तदवस्थैव सा पुनः ।

भण्यते न व्यनक्तीति घटादीनामसंनिधौ ॥ ६५ ॥

The point intended by the analogy is brought out in the following:

65. Exactly in the same state in which we say the diamond illumines objects, we say it does not illumine, if the objects to be illumined are not in the required proximity.

तत्र च ।

सर्वधीव्यञ्जकस्तद्वत्परमात्मा प्रदीपकः ।

संनिध्यसंनिधानेषु धीवृत्तीनामविक्रियः ॥ ६६ ॥

न प्रकाशक्रिया काचिदस्य स्वात्मनि विद्यते ।

उपचारात्क्रिया सास्य यः प्रकाशस्य संनिधिः ॥ ६७ ॥

66-67. The supreme Self is the light that reveals all minds. Whether the functions of minds take place in its vicinity or not, it remains immutable. In the Self there is no such thing as the act of illumining. The approach of the object to be illumined within its range of illumination is figuratively spoken of as the act of illumination on the part of the Self.

मेवं शङ्खुष्ठाः सांख्यराद्धान्तोज्यमिति । यतः ।

यथा विशुद्ध आकाशे सहस्रैवाभ्रमण्डलम् ।

भूत्वा विलीयते तद्वदात्मनीहाखिलं जगत् ॥ ६८ ॥

Let it not be thought that this is the system of Sāṅkhya; For:

68. Just as, in the uncontaminated sky, clouds appear and dissolve, even so the whole phenomenal world appears and disappears in the self.

तस्मादेष कूटस्थो न द्वैतं मनागपि स्पृशति । यतः ।

शब्दशब्दाकारनिर्भासाः क्षणप्रध्वंसिनीर्हृता ।

नित्योऽक्रमद्वगात्मैको व्याप्नोतीव धियोऽनिशम् ॥ ६९ ॥

Thus the unchanging Self does not so much as touch the realm of duality:

69. The one, eternal and non-successive seer, through his consciousness, pervades as it were, all the perishing functions of the mind always which take up forms of objects like sound and colour.

एवं च सति बुद्धेः परिणामित्वं युक्तम् ।

अतीतानागतेहृत्यान्युपत्सर्वगोचरान् ।

वेत्यात्मवन्न धीर्यस्मात्तेनेयं परिणामिनी ॥ ७० ॥

Refer  
83/175  
&  
Bose  
47-48  
p 165

Such being the case, it is logical to suppose that the mind is subject to modification:

70. The mind is subject to modification, because it does not cognize all objects, past, present and future in a simultaneous apprehension as the Self does.

ततश्चेतस्सिद्धम् ।

अपश्यन्पश्यतीं बुद्धिमशृण्वन् शृण्वतीं तथा ।

निर्यत्नोऽविक्रियोऽनिच्छन्निच्छन्तीं चाप्यलुप्तहृक् ॥ ७१ ॥

द्विषन्तीमद्विषन्नात्मा कुप्यन्तीं चाप्यकोपनः ।

निर्दुःखो दुःखिनीं चैव निस्सुखः सुखिनीमपि ॥ ७२ ॥

अमुह्यमानो मुह्यन्तीं कल्पयन्तीमकल्पयन् ।

स्मरन्तीमस्मरन्श्चैव शयानामस्वपन्मुहुः ॥ ७३ ॥

सर्वाकारां निराकारः स्वार्थोऽस्वार्थां निरिङ्गनः ।

निस्त्रिकालस्त्रिकालस्थां कूटस्थः क्षणभङ्गुराम् ॥ ७४ ॥

निरपेक्षश्च सापेक्षां परार्चीं प्रत्यगद्वयः ।

सार्वार्धं निर्गतेयत्तः सर्वदेहेषु पश्यति ॥ ७५ ॥

Therefore this is established:

71-75. The Self which does not see, does not hear, does not will, does not change, does not desire, does not lose awareness at any time, does not hate, does not get angry, does not suffer, does not enjoy, does not get deluded, does not indulge in imagination, does not remember, does not slumber, does not have any form, is for itself, unmoving, is time-less, is immutable, is not relative, is the inner undivided Reality, and is infinite, perceives in all bodies the mind, which

sees, hears, desires, hates, gets angry, suffers, enjoys, gets deluded, indulges in imagination, remembers, slumbers, assumes all forms, subserves the ends of another, is subject to time, past, present and future, perishes every moment, is relative, is external and finite.

एतस्माच्च कारणादयमर्थो व्यवसीयताम् ।

दुःखी यदि भवेदात्मा कस्साक्षी दुःखिनो भवेत् ।

दुःखिनः साक्षितायुक्ता साक्षिणो दुःखिता तथा ॥ ७६ ॥

For this reason also, the following principle is to be admitted:

76. If the Self suffers, who is it that witnesses the subject of suffering? The subject of suffering cannot himself be the witness. Similarly the witness cannot be the subject of suffering.

पूर्वस्यैव व्याख्यानार्थमाह ।

नर्ते स्याद्विक्रियां दुःखी साक्षिता का विकारिणः ।

धीविक्रियासहस्राणां साक्ष्यतोऽहमविक्रियः ॥ ७७ ॥

In interpretation of what is said, the following is added:

77. Without change, there can be no suffering. How can he who changes be the witness? Therefore the Self is the unchanging witness of the thousand modifications of the mind.

एवं सर्वस्मिन् व्यभिचारिण्यात्मवस्त्वेवाव्यभिचारीत्यनुभवतो व्यवस्थापनायाह ।

प्रमाणतन्निभेष्वस्या नोच्छित्तिर्मम संविदः ।

मत्तोऽन्यद्रूपमाभाति यत्तत्स्यात्क्षणभङ्गि हि ॥ ७८ ॥

Thus, to establish by experience, that the principle of the ātman, is the invariable factor in and through all variable phenomena, the following is enunciated:

78. My consciousness knows no cessation in all the valid modes of knowledge and also whatever else merely appears as valid knowledge. If anything appears as related to me and other than myself, then it may be transient and momentary.

उत्पत्तिस्थितिभङ्गेषु कुम्भस्य वियतो यथा ।

नोत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशास्युर्बुद्धेरेवं ममापि च ॥ ७९ ॥

79. Just as space (*i.e.*, ether) remains unalterably the same through the origin, subsistence and destruction of the pot, even so the origin, subsistence and destruction of mental operations do not enter into my being.

सुखदुःखतत्संबन्धानां च प्रत्यक्षत्वात्त श्रद्धामात्रग्राह्यमेतत् ।

सुखदुःखादिसंबद्धां यथा दण्डेन दण्डिनम् ।

राधको वीक्षते बुद्धिं साक्षी तद्वदसंहतः ॥ ८० ॥

This need not be admitted on mere faith; It is a matter of direct experience that pleasures, pains and the relation to them do not pertain to the Self:

80. A man sees another holding a staff, though he is without one; in the same way the witness, though unconnected with what he sees, sees the mind characterized by pleasure, pain, etc.

एतस्माच्च हेतोर्धियः परिणामित्वं युक्तम् ।

येनैवास्या भवेद्योगः सुखकुम्भादिना धियः ।

तं विदन्ती तदैवान्यं वेत्ति नातो विकारिणी ॥ ८१ ॥



For this additional reason, it is right to hold that the mind is subject to modification:

81. A mind may be associated at a particular time with pleasure or a pot. Now the mind cognizing these, cannot at the very same moment cognize anything else. Therefore the mind is ever-changing.

अस्याश्च क्षणभङ्गरत्वे स्वयमेवात्मा साक्षी । न हि कूटस्थावबोधमन्तरेण बुद्धेरेवाविर्भावतिरोभावादिसिद्धिरस्ति ।

परिणामिधियां वृत्तं नित्याक्रमद्वगात्मना ।

षड्भावविक्रियामेति व्याप्तं खेनाङ्करो यथा ॥ ८२ ॥

In the matter of the mind being ever-changing, the Self itself is the witness. Surely in the absence of an unalterable consciousness, the appearance and disappearance of the mind would not be matters of experience.

82. Just as a plant sprouts up only as pervaded by space, does the activity of the changing mind assume its sixfold forms of change, pervaded by the Self constituted of eternal and non-successive awareness.

सत आत्मनश्चाविकारित्वे युक्तिः ।

स्मृतिस्वप्नप्रबोधेषु न कश्चित्प्रत्ययो धियः ।

दशाव्याप्तोऽस्त्यतो नित्यमविकारी स्वयंदृशिः ॥ ८३ ॥

The argument for the unchanging character of the Self is this:

83. Among remembrance, dream and awakening, not one presentational modification of the mind occurs unpermeated by consciousness and hence, consciousness in itself is abiding and changeless.

एवं तावत्पराभ्युपगतप्रक्रियाप्रस्थानेन निरस्ताशेषविकारैकात्म्यं प्रतिपादितमुपपत्तिभिः । अथाघुना श्रौतौ प्रक्रियामवलम्ब्योच्यते ।

अस्तु वा परिणामोऽस्य द्वेः कूटस्थरूपतः ।  
कल्पितोऽपि मृषैवासौ दण्डस्येवाप्सु वक्रता ॥ ८४ ॥

Thus, the unity of the Self, divested of all change, has been set forth in terms of reason in the manner adopted by other schools. Now the argument is presented in accordance with the procedure of the śruti:

84. Let it be admitted that there is even modification ascribed to consciousness. But as consciousness is absolutely changeless, the modification cannot but be unreal, like the crookedness seen in a straight stick placed in water.

षट्सु भावविकारेषु निषिद्धं श्वेवमात्मनि ।  
दोषः कश्चिदिहासक्तुं न शक्यस्ताकिंश्चभिः ॥ ८५ ॥

85. When once the sixfold forms of change are negated of the self, no deficiency or evil can be demonstrated in it by the dog-like logicians.

प्रकृतमेवोपादाय बुद्धेः परिणामित्वमात्मनश्च कूटस्थत्वं युक्तिभिरुच्यते ।  
प्रत्यर्थं तु विभिद्यन्ते बुद्धयो विषयोन्मुखाः ।  
न भिदावगतेस्तद्वत्सर्वास्ताश्चिन्निभा यतः ॥ ८६ ॥

Taking up this matter, the changeable character of mind and the absolute changelessness of the Self are urged through arguments:

86. The cognitive functions of the mind directed to external objects differ from object to object. But the element of consciousness in them does not differ in the same way, for all those functions, are forms of consciousness.

स्वसंबन्धार्थ एव ।

सावशेषपरिच्छेदिन्यत एव न कृत्स्नवित् ।

नो चेत्परिणमेद्बुद्धिः सर्वज्ञा स्वात्मवद्भवेत् ॥ ८७ ॥

The mind is bound up with its change:

87. The mind discerns objects by fragments and leaves residues. It is not all-cognizing. If the mind were not subject to modification, it would be omniscient like the Self.

अतोऽवगतेरेकत्वात् ।

चण्डालबुद्धेर्यद्दृष्टं तदेव ब्रह्मबुद्धिदृक् ।

एकं तदुभयोज्योतिर्भास्यभेदादनेकवत् ॥ ८८ ॥

Therefore, as the Self is one—

88. That which is the witness of the mind of a Caṇḍāla, is the same as the witness of the mind of Brahṁā. The light of consciousness is the same in both; but it appears many, owing to the difference of what is illumined.

कस्मात् ।

अवस्थादेशकालादिभेदो नास्त्यनयोर्यतः ।

तस्माज्जगद्वियां वृत्तं ज्योतिरेकं सदेक्षते ॥ ८९ ॥

Why is this so?

89. The consciousness shining in the two, does not have difference of state, space, time, etc., Therefore the same light sees always all the activities of the minds of the world.

सर्वदेहेष्वात्मैकत्वे प्रतिबुद्धपरमार्थतत्त्वस्याप्यप्रतिबुद्धदेहसंबन्धादशेषदुःखसंबन्ध इति चेत्तन्न ।

बोधात्प्रागपि दुःखित्वं नान्यदेहोत्थमस्ति नः ।

बोधाद्धूर्व कुतस्तत्स्याद्यत्र स्वगतमप्यसत् ॥ ९० ॥

Here it is objected: If there is a single Self in all bodies, he who is enlightened about ultimate Reality, must realize his identity with the Self in other bodies in which this enlightenment has not taken place. Hence he must suffer all the sufferings in the world. The reply is this:

90. Even before our attaining enlightenment, the sufferings occurring in other bodies do not affect us. How can, what occurs in other bodies affect us after our enlightenment in which state the sufferings occurring even in our own bodies cease to be for us?

न चेयं स्वमनीषिकेति ग्राह्यम् । कुतः । श्रुत्यवष्टम्भात् ।

शब्दाद्याकारनिर्भासा हानोपादानधर्मिणी ।

भास्येत्याह श्रुतिर्दृष्टिरात्मनोऽपरिणामिनः ॥ ९१ ॥

This is not a thesis fabricated by ourselves. It is based on the authority of the śruti:

91. Śruti affirms that there is a seeing illumined by the unchanging Self, which sheds light on external objects like sound and colour and engages in appropriating and avoiding objects.

का त्वसौ श्रुतिः ।

दृष्टेर्दृष्टारमात्मानं न पश्येर्दृश्यमानया ।

विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयाद्वियां पतिम् ॥ ९२ ॥

Which is this śruti passage?

92. 'You cannot see the Seer of the seeing with the help of the mind which itself belongs to the realm of the seen' (B. U. III. iv. 2). 'Through what means can

you know the knower, who is the Lord of all minds?'  
(*B. U. II. iv. 14*).

यस्मात्सर्वप्रमाणोपपन्नोऽयमर्थस्तस्मादतोऽन्यथावादिनो जात्यन्धा इवानुकम्प-  
नीया इत्याह ।

तदेतद्वयं ब्रह्म निर्विकारं कुबुद्धिभिः ।

जात्यन्धगजदृष्टयेव कोटिशः परिकल्प्यते ॥ ९३ ॥

As this position is substantiated by all the modes of proof, the thinkers who hold otherwise, are to be pitied like the born-blind.

93. This changeless and secondless Brahman is misconceived in crores of ways, like the elephant by the born-blind.

प्रमाणोपपन्नस्यार्थस्यासंभावनात्तदनुकम्पनीयत्वसिद्धिः । तदेतदाह ।

यद्यद्विशेषणं दृष्टं नात्मनस्तदनन्वयात् ।

खस्य कुम्भादिवत्तस्मादात्मा स्यान्निविशेषणः ॥ ९४ ॥

They are to be pitied because they do not see what is established by the sources of valid knowledge. This is said further:

94. Nothing that appears as qualitatively determining the Self, does really belong to the Self, as things like a pot appearing as qualifying space do not really belong to space. Therefore the Self is fundamentally unqualified.

अतश्चात्मनो भेदासंस्पर्शो भेदस्य मिथ्यास्वाभाव्यादत आह ।

अवगत्यात्मनो यस्मादागमापायि कुम्भवत् ।

साहंकारमिदं विश्वं तस्मात्तत्स्यात्कचादिवत् ॥ ९५ ॥

Therefore, the Self is free from differentiation, for differentiation is of the nature of falsity:

95. This world along with the ego, arises and passes away, like a pot in space, within the Self of the nature of awareness. Hence it is not constitutive of the Self and is subject to negation being a false presentation.

सर्वस्यैवानुमानव्यापारस्य फलमियदेव यद्विवेकग्रहणम् । तदुच्यते ।

बुद्धेरनात्मधर्मत्वमनुमानात्प्रसिद्धयति ।

आत्मनोऽप्यद्वितीयत्वमात्मत्वादेव सिद्धयति ॥ ९६ ॥

This discrimination alone is the consummation of the whole operation of ratiocination. This is stated in the following:

96. Reasoning establishes that the mind is not the attribute of the Self. The oneness of the self is established by the very fact of its being the Self.

यद्यप्ययं ग्रहीतृग्रहणग्राह्यगृहीतितत्फलात्मक आब्रह्मस्तम्बपर्यन्तः संसारोऽन्वय-  
व्यतिरेकाभ्यामनात्मतया निर्माल्यवदपविद्धः । तथापि तु नैवासौ स्वतस्सिद्धात्म-  
व्यतिरिक्तानात्मप्रकृतिपदार्थव्यपाश्रयः सांख्यानमिव । किं तर्हि । स्वतस्सिद्धानु-  
दितानस्तमितकूटस्थात्मप्रज्ञानमात्रशरीरप्रतिबिम्बिताविचारितसिद्धात्मानवबोधाश्रय  
एव तदुपादानत्वात्तस्येतीममर्थं निर्वक्तुकाम आह ।

ऋते ज्ञानं न सन्त्यर्था अस्ति ज्ञानमृतेऽपि तान् ।

एवं धियो हिरण्योतिर्विविच्यादनुमानतः ॥ ९७ ॥

Though this world beginning with Brahmā down to the lowest creature, consisting of the knower, the means of knowing, the object of knowledge, the knowing itself and the emergent knowledge, is determined to be other than the Self by reasoning and is thus discarded like a garland no longer fresh, still it is not something that rests in a self-existent non-self as affirmed by the Sāṅkhya philosophers. What, then, is it? It rests as a product on the non-apprehension of the Self, which non-apprehension appears through failure of inquiry into the Self that is constituted solely of absolute

consciousness changeless, birthless, everlasting and self-established. This point is elucidated in the following:

97. Independent of knowledge, there are no objects of knowledge, while independent of them knowledge can exist. In this fashion should one discriminate the element of consciousness from the objective phenomena presenting themselves to the mind.

यस्मात्प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहार आत्मानवबोधाश्रय एव तस्मात्सिद्धमात्मनोऽप्रमेयत्वम् । नैव हि कार्यं स्वकारणमतिलङ्घ्यान्यत्राकारक आस्पदमुपनिबध्नाति । अत आह ।

व्यवधीयन्त एवामी बुद्धिदेहघटादयः ।

आत्मत्वादात्मनः केन व्यवधानं मनागपि ॥ ९८ ॥

As the empirical life involving means of knowledge and objects of knowledge is thus founded on the ignorance of the Self, it is evident that the Self is not an object of knowledge. The effect cannot go beyond its cause and rest on what is not a factor in its production. Hence the following:

98. The mind, body and the objects are all mediately presented. But the Self, because it is the Self, is present without any mediation whatever.

स्वयमनवगमात्मकत्वादनवगमात्कत्वं च मोहमात्रोपादानत्वात् ।

प्रमाणमन्तरेणैषां बुद्ध्यादीनामसिद्धता ।

अनुभूतिफलार्थित्वादात्मा ज्ञः किमपेक्षते ॥ ९९ ॥

This is so because they are not of the nature of consciousness by themselves and they are not of that nature because they are products of mere delusion:

99. These phenomena like the mind are not there independent of knowledge probative of them, because they require to be illumined by experience.

But the self is sentience itself. Hence what else does it need for presenting itself?

वक्ष्यमाणेतरेतराध्याससिद्धयर्थमुक्तव्यतिरेकानुवादः ।

घटबुद्धेर्घटाच्चार्थाद्द्रष्टुर्यद्वद्विभिन्नता ।

अहंबुद्धेरहंगम्याद्दुःखिनश्च तथा दृशेः ॥ १०० ॥

To support in advance the idea of mutual superimposition to be propounded, the distinction stated already is repeated:

100. The seer of the jar is different from the idea of the jar, and the jar. Similarly consciousness is different from the idea of the ego and from what is signified by the idea of the ego *i.e.*, the individual who is subject to suffering.

एवमेतयोरात्मानात्मनोः स्वतः परतः सिद्धयोर्लौकिकरज्जुसर्पाध्यारोपवद-  
विद्योपाश्रय एवेतरेतराध्यारोप इत्येतदाह ।

अभ्रयानं यथा मोहाच्छशभृत्यध्यवस्यति ।

सुखित्वादीन्धियो धर्मास्तद्वदात्मनि मन्यते ॥ १०१ ॥

दग्धृत्वं च यथा वह्नेरयसो मन्यते कुधीः ।

चैतन्यं तद्वदात्मीयं मोहात्कर्तरि मन्यते ॥ १०२ ॥

Thus the self is self-established and the non-self is established by another. They are superimposed on each other as in the ordinary rope-snake illusion. As in the latter well-known case, this mutual superimposition of Self and non-Self over each other, is based on nescience. This is brought out now:

101-102. Just as on the moon is superimposed the movement of clouds, the qualities of the mind like pleasure and pain are ascribed to the pure Self. Just as a deluded fellow ascribes the burning propensity of the fire to the red-hot iron, the consciousness that



belongs to the Self as such properly, is ascribed in delusion to the agent (*i.e.*, the mind or ego).

सर्वं एवायमात्मानात्मविभागः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवर्त्मन्युपपत्तितोऽविद्योत्सङ्ग-  
वर्त्येव न परमात्मव्यपाश्रयः । अस्याश्चाविद्यायाः सर्वानर्थहेतोः कुतो निवृत्तिरिति  
चेत्तदाह ।

दुःखराशेर्विचित्रस्य सेयं भ्रान्तिश्चिरन्तनी ।

मूलं संसारवृक्षस्य तद्बाधस्तत्त्वदर्शनात् ॥ १०३ ॥

All this distinction between the Self and non-Self falling, as it does, in the field of knowledge like perception, is grounded in nescience and does not rest on the supreme Self. In answer to the question as to how this nescience, which is the root-cause of all evil, is terminated, the following is formulated:

103. The root of this tree of transmigratory existence, which abounds in extraordinary varieties of evil, is this ageless illusion. That illusion is annihilated by the vision of Reality.

तद्बाधस्तत्त्वदर्शनादिति कुतः संभाव्यत इति चेदत आहागोपालाविपालपण्डित-  
मियमेव प्रसिद्धिः ।

अप्रमोत्थं प्रमोत्थेन ज्ञानं ज्ञानेन बाध्यते ।

अहिरज्ज्वादिवद्बाधो देहाद्यात्ममतेस्तथा ॥ १०४ ॥

That it is annihilated by the vision of Reality can be understood by this consideration which is universally acknowledged:

104. The cognition springing from error is sublated by a cognition springing from right apprehension in the case of snake-rope illusion. Similarly the conception of the body etc., as the Self is sublated by the right knowledge of the Self.

लौकिकप्रमेयवैलक्षण्यादात्मनो नेहानधिगताधिगमः प्रमाणफलम् ।

अविद्यानाशमात्रं तु फलमित्युपचर्यते ।

नाज्ञातज्ञापनं न्याय्यमवगत्यैकरूपतः ॥ १०५ ॥

Here the product of right knowledge is not the discovery of what was unknown before, because the Self differs from objects of ordinary modes of right knowledge:

105. Only the destruction of nescience is spoken of here as the effect of knowledge figuratively. It would not be right to describe the effect as the revelation of what is unknown before, for the Self is solely of the nature of awareness itself.

यस्मादात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानाः प्रमात्रादयस्तस्मात् ।

न विदन्त्यात्मनः सत्तां द्रष्टृदर्शनगोचराः ।

न चान्योन्यमतोऽस्मीषां ज्ञेयत्वं भिन्नसाधनम् ॥ १०६ ॥

Because the phenomena of the knower etc. are the outcome of the non-apprehension of the Self alone, it follows:

106. The seer, the seeing and the object seen do not by themselves cognize their own being. Nor do they cognize one another reciprocally. Therefore their becoming objects of cognition depends on something transcending them.

द्रष्टृदेरसाधारणरूपज्ञापनायाह ।

बाह्य आकारवान् ग्राह्यो ग्रहणं निश्चयादिमत् ।

अन्वय्यहमिति ज्ञेयः साक्षी त्वात्मा ध्रुवः सदा ॥ १०७ ॥

The distinctive characters of these factors, the seer etc. are brought out:

107. The object of knowledge is the external factor having sensible form. Knowledge consists of judg-

ment etc., The knower in relation to these is the ego. The witness of all these is the Self, abiding always.

सर्वकारकक्रियाफलविभागात्मकसंसारशून्य आत्मेति कारकक्रियाफलविभाग-  
साक्षित्वादात्मनस्तदाह ।

ग्राहकग्रहणग्राह्यविभागे योऽविभागवान् ।

हानोपादानयोस्साक्षी हानोपादानवर्जितः ॥ १०८ ॥

As the Self is the witness of the distinctions like the factors of action, action and the result of action, he is free from the relative existence consisting of these distinctions of the causal factors, action and result. That point is stated now:

108. He who is undivided manifesting himself through the divisions of the apprehender, apprehension and apprehended, and witnesses the acts of appropriation and rejection, transcends all appropriation and rejection.

ग्राहकादिनिष्ठैव ग्राहकादिभावाभावविभागसिद्धिः कस्मान्नेति चेत्तदाह ।

स्वसाधन स्वयं नष्टो न नाशं वेत्त्यभावतः ।

अत एव न चान्येषामतोऽसौ भिन्नसाक्षिकः ॥ १०९ ॥

Why should not the being and non-being of these divisions, the knower, knowing and the object of knowledge be regarded as cognizable by these factors themselves? It is said in reply:

109. None of these factors can know how it is brought about and that it is destroyed, because before its origin and after its destruction, it is not there to know. For the same reason it cannot know the origin and destruction of other factors. Therefore every one of them must be known by a witness other than itself.

ग्राहकादेरन्यसाक्षिपूर्वकत्वसिद्धेः स्वसाक्षिणोऽप्यन्यसाक्षिपूर्वकत्वादनवस्थेति चेत्तन्न साक्षिणो व्यतिरिक्तहेत्वनपेक्षत्वादत आह ।

धीवन्नापेक्षते सिद्धिमात्मान्यस्मादविक्रियः ।

निरपेक्षमपेक्ष्यैव सिद्धयन्त्यन्ये न तु स्वयम् ॥ ११० ॥

It may be argued that as the factors like the knower became known by another witness, the witness also is to be known by another witnessing agency. In that case an infinite regress results. In reply it has to be pointed out that the truth is not so, because the witness does not stand in need of a witness other than itself. This is said in the following:

110. Just as the mind requires to be established by another, the unchanging Self does not require another witnessing agency to become established. The others get established through another, which is independent of such presuppositions and that other agency does not so require another.

यतो ग्राहकादिष्वात्मभावोऽविद्यानिबन्धन एव तस्मादन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां विभज्यानात्मनः स्वयम् ।

उत्पत्तिस्थितिनाशेषु योऽवगत्यैव वर्तते ।

जगतोऽविकारयावेहि तमस्मीति न नश्वरम् ॥ १११ ॥

The self-hood of the empirical knower etc. is grounded in nescience. Therefore, through reasoning, all such phenomena must be separated from the Self:

111. He who remains through the origin, continuance and cessation of the world, in the form of unchanging awareness must be understood as the Self, as 'I am he'. Do not think of yourself as any of these transient factors.

स्वतस्सिद्धात्मचैतन्यप्रतिबिम्बिताविचारितसिद्धिकात्मानवबोधोत्थेतरस्वभावापेक्षसिद्धत्वात्स्वतश्चासिद्धेरनात्मनो द्वैतेन्द्रजालस्य ।

न स्वयं स्वस्य नानात्वं नावगत्यात्मना यतः ।

नोभाभ्यामप्यतस्सिद्धमद्वैतं द्वैतबाधया ॥ ११२ ॥

As this magic show of duality forming the non-Self shines by the light of the self-established consciousness of the Self, as it presents itself owing to the absence of inquiry, as it springs out of the non-apprehension of the Self, as it involves reciprocal dependence and also as it does not establish itself by itself, it follows:

112. Plurality is not self-cognized. Nor is it cognized by the pure awareness as one with itself, for they cannot be one. Nor is it cognized both intrinsically and by the awareness, for they cannot enter into such a relation. Therefore it is clear that non-dualism results from the nullification of all duality.

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तिर्ब्रह्मिन्ने श्रुत्युदाहरणोपन्यासः ।

नित्यावगतिरूपत्वात्कारकादिर्न चात्मनः ।

अस्थूलं नेतिनेतीति न जायत इति श्रुतिः ॥ ११३ ॥

To strengthen this conviction, the words of the śruti are brought forward:

113. Since the Self is of the nature of eternal awareness, factors of action etc. do not belong to the Self. Śruti says that the Self is 'Not gross' (*K. U. III. viii. 8*), 'Not this, not this' (*B. U. II. iii. 6*) and 'Not born' (*K. U. I. ii. 18*).

सर्वस्यास्य ग्राहकादेद्वैतप्रपञ्चस्यात्मानवबोधमात्रोपादानस्य स्वयं सेद्धुमशक्य-  
त्वादात्मसिद्धेश्चानुपादेयत्वात् ।

आत्मनश्चेन्निवार्यन्ते बुद्धिदेहघटादयः ।

षष्ठगोचरकल्पास्ते विज्ञेयाः परमार्थतः ॥ ११४ ॥

All this knower etc. constituting the world of duality and solely the outcome of the ignorance of the Self, cannot be established by itself. Nor can it be established by the Self. Therefore:

114. If the mind, body and objects like a jar, are denied of the Self, they ought to be understood in truth as unreal, as almost non-existent.

कुतो न्यायबलादेवं निश्चितं प्रतीयते । यस्मात् ।

नित्यां संविदमाश्रित्य स्वतस्सिद्धामविक्रियाम् ।

सिद्धायन्ते धियो बोधास्तांश्चाश्रित्य घटादयः ॥ ११५ ॥

On the strength of what principle is this arrived at? It is this way:

115. On the support of the self-established, unchanging and eternal consciousness, arise the acts of knowledge in the mind. It is through such acts of the mind, that the external objects like a jar, reveal themselves.

यस्मान्न कयाचिदपि युक्त्यात्मनः कारकत्वं क्रियात्वं फलत्वं चोपपद्यते तस्मादात्मवस्तुयाथात्म्यानवबोधमात्रोपादानत्वात्तन्मसीव रजोधूमतुषार नीहारनीलत्वाद्यध्यासो यथोक्तात्मनि सर्वोऽयं क्रियाकारकफलात्मकसंसारोऽहंमत्त्वयत्नेच्छादिमिथ्याध्यास एवेति सिद्धमिममर्थमाह ।

अहंमिथ्याभिशापेन दुःख्यात्मा तद्बुभुत्सया ।

इतः श्रुतिं तथा नेतीत्युक्तः कैवल्यमास्थितः ॥ ११६ ॥

On no logical consideration, can it be proved that the Self is one with the factors of action, action itself and the results of action. Therefore all this relative world of action, factors of action and the results thereof, the ego, the sense of 'mine', will, desire, etc., resting, as it does, on the ignorance of the real nature of the Self,

is merely a false superimposition on the said Self like the dust, smoke, mist, fog and blueness superimposed on the sky. This is explained:

116. The Self cursed by the ego, which is false, becomes miserable. Desiring to understand the truth it approaches the śruti. Being told by śruti, 'Not this, not this', it realizes freedom.

तस्यास्य मुमुक्षोः श्रौताद्वचसः स्वप्ननिमित्तोत्सारितनिद्रस्येवेयं निश्चितार्थं  
प्रमा जायते ।

नाहं न च ममात्मत्वात्सर्वदानात्मवर्जितः ।

मानाविव तमोध्यासोऽपल्लवश्च तथा मयि ॥ ११७ ॥

In this aspirant after freedom, there arises from the words of the śruti, true knowledge of settled import, as a man is awakened from sleep by what he sees in his dream:

117. I am not the ego, nothing is mine and I am bereft of all non-Self always. Like darkness ascribed to the sun, they are all superimposed on me. Even their negation is a superimposition on me.

सोऽयमेवंप्रतिपन्नस्वभावमात्मानं प्रतिपन्नोऽनुश्रौशति ।

यत्र त्वस्येति साटोपं कृत्स्नद्वैतनिषेधिनीम् ।

प्रोत्सारयन्तीं संसारमप्यश्रौषं न किं श्रुतिम् ॥ ११८ ॥

Realizing the nature of the Self thus, the aspirant laments aloud his previous ignorance:

118. Why did I not listen to the śruti before, which, with a flourish, as it were, proclaims, 'Where the Self is all, what can one see and by what means?' (B. U. IV. v. 15) and negates all duality and destroys bondage?

इत्योमित्यवबुद्धात्मा निष्कलोऽकारकोऽक्रियः ।

विरक्त इव बुद्ध्यादेरेकाकित्वमुपेयिवान् ॥ ११९ ॥

119. Thus affirming with the sacred syllable Om and comprehending the Self, the man of realization, discards the mind etc., just as an ascetic renounces sense-pleasures, and abides without parts, factors of action and change, and attains absolute singleness of being.



## तृतीयोऽध्यायः

सर्वोऽयं प्रमितिप्रमाणप्रमेयप्रमातृलक्षण आब्रह्मास्तम्बपर्यन्तो मिथ्याध्यास एवेति बहुश उपपत्तिभिरतिष्ठपम् । आत्मा च जन्मादिषड्भावविकारवर्जितः कूटस्थबोध एवेति स्फुटीकृतम् । तयोश्च मिथ्याध्यासकूटस्थात्मनोर्नान्तराज्ञानं संबन्धोऽन्यत्र चोदनापरिप्रापितात् यथा “इयमेवर्गग्निः साम” इति । तच्चाज्ञानं स्वात्ममात्र निमित्तं न संभवतीति कस्यचित्कस्मिन्निद्विषये भवतीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । इह च पदार्थद्वयं निर्वहिरितमात्मानात्मा च । तत्रानात्मनस्तावन्नाज्ञानेनाभिसंबन्धः । तस्य हि स्वरूपमेवाज्ञानं न हि स्वतोऽज्ञानस्याज्ञानं घटते । संभवदप्यज्ञानस्वभावेऽज्ञानं कमतिशयं जनयेत् । न च तत्र ज्ञानप्राप्तिरस्ति येन तत्प्रतिषेधात्मकमज्ञानं स्यात् । अनात्मनश्चाज्ञानप्रसूतत्वात् । न हि पूर्वसिद्धं सत्तोलब्धात्मलाभस्य सेत्स्यत आश्रयस्याश्रयि संभवति । तदनपेक्षस्य च तस्य निस्स्वभावत्वात् । एतेभ्य एव हेतुभ्यो नानात्मविषयमज्ञानं संभवतीति ग्राह्यम् । एवं तावन्नानात्मनोऽज्ञानित्वं नापि तद्विषयमज्ञानम् । पारिशेष्यादात्मन एवास्त्वज्ञानं तस्याज्ञोऽस्मीत्यनुभवदर्शनात् । “सोऽहं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवास्मि नात्मवित्” इति श्रुतेः । न चात्मनोऽज्ञानस्वरूपता तस्य चैतन्यमात्रस्वाभाव्यादतिशयश्च संभवति ज्ञानविपरिलोपो ज्ञानप्राप्तेश्च संभवस्तस्य ज्ञानकारित्वात् । न चाज्ञानकार्यत्वं कूटस्थात्मस्वाभाव्यादज्ञानानपेक्षस्य चात्मनः स्वत एव स्वरूपसिद्धेर्युक्तमात्मन एवाज्ञत्वम् । किंविषयं पुनस्तदात्मनोऽज्ञानम् । आत्मविषयमिति ब्रूमः । नन्वात्मनोऽपि ज्ञानस्वरूपत्वादनन्यत्वाच्च ज्ञान-प्रकृतित्वादिभ्यश्च हेतुभ्यो नैवाज्ञानं घटते । घटत एव । कथम् । अज्ञानमात्र-निमित्तत्वात्तद्विभागस्य सर्पात्मतेव रज्ज्वाः । तस्मात्तदपनुत्तौ द्वैतानर्थाभावः । तदपनोदश्च वाक्यादेव तत्पदपदार्थाभिज्ञस्य । अतो वाक्यव्याख्यानायाध्याय आरभ्यते । तत्र यथोक्तेन प्रकारेण तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योपनिविष्टपदपदार्थयोः कृतान्वयव्यतिरेकः ।

यदा ना तत्त्वमस्यादेर्ब्रह्मास्मीत्यवगच्छति ।

प्रध्वस्ताहंममो नैति तदा गीर्मनसोः सृतिम् ॥ १ ॥

## CHAPTER III

It has been established through elaborate reasoning, that all this empirical world, from Brahma down to the lowest species,

consisting of knowledge, means of knowledge, objects of knowledge and the subjects thereof, is merely a false superimposition. The Self, it has been clarified, is eternal consciousness devoid of changes of being like origin. Except in cases where a scriptural injunction identifies one thing for another for a special purpose, the relation between two items like the false superimposition and eternal consciousness is impossible without a basic ignorance. That ignorance cannot be a self-existent principle and therefore, it must be admitted that it belongs to some subject of knowledge and is concerning some object of knowledge. We have determined that there are two categories, the Self and the non-Self. Of the two, it is evident that the non-Self cannot be the locus of ignorance. Its very nature is ignorance and surely there could be no additional ignorance in a locus which is itself of the nature of ignorance. Even if this were possible, what new feature could this further ignorance add to the original ignorance? The non-Self could never acquire knowledge and only if the possibility of knowledge is there, could there be ignorance of the nature of the privation of knowledge. Further, the non-Self is itself a product of ignorance. What exists already cannot be dependent on what is brought into being by itself. The non-Self has no nature of its own independent of ignorance. These very same reasons go to show that the ignorance is not about the non-Self. Therefore the subject of ignorance is not the non-Self; nor is ignorance about the non-Self.

By the principle of elimination ignorance takes place in the Self. In it occurs experience of the form 'I am ignorant'. Śruti has the passage, 'Blessed one, I know the hymns; but I do not know the Self, (C.U.VII. i. 3) The Self is not of the nature of ignorance, for its essence is pure consciousness. Ignorance can make a difference to it. The lapse of knowledge can very well occur in it. There is a possibility of attaining knowledge in the Self, for it is ultimately the source of knowledge. The Self, being of the nature of unchanging awareness, is no product of ignorance. Independent of ignorance, the Self has an intrinsic nature of its own. For all these reasons, it is tenable to hold that the Self is the locus of ignorance. What object does that ignorance located in the Self concern? We answer that it concerns the Self itself. 'But,' it may be argued,

'the Self is of the nature of knowledge, it is undivided and one and is the source of knowledge. For these reasons it is impossible that it can support ignorance. We reply that it can support ignorance. How? The divisions within the Self are brought about by mere ignorance as in the rope which appears as a snake. Therefore all evil of the nature of duality, ceases, when ignorance is dispelled. The removal of ignorance is possible only through the proposition (of Vedānta). The proposition is effective for one who understands the terms and their meanings. Therefore this chapter is started with a view to interpret the proposition. One who has understood through reasoning, according to the procedure stated, the terms and their meanings in the proposition, 'That thou art' fulfils himself as follows:

1. When a person understands 'I am Brahman' through the propositions like 'That thou art', his sense of 'I' and 'mine' are destroyed and he goes beyond the realm of words and mind.

यदेव तदर्थं त्वमर्थोऽवेति तदेवावाक्यार्थतां प्रतिपद्यते गीर्मेनसोः सृति न प्रति-  
पद्यत इति । कुत एतदध्यवसीयते । यस्मात् ।

तत्पदं प्रकृतार्थं स्यात्त्वंपदं प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

नीलोत्पलवदेताभ्यां दुःख्यनात्मत्ववारणे ॥ २ ॥

The significance is that when he discerns the import of 'That' in the import of 'Thou', then itself he attains what is beyond the import of the proposition and transcends accessibility to words and mind. How is this known?

2. The term 'That' signifies the subject-matter under consideration. The term 'Thou' signifies the inner Self of experience. As in the expression, 'Blue lotus' subjection to misery and the character of being non-Self are negated by these two terms.

एवं कृतान्वयव्यतिरेको वाक्यादेवावाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यत इत्युक्तमतस्तद्व्याख्यानाय सूत्रोपन्यासः ।

सामानाधिकरण्यं च विशेषणविशेष्यता ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धः पदार्थप्रत्यगात्मनाम् ॥ ३ ॥

Thus one, who has reasoned in this manner, grasps through the proposition itself an import beyond the import of the proposition. In interpretation of this assertion, the principle is formulated in an aphoristic form:

3. Co-ordination, subject-predicate relation and indirect indication are the three ways governing terms, their meanings and the inner Self.

अस्मिन् सूत्र उपन्यस्ते कश्चिच्चोदयति योऽयं वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तौ पूर्वाध्याये-  
नान्वयव्यतिरेकलक्षणो न्यायः सर्वकर्मसंन्यासपूर्वकोऽभिहितः किमयं विधिपरिप्रापितः  
किं वा स्वरसत एवात्र पुमान्प्रवर्तत इति । किंचातः । शृणु । यद्यात्मवस्तु-  
साक्षात्करणाय विधिपरिप्रापितोऽयं न्यायस्तदावश्यमात्मवस्तुसाक्षात्करणाय व्यावृ-  
त्तशुभाशुभकर्मराशिरेकाग्रमना अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां यथोक्ताभ्यामात्मदर्शनं करोति ।  
अपरिसमाप्यात्मदर्शनं ततः प्रच्यवमान आरूढपतितो भवति । यदि पुनर्यदृच्छातः  
प्रवर्तते तदा न कश्चिद्दोष इति । विधिपरिप्रापित इति ब्रूमो यत आह ।

शमादिसाधनः पश्येदात्मन्यात्मानमञ्जसा ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां त्यक्त्वा युष्मदशेषतः ॥ ४ ॥

युष्मदर्थे परित्यक्ते पूर्वोक्तैर्हेतुभिः श्रुतिः ।

वीक्षापन्नस्य कोऽस्मीति तत्त्वमित्याह सौहृदात् ॥ ५ ॥

On hearing this aphorism some one questions this way: The procedure of rational discrimination laid down in the previous chapter, for comprehending the import of the proposition, preceded by the renunciation of all actions, is either enjoined by scriptural imperatives or is undertaken by natural propensity. If it is undertaken in obedience to an imperative, for the purpose of realizing the Self, then it is inevitable that one, having renounced good and

bad actions, and with a concentrated mind, should proceed to discover the Self in the prescribed manner of discrimination, for gaining a direct vision of the Self. If it happens that the discovery of the Self is not completed and he relapses from the endeavour, he falls from the height gained. If the undertaking is by natural propensity, then there is no such blemish.

In this matter, we say that this process is initiated by the imperatives of scriptures to that effect:

4-5. Let one, equipped with qualities like the control of the senses, see the Self in the self through the method of discrimination having abandoned the non-Self in its entirety. When what is signified by 'Thou' (i.e., objective factors like the body, mind and ego) is abandoned on the grounds stated previously, and then there arises in the enquirer the question 'Who, then, am I?', the śruti answers in compassion 'You are *that*'.

अत्रापि चोदयन्ति सांख्याः । शरीरेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिष्वनात्मस्वात्मेति निस्संखि-  
बन्धनं मिथ्याज्ञानमज्ञानं तस्मिन्बन्धनो ह्यात्मनोऽनेकानर्थसंबन्धस्तस्य चान्वयव्यतिरेका-  
भ्यामेव निरस्तत्वान्निर्विषयं तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं प्राप्तम् । तस्माद्वाक्यस्य चैष महिमा  
योऽयमात्मानात्मनोर्विभाग इति । तस्मिन्नाकरणायेदमुच्यते ।

भेदसंविदिदं ज्ञानं भेदाभावश्च साक्षिणि ।

कार्यमेतदविद्याया ज्ञात्मना त्याजयेद्वचः ॥ ६ ॥

In this connection, the Sāṅkhya philosophers, raise the following objection: Ignorance is the false knowledge, attaching itself fast, that the body, senses, mind and the intellect, which are not the Self, are the Self. From that arises the association of the Self with manifold evils. When this ignorance is got rid of through rational discrimination itself, there is no matter to be communicated by the scriptural proposition, 'That thou art'. Therefore the glory of that proposition would lie merely in this discrimination between

the Self and non-Self. In refutation of this objection, the following is stated:

6. This discriminative knowledge is apprehension of difference; but in the witness there is no difference. Apprehension of difference is the effect of nescience. The words of the scripture set it aside by focussing on the Self of the nature of pure consciousness.

ज्ञात्मना त्याजयेद्वच इत्युपश्रुत्याह कश्चित् । मिथ्याज्ञानव्यतिरेकेणात्मानव-  
बोधस्याभावात्किं वाक्येन निवर्त्यते । अज्ञानं हि नाम ज्ञानाभावस्तस्य चावस्तु-  
त्वाभाव्यात्कुतः संसारकारणत्वं न ह्यसतः सज्जन्मेव्यते “कुतस्तु खलु सोम्येवं स्यात्”  
इति “कथमसतः सज्जायेत” इति श्रुतेरिति । अत्रोच्यते ।

अज्ञात एव सर्वोऽर्थः प्राग्यतो बुद्धिजन्मनः ।

एकेनैव सता संश्र्व सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्ततः ॥ ७ ॥

Hearing that it is set aside by focusing on Self of the nature of consciousness, some one objects as follows: As there is no ignorance of the Self other than false knowledge, what is it that is set aside by the Vedāntic proposition? By ignorance is meant the absence of knowledge. Since it is nothing positive how can it be the cause of transmigratory existence? Surely nothing positive can originate from non-existence. Śruti asks, ‘How can this be? How can Being take birth in Non-being?’ (C.U. VI. ii. 2). The reply is this:

7. All things are unknown, before the coming into being of knowledge. They are, in that state, one with the pure secondless Being. It is Being that is unknown.

सन्नज्ञातो भवेत्तत इत्युक्तमवस्तनेन श्लोकेन । कोऽसौ सन्नज्ञात इत्यपेक्षायां  
तत्स्वरूपप्रतिपादनायाह ।

प्रमित्सायां य आभाति स्वयं मातृप्रमाणयोः ।

स्वमहिम्ना च यस्सिद्धः सोऽज्ञातार्थोऽवसीयताम् ॥ ८ ॥

The previous verse has said, 'It is Being that is unknown'. If it be asked, 'What is this unknown Being?' in reply its nature is brought out:

8. What shines forth by itself in the state of the desire for knowledge, in the knower and his knowing, and is the one, which is self-established *i.e.* the Self, let that be understood as the unknown Being.

अत्र केचिदाहुः । यत्किञ्चिदिह वाक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं वा तत्सर्वं संसर्गात्मकमेव वाक्यार्थं गमयति । अतस्तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्यः संसर्गात्मकमहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञाय तावन्निदिध्यासीत यावदवाक्यार्थात्मकः प्रत्यगात्मविषयोऽवबोधोऽहं ब्रह्मेति सम-  
भिजायते । तस्मादेव विज्ञानात्कैवल्यमाप्नोतीति तन्निराकरणायेदमुच्यते ।

सामानाधिकरण्यादेर्घटेतरखयोरिव ।

व्यावृत्तेः स्यादवाक्यार्थः साक्षान्नस्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ॥ ९ ॥

Here some thinkers maintain the following: 'Every proposition, scriptural or worldly, conveys an import, which is a complex of many items. Therefore, after one gathers the complex import of Vedāntic propositions like 'That thou art' in the form of the judgement 'I am Brahman', he must practise meditation on that theme, until an integral and non-verbal knowledge of the inmost Self emerges in the form of the direct experience 'I am Brahman'. It is only through such a realization that liberation is achieved. To refute this view, the following is propounded:

9. According to us the relations *i.e.* co-ordination, subject-predicate relation and indirect indication, connecting words, their meanings and the Self, bring out directly the non-verbal import of 'That thou art' like the identity of space through the cancellation of the different adjuncts.

कुतोऽवाक्यार्थोऽवसीयत इति चेत्तत्प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं विशेषणविशेष्ययोः सामर्थ्योक्तिः ।

निर्दुःखित्वं त्वमर्थस्य तदर्थेन विशेषणात् ।

प्रत्यक्ता च तदर्थस्य त्वंपदेनास्य संनिधेः ॥ १० ॥

How is the non-verbal import understood? To answer this, the efficacy of subject-predicate relation is explained:

10. The meanings of 'Thou' is construed as free from sorrow owing to the predication of the meaning of 'That'. The meaning of 'That' receives the sense of immediacy, owing to the syntactical apposition to 'Thou'.

उक्तं सामानाधिकरण्यं विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्च संक्षेपतोऽथ लक्ष्यलक्षणव्याख्यानायाह ।

कूटस्थबोधप्रत्यक्त्वमनिमित्तं सदात्मनः ।

बोद्धताहंतयोर्हेतुस्ताभ्यां तेनोपलक्ष्यते ॥ ११ ॥

Thus the co-ordination of terms and the subject-predicate relation of their meanings have been stated briefly. In interpretation of the indicator-indicated relation, the following is said:

11. The unchanging immediate awareness, that is self-existent, is the nature of the real Self. This is the cause of the mind's cognizing power and the immediacy that its ego-hood enjoys. Therefore, by virtue of this cognizing power and immediacy of the mind being causally dependent on the Self, the latter is indicated by them.

बुद्धेः कूटस्थबोधप्रत्यक्त्वनिमित्ते बोद्धताप्रत्यक्त्वे ये त्वसाधारणे तयोर्विशेषवचनम् ।

बोद्धता कर्त्ता बुद्धेः कर्मता स्यादहंतया ।

तयोरैक्यं यथा बुद्धौ पूर्वयोरेवमात्मनि ॥ १२ ॥

The mind's cognizing power and immediacy, are grounded in the unchanging awareness and immediate self-certitude of the Self. These qualities are explained to show how they inhere in the Self and in the mind and how as inhering thus in the latter they have some speciality:



12. The mind's agency is its cognizing power and its becoming an object is by virtue of its ego-hood. As they are blended in the mind, the features in the Self responsible for this cognizing power and the ego-hood are also blended in essence.

यथा बुद्धौ पूर्वयोरेवमात्मनीत्यतिदेशेन बुद्धिसाधर्म्यविधानान्नानात्वप्रसक्तौ तदपवादार्थमाह ।

धर्मधर्मित्वभेदोऽस्याः सोऽपि नैवात्मनो यतः ।

प्रत्यग्ज्योतिरतोऽभिन्नं भेदहेतोरसंभवात् ॥ १३ ॥

The analogy with the mind, might create the presumption that the two features might be conceived as forming attributive distinctions within the self. That is repudiated in the next verse:

13. The distinction between substance and attribute falls within mind. It does not belong to the Self. Thus the Self is immediate awareness without any internal distinction, for there could be no ground for differentiation within it.

भेदहेत्वसंभवं दर्शयन्नाह ।

न कस्यांचिदवस्थायां बोधप्रत्यक्त्वयोभिदा ।

व्यभिचारोऽथवा दृष्टो यथाहंतद्विदोस्सदा ॥ १४ ॥

Why there could be no ground for differentiation is brought out:

14. In no condition are consciousness and immediacy differentiated; nor are they found separately. This is unlike the relation between the ego and the knower thereof.

यस्मादज्ञानोपादानाया एव बुद्धेर्भेदो नात्मनस्तस्मादेतत्सिद्धम् ।

कूटस्थबोधतोऽद्वैतं साक्षात्त्वं प्रत्यगात्मनः ।

कूटस्थबोधाद्बोद्धी धीः स्वतो हीयं विनश्वरी ॥ १५ ॥

This is established, for the divisions occur in the mind, which is an outcome of ignorance and never in the Self:

15. The inmost Self is one and non-dual and has immediacy, because of its nature as unchanging consciousness. But the mind has the power of cognizing owing to the influence of that unchanging consciousness. By itself the mind is perishable.

अथाधुना प्रकृतस्यैव परिणामिनः कूटस्थस्य च लक्षणमुच्यते ।

विशेषं कंचिदाश्रित्य यत्स्वरूपं प्रतीयते ।

प्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रमाणेन परिणामी स देहवत् ॥ १६ ॥

Now the definitions of what is changing and the unchanging reality are given:

16. What gets apprehended through recognition as one and continuous in and through differences is the changing phenomenon like the body.

सामान्याच्च विशेषाच्च स्वमहिम्नैव यो भवेत् ।

व्युत्थायाप्यविकारी स्यात्कुम्भाकाशादिवत्तु सः ॥ १७ ॥

17. What, by its own nature, transcends the universal and particular determinations as their witness and abides by itself without any change whatever, is called unchanging like the space transcending the limiting condition of a jar.

आत्मनो बुद्धेश्च बोधप्रत्यगात्मत्वमभिहितं तयोस्ताधारणलक्षणाभिधानार्थमाह ।

बुद्धेर्यत्प्रत्यगात्मत्वं तत्स्याद्देहाद्युपाश्रयात् ।

आत्मनस्तु स्वरूपं तन्नभसः सुषिता यथा ॥ १८ ॥

To both the Self and the mind consciousness and immediacy were ascribed. Now their distinctive natures are definitely elucidated:

18. The mind can be regarded as the inner self only relatively to the body etc., but being the inmost self is the intrinsic essence of the real Self, even as spaciousness is the essence of space.

बोद्धृत्वं तद्वदेवास्याः प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतुतः ।

आत्मनस्तु स्वरूपं तत्तिष्ठन्तीव महीभृतः ॥ १९ ॥

19. The cognizing power of the mind is relative to its being the cause of mental presentations. But the consciousness of the Self is its intrinsic essence, like the stability of a mountain.

तयोः कूटस्थपरिणामिनोरात्मानवबोध एव संबन्धहेतुर्न पुनर्वास्तवः कश्चिदपि संबन्ध उपपद्यत इत्याह ।

सम्यक्संशयमिथ्यात्वैर्द्धीरेवेयं विभज्यते ।

हानोपादानतामीषां मोहादध्यस्यते दृशौ ॥ २० ॥

Between these two, the unchanging Self and the changing self there is a phenomenal relation brought about by the ignorance of the Self. No ultimately real relation is possible between them. This is stated now:

20. It is the mind itself that assumes diverse forms such as correct knowledge, doubt and false understanding. The emergence and cessation of these

are attributed to the pure consciousness itself by delusion.

कुतः कूटस्थात्मसिद्धिरिति चेद्यतः ।

न हानं हानमात्रेण नोदयोऽपीयता यतः ।

तत्सिद्धिः स्यात्तु तद्वीने हानादानविधर्मके ॥ २१ ॥

How is the unchanging Self established?

21. Nothing that appears and nothing that disappears can be established as thus appearing and disappearing by itself. They are established to be appearing and disappearing in the awareness of the Self, which neither appears nor disappears.

एवम् ।

आगमापायिहेतुभ्यां धूत्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।

ततस्तत्त्वमसीत्येतद्वन्त्यस्मदि निजं तमः ॥ २२ ॥

Thus—

22. After discarding all that is non-Self on the ground that it is subject to origin and cessation, the proposition 'That thou art' destroys in the Self its darkness.

इत्यादि पुनः पुनरुच्यते ग्रन्थलाघवाद्बद्धिलाघवं प्रयोजकमिति । तत्र यद्यपि तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यादुपादित्सिद्धिर्द्वितीयात्मार्थवत्पारोक्ष्यसिद्धितीयार्थः प्रतीयते । तथापि तु नैवासावर्थः श्रुत्या तात्पर्येण प्रतिपिपादयिषितः प्रागप्येतस्य प्रतीतत्वादितोममर्थमाह ।

तदित्येतत्पदं लोके बह्वर्थप्रतिपादकम् ।

अपरित्यज्य पारोक्ष्यमभिधानोत्थमेव तत् ॥ २३ ॥

त्वमित्यपि पदं तद्वत्साक्षान्मात्रार्थवाचि तु ।

संसारितामसंत्यज्य सापि स्यादभिधानजा ॥ २४ ॥

In this fashion the same truth is again and again presented, with the idea that as the exposition is rendered easy, the comprehension of meaning becomes easy. Even though the terms 'That' and 'Thou' signify the wanted aspects of meaning, namely, that of being secondless and of being the Self, and similarly those of mediateness and of having a second, the latter aspects of meaning are not purported to be conveyed by the śruti, for they are matters of experience even prior to the hearing of the śruti. This point is brought up now:

23-24. The term 'That' has many meanings in popular parlance. In all its meanings it contains an intimation of mediateness. The term 'Thou' is connotative of the direct knower. But it also contains in its meaning an intimation that what it signifies is a saṁsārin, a soul caught up in transmigratory existence.

विरुद्धोद्देशनत्वान्च पारोक्ष्यदुःखित्वयोरविवक्षितत्वमित्याह ।

उद्दिश्यमानं वाक्यस्थं नोद्देशनगुणान्वितम् ।

आकाङ्क्षितपदार्थेन संसर्गं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ २५ ॥

As the two terms equated contain contradictory connotations, these conflicting elements, namely, mediateness and subjection to misery, are not intended to be asserted. That is brought out now:

25. The subject does not get related to the predicate, along with the aspect that seems natural to it but really conflicts with the predicate.

यत् एतदेवमतोऽनुपादित्सितयोरपि तत्त्वमर्थयोर्विशेषणविशेष्यभावो भेदसंसर्गरहितवाक्यार्थलक्षणायैवेत्युपसंहारः ।

तदो विशेषणार्थत्वं विशेष्यत्वं त्वमस्तथा ।

लक्ष्यलक्षणसंबन्धस्तयोः स्यात्प्रत्यगात्मना ॥ २६ ॥

Therefore, the subject-predicate relationship of the imports of 'That' and 'Thou', which are not really intended, is for indicating a meaning of the proposition devoid of association with difference:

26. The term 'Thou' signifies the subject. The term 'That' signifies the predicate. The proposition as a whole relates them to the inner Self as their indicated import.

कथं पुनरविवक्षितविरुद्धनिरस्यमानस्य लक्षणार्थत्वम् ।

लक्षणं सर्पवद्रज्ज्वाः प्रतीचः स्यादहं तथा ।

तद्वाधेनैव वाक्यार्थं वेत्ति सोऽपि तदाश्रयात् ॥ २७ ॥

How can what is not intended, is conflicting and is rejected serve the purpose of indicating another meaning?

27. Even as the snake indicates the rope, the ego is the indicator of the inner Self. The import of the sentence is grasped by a sublation of the ego and the Self is capable of being so indicated because it is the substratum of the ego.

इयं चावाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिरन्वयव्यतिरेकाभिज्ञस्यैव । यस्मात् ।

यावद्वावन्निरस्यायं देहादीन्प्रत्यगञ्चति ।

तावत्तावत्तदर्थोऽपि त्वमर्थं प्रविविक्षति ॥ २८ ॥

This grasp of the meaning of the sentence which goes beyond its obvious verbal sense, is possible only for him who has known the discrimination between the Self and non-Self. For:

28. As one approaches the inmost Self progressively rejecting the non-Self aspect by aspect from the body onwards, exactly concomitant with the process is the tendency of the meaning of 'That' to merge in the meaning of 'Thou'.

कस्मात्पुनः कारणाद्देहाद्यनात्मत्वप्रतिपत्तावेवात्मा तदर्थमात्मत्वेनाभिलिङ्गते न विपर्यय इति । उच्यते । प्रत्यगात्मानवबोधस्यानात्मस्वाभाव्यात्तदभिनिर्वृत्तश्चायं बुद्ध्यादिदेहान्तस्तस्मिन्नात्मत्वमविद्याकृतमेवात्मत्वमिवानात्मत्वमपि साविद्यस्यैव । यतो निरविद्यो विद्वानवाक्यार्थरूप एव केवलोऽवशिष्यते तस्मादुच्यते ।

देहादिव्यवधानत्वात्तदर्थं स्वयमप्यतः ।

पारोक्ष्येणैव जानाति साक्षात्त्वं तदनात्मनः ॥ २९ ॥

Why is it that the Self fuses with the meaning of 'That' only on our understanding that the non-Self such as the body is not the Self? The non-apprehension of the Self is not inherent to the Self. By that non-apprehension itself all this non-Self like the body is set up. Its identification with the Self is due to nescience. Similarly, its distinction from the Self and its presentation as non-Self is also due to nescience. Thus the enlightened one, free from ignorance, abides alone and is himself of the nature of the non-verbal import of 'That thou art'. Therefore the following is said:

29. It is owing to the intervention of factors like the body, the meaning of 'That', though intrinsic to the Self, appears as if remote and mediately given and the non-Self seems to be immediately apprehended.

यथोक्तार्थप्रतिपत्तिसौकर्याय दृष्टान्तोपादानम् ।

प्रत्यगुद्भूतपित्तस्य यथा बाह्यार्थपीतता ।

चैतन्यं प्रत्यगात्मीयं बहिर्वद्दृश्यते तथा ॥ ३० ॥

To put this point in a clearer light, an analogy is given:

30. One who suffers from jaundice in himself sees all things as yellow. Similarly, the consciousness that is constitutive of the Self appears as if it were an external reality.

यस्मादेवमतो विशुद्धमवसीयताम् ।

पदान्युद्धृत्य वाक्येभ्यो ह्यन्वयव्यतिरेकतः ।

पदार्थल्लोकतो बुद्ध्वा वेत्ति वाक्यार्थमञ्जसा ॥ ३१ ॥

Such being the case, let this be firmly understood:

31. Let the words be properly taken and let their meanings be properly understood through rational discrimination and the usage of the world. Then the final import of the proposition is rightly grasped.

कुतः पुनः सामान्यमात्रवृत्तेः पदस्य वाक्यार्थप्रतिपत्तिहेतुत्वमिति । बाढम् ।

सामान्यं हि पदं ब्रूते विशेषो वाक्यकर्तृकः ।

श्रुत्यादिप्रतिबद्धं सद्विशेषार्थं भवेत्पदम् ॥ ३२ ॥

How do terms standing for generalities produce the understanding of the specific meaning of propositions? It happens this way:

32. A term, of course, stands for a universal. But what is specific is conveyed by sentences. The term itself, determined by its particular context etc., acquires a determinate significance.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं वाक्यमेव सामानाधिकरण्यादिनाविद्यापटलप्रध्वंसद्वारेण मुमुक्षुं स्वाराज्येऽभिषेचयति न त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकमात्रसाध्योऽयमर्थ इत्याह ।

बुद्ध्यादीनामनात्मत्वं लिङ्गादपि च सिध्यति ।

निवृत्तिस्तावता नेतीत्यतो वाक्यं समाश्रयेत् ॥ ३३ ॥

Now it is pointed out that coming after the discrimination between the Self and non-Self, the proposition itself, through relations like co-ordination, destroys the veil of nescience and by that establishes the aspirant after liberation in the supreme kingdom of self-soverignty. This goal is not to be secured by mere discrimination through reason:



33. That the mind etc. are other than the Self can be ascertained by reason also. But they are not finally eliminated thereby. For effecting their elimination recourse to the Vedāntic proposition is imperative.

न केवलमनुमानमात्रशरणोऽभिलषितमर्थं न प्राप्नोतीत्यनर्थं चाप्नोतीत्याह ।

अनादृत्य श्रुतिं मोहादतो बौद्धास्तमस्विनः ।

आपेदिरे निरात्मत्वमनुमानैकचक्षुषः ॥ ३४ ॥

One who subsists on mere reason, does not only fail to achieve the desired goal but also lands in evil. This is brought out now:

34. The Buddhists disregarded the śruti in delusion and were given to darkness as a consequence. They, being guided solely by reasoning, landed in the unreality of the Self.

न चानादरे कारणमस्ति । यस्मात्सर्वत्रैवानादरनिमित्तं प्रमाणस्य प्रमाणान्तर-प्रतिषन्नप्रतिपादनं वा विपरीतप्रतिपादनं वा संशयितप्रतिपादनं वा न वा प्रतिपादनमिति—न चैतेषामन्यतमदपि कारणमस्ति । यत आह ।

मानान्तरानवष्टब्धं निर्दुःख्यात्मानमञ्जसा ।

बोधयन्ती श्रुतिः केन न प्रमाणमितीर्यते ॥ ३५ ॥

In fact, there is no ground for such a disregard. In all cases where such a procedure is legitimate, the knowledge in question must be simply re-affirming what is ascertained through another source of knowledge or it must be affirming what is contradicted by another source or it must be indeterminate in itself or it must fail to convey any knowledge whatever. In the present case, none of these reasons holds goods. Therefore it is said:

35. On what grounds can śruti, which reveals the real Self, free from misery and inaccessible to other sources of knowledge, be judged as not being a source of valid knowledge?

न च संशयितव्यमवगमयति । यतः ।

सर्वसंशयहेतौ हि निरस्ते कथमात्मनि ।

जायेत संशयो वाक्यादनुमानेन युष्मदि ॥ ३६ ॥

Nor does it convey what is open to doubt; for:

36. When the non-Self, which is the root-cause of all possible doubt, is removed through reasoning, how can the meaning of the śruti in relation to the Self be open to doubt?

अपि च ।

यत्र स्यात्संशयो नासौ ज्ञेय आत्मेति पण्डितैः ।

न यतः संशयप्राप्तिरात्मनोज्वगतित्वतः ॥ ३७ ॥

Further—

37. That about which doubts may arise is not to be considered the Self by the wise. With regard to the Self, there could be no doubt, for it is of the nature of awareness itself.

अनवबोधकत्वं तु दूरोत्सारितमेव । यत आह ।

बोधयेऽप्यनुभवो यस्य न कथंचन जायते ।

तं कथं बोधयेच्छास्त्रं लोष्टं नरसमाकृतिम् ॥ ३८ ॥

That the śruti does not reveal anything at all is not even remotely possible. Therefore it is said:

38. How can he in whom no experience arises concerning the matter on hand, be instructed by the scripture? Indeed he is a figure of clay in the likeness of man.

अन्वयव्यतिरेकपुरस्सरं वाक्यमेवावाक्यार्थरूपमात्मानं प्रतिपादयतीत्यस्य पक्षस्य  
ब्रह्मिन् श्रुत्युदाहरणमुपन्यस्यति ।

जिघ्राणीममहं गन्धमिति यो वेत्यविक्रियः ।

स आत्मा तत्परं ज्योतिः शिरसीदं वचः श्रुतेः ॥ ३९ ॥

In support of the position that the Vedāntic proposition itself, coming after discrimination between the Self and non-Self, reveals the Self, which transcends the primary import of the proposition, the authority of the śruti is adduced:

39. The head of the śruti has this statement: 'He who cognizes the ego experiencing "I smell this smell" and is unchanging, is the Self, and he is the supreme light.'

यथा "तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि" इत्यस्य शेषत्वेनान्वयव्यतिरेकश्रुतिर्यथा  
"य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते" इत्याद्या "अथ यो वेदेदं जिघ्राणि" इत्यन्ता तथा  
"अहं ब्रह्मास्मि" इत्यस्य शेषः ।

अहमः प्रत्यगात्मार्यो निरस्ताशेषयुष्मदः ।

ब्रम्भणीति श्रुतिर्न्याय्या योऽयमित्यादिनाऽसकृत् ॥ ४० ॥

Just as the passage beginning with 'He, the puruṣa seen in the right eye' (C.U. VIII vii.4) and ending with 'I am smelling' (C.U. VIII. xii.4) is preliminary and subsidiary to the text, 'That is real, He is the Self and thou art That' (C.U. VI. viii.7), even so the text 'I am Brahman' has the following subsidiary passage:

40. The śruti 'He who is full of consciousness, and resides as the inner light among senses etc'. (B.U. IV. iii.7) repeatedly refers to the inmost Self divested of all non-Self in the manner of reason.

कथं पुनरयमर्थोऽवसीयते अहंव्याजेनात्रात्मार्यो बुबोधयिषित इति । यतः ।

एष आत्मा स्वयंज्योती रविसोमाग्निवाक्षु सः ।

इतेष्वस्तं दृगेवास्ते भासयंश्चित्तचेष्टितम् ॥ ४१ ॥

How is it known that the real Self is referred to by the gateway of the ego?

41. This Self is self-luminous and it illumines the activities of the mind when the sun, moon, fire and speech subside and set.

निर्णेनेक्ति च पृष्टो मुनिः ।

आत्मनैवेत्युपश्रुत्य कोऽयमात्मेत्युदीरिते ।

बुद्धेः परं स्वतोमुक्तमात्मानं मुनिरभ्यधात् ॥ ४२ ॥

The sage, being asked, specifically settled this matter:

42. The King, being told 'by the light of the Self, it remains' (B.U. IV. iii. 6) asks, 'Who is this Self?' In reply the sage speaks of the Self, transcending the mind and intrinsically free.

यस्माच्चात्मात्राहंव्याजेन प्रत्यङ्मात्रो जिग्राहयिषितस्तस्मादहंवृत्तिः स्वरूपस्य विलयेनेव वाक्यार्थाविगमाय कारणत्वं प्रतिपद्यत इतीममर्थमाह ।

अहंवृत्त्यैव तद्ब्रह्म यस्मादेषोऽवगच्छति ।

तत्स्वरूपलयेनातः कारणं स्यादहंकृतिः ॥ ४३ ॥

The inner Self is to be grasped through the ego-consciousness. Therefore, the ego sheds its own being and leads to the apprehension of the import of the proposition:

43. As one understands that Brahman through the ego-awareness, the ego becomes instrumental in this matter by self-elimination.

अत एव च यः प्रतिज्ञातोऽर्थो "नाहंप्राह्ये न तद्धीने" इत्यादिः स युक्ति-भिरुपपादित इति कृत्वोपसंह्रियते ।

गृहीताहंपदार्थश्चेत्कस्माज्ज्ञो न प्रपद्यते ।

प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधाच्चेत्प्रतीच्युक्तिर्न युष्मदि ॥ ४४ ॥

Therefore, what was declared in the beginning (II.5) stands vindicated through reason and as such the argument concludes:

44. If a person has understood the import of 'I' in the proposition 'I am Brahman', why does he not understand the meaning of the whole proposition? If it be said that the proposition goes against the evidence of perception etc. it is untenable. The proposition concerns the inmost and self-luminous Self and not the external world.

पूर्वस्यैव श्लोकार्थस्य विस्पष्टार्थमाह ।

पराञ्च्येव तु सर्वाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि नात्मनि ।

प्रतीच्येव प्रवृत्तं तत्सदसीति वचोऽञ्जसा ॥ ४५ ॥

The significance of the verse above is cleared:

45. All evidences like perception pertain to external objects and do not concern themselves with the Self. On the contrary, scripture saying 'That ultimate Being, you are', by its very nature, relates to the Self.

तस्मात्प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयेभ्यो हीयमानोपादीयमानेभ्योऽन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां मुञ्जे-  
षोकावदशेषबुद्धिविक्रियासाक्षितयात्मानं निष्कृष्य तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येभ्योऽपूर्वादि-  
लक्षणमात्मानं विजानीयात् । तदेतदाह ।

अहं दुःखी सुखी चेति येनायं प्रत्ययोऽध्रुवः ।

अवगत्यन्त आभाति स म आत्मेति वाक्यधीः ॥ ४६ ॥

Therefore, in the total world of experience consisting of the knower, knowing and the objects of knowledge, and the things to be appropriated and rejected, one must, through rational discrimination, distinguish the Self, that is the witness of all the modifications of the mind and understand through texts like 'That thou art'

its nature of which time-sequences etc. are denied in the scripture. This is drawn out now:

46. The scriptural proposition is to the effect 'He is my Self' referring to that through whose light of consciousness the fleeting experiences such as 'I am miserable', 'I am happy' occur culminating in definite cognitions.

प्रमाणान्तरानवष्टब्धं निरस्ताशेषकार्यकारणात्मकद्वैतप्रपञ्चं सत्यज्ञानानन्द-  
लक्षणमात्मानं तत्त्वमस्यहंब्रह्मास्मीत्यादिवाक्यं संशयितमिथ्याज्ञानाज्ञानप्रध्वंसमुखेन  
साक्षादपरोक्षात्करतलन्यस्तामलकवत्प्रतिपादयत्येवेत्यसकृदभिहितम् । तत्र केचिदाहुः-  
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैर्यथावस्थितवस्तुयाथात्म्यान्वाख्याननिष्ठैर्न यथोक्तोऽर्थः प्रतिपत्तुं  
शक्यतेऽभिधाश्रुतित्वात्तेषाम् । न हि लोकेऽभिधाश्रुतेः प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षाया  
नद्यास्तीरे फलानि सन्तीत्यादिकायाः प्रामाण्यमभ्युपगतम् । अतो नियोगमुखेनैवा-  
भिधाश्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं युक्तं प्रमाणान्तरनिरपेक्षत्वान्नियोगस्य । अस्य परिहारार्थमशेष-  
प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमेयत्वनिराकरणद्वारेणातीन्द्रियार्थविषयत्वादभिधाश्रुतेः प्रामाण्यं सुप्तपुरुष-  
प्रबोधकवाक्यस्यैव वक्तव्यमित्ययमारम्भः ।

नित्यावगतिरूपत्वादन्यमानानपेक्षणात् ।

शब्दादिगुणहीनत्वात्संशयानवतारतः ॥ ४७ ॥

तृष्णानिष्ठीवनैर्नात्मा प्रत्यक्षाद्यैः प्रमीयते ।

प्रत्यगात्मत्वहेतोश्च स्वार्थत्वादप्रमेयतः ॥ ४८ ॥

The ultimate Self goes beyond the other modes of knowledge and is divested of the whole world of plurality consisting of causes and effect. Its essential nature is constituted of reality, knowledge and bliss. It is this Self that texts like 'That thou art' and 'I am Brahman' reveal by destroying doubt, false understanding and ignorance and present to direct apprehension, as if it were a fruit in one's own hand. All this has been stated by us over and over again.

In this connection some raise the following objection: The texts like 'That thou art', purporting to expound reality as it actually

is, cannot convey the meaning ascribed to them for they are existential in import. In ordinary life, existential statements like, 'On the bank of the rivers, there are fruits', not supported by other corroborative evidence, are not accorded validity. Hence such statements must be thought of as valid by means of their connection with injunctive propositions, for injunctive proposition are independent of other sources of knowledge.

In order to rule out this objection, it has to be pointed out now that these existential texts of the śruti relate to a theme, which being super-sensuous, transcends all other means of knowledge like perception and hence are valid, like the words that wake up a man from sleep. For this purpose the next phase of the argument is initiated:

47-48. As the Self is of the nature of eternal awareness, as it stands in need of no other proof, as it is without physical qualities like sound, as it is that about whose existence doubts can never arise, as it is the inmost Self, as it is an end to itself in itself, as it is not an object of knowledge, it is not cognized through ways of knowing like perception by persons governed by worldly desires.

श्रुतिरपीममर्थं निर्वदति ।

दिदृक्षितपरिच्छिन्नपराग्रूपादिसंश्रयात् ।

विपरीतमतो दृष्ट्या स्वतोबुद्धं न पश्यति ॥ ४९ ॥

न्यायसिद्धमतो वक्ति दृष्टेर्द्वष्टारमात्मनः ।

न पश्येत्प्रत्यगात्मानं प्रमाणं श्रुतिरादरात् ॥ ५० ॥

The śruti also says the same thing:

49-50. This is contrary in nature, to things limited and external about which ordinary investigation is

undertaken. It is self-revealed, and hence, through ordinary apprehension, it is not to be seen. The authoritative śruti declares with keen interest what is eminently logical, when it says 'Your inner Self, the seer of seeing, you cannot see'.

अनुमानाविषयत्वेऽन्यदपि कारणमुच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्षस्य पराक्त्वान्न संबन्धग्रहणं यतः ।

आत्मनोऽतोऽनुमित्यास्यानुभवो न कथंचन ॥ ५१ ॥

There is another reason also for its not being an object of inference:

51. Perception is directed to external objects. It is in perception that the connection between ground and consequence necessary for inference is to be established. Therefore, in relation to the Self, such connection cannot be grasped. Therefore no experience of Self can be acquired through inference.

एवमयं प्रमातृप्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः सर्व एव पराचीनविषय एव न प्रतीचीन-  
मात्मानमवगाहयितुमलम् । एवं च सत्यनेनैव यथोक्तोऽर्थोऽवसातुं शक्यत इत्याह ।

प्रमाणव्यवहारोऽयं सर्व एव पराग्यतः ।

सुविचार्याप्यतोऽनेन युष्मद्येव दिदृक्षते ॥ ५२ ॥

Thus this whole world of the knower, knowing and the object of knowing falls within the external world and so it cannot fathom the inner reality of the Self. This being so, it can be approached only in the manner specified by us:

52. As this entire mechanism of knowledge relates to the external world, however far we may examine, the ordinary modes of knowledge are only for gaining knowledge of external objects.



यस्मात्लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणानधिगम्योऽहंब्रह्मास्मीति वाक्यार्थस्तस्मात् ।

अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां निरस्याप्राणतो यतेः ।

वीक्षापन्नस्य कोऽस्मीति तदसीति श्रुतिर्जगौ ॥ ५३ ॥

Because the import of 'I am Brahman' cannot be apprehended through ordinary modes of knowing, it follows:

53. To the enquirer who, after rejecting every phenomenon up to the vital breath as non-Self, asks 'Who am I?' the śruti furnishes the answer 'You are *That*'.

सोऽयमन्वयव्यतिरेकन्याय एतावानेव यदवसानो वाक्यार्थस्तदभिज्ञस्याहंब्रह्मा-  
स्मीत्याविर्भवति । द्रष्टृदृश्यविभागेनागमापायिसाक्षिविभागेन च श्रुत्यभ्युपगमतः  
संक्षिप्योच्यते ।

दृश्यत्वाद्घटवद्देहो देहवच्चेन्द्रियाण्यपि ।

मनश्चेन्द्रियवज्ज्ञेयं मनोवन्निश्चयादिमत् ॥ ५४ ॥

The rational discrimination stretches only up to this point. As it culminates here, there manifests the import of the proposition 'I am Brahman', to one who has followed it. The distinction between the Self and the non-Self on the grounds that one is the seer and the other is the seen and that one is subject to origin and disappearance and the other is the witness thereof is briefly presented here in accordance with the śruti:

54. As it is an object of perception, the body is like the jar (in being other than the Self). The senses are like the body in this respect. The mind is like the senses. The intellect, the determinative inner sense, is like the mind.

तथा सकलकार्यकारणागमापायि विभागसाक्षित्वेनापि ।

प्रागसद्याति पश्चात्सत्सच्च यायादसत्तथा ।

अनात्माभिजनं तत्स्याद्विपरीतः स्वयं दृशिः ॥ ५५ ॥

The Self is the witness of distinctions which arise and pass away and which consist of the causes and effects:

55. What is non-existent before acquires being afterwards and what is existent passes into non-being afterwards. This is the geneology of the non-self. But the witnessing consciousness is quite unlike this in its intrinsic nature.

तत्र घटादीनां दृश्यानामनात्मत्वं द्रष्टात्मपूर्वकं प्रत्यक्षेणैव प्रमाणेनोपलभ्याना-  
त्मनश्चासाधारणान्धर्मानिवधायं तद्वृत्त्यवस्थागमापायादिभिर्धर्मैः शरीरेन्द्रियमनोनिश्च-  
यादिवृत्तीरनात्मतया व्युदस्याहंवृत्तिमतोऽपि दृश्यत्वाविशेषाद्द्रष्टृपूर्वकत्वमवसीयते ।  
तदेतदाह ।

घटादयो यथा लिङ्गं स्युः परंपरयाहमः ।

दृश्यत्वादहमप्येवं लिङ्गं स्याद्द्रष्टुरात्मनः ॥ ५६ ॥

By perception itself it is ascertained that external objects like a jar are other than the Self, being objects of perception and that they presuppose the seeing Self. By these examples the distinguishing characteristics of the non-Self are discerned. These characteristics like objectivity and subjection to origin and cessation are found in the body, the senses, mind and intellect. From this fact it is determined that they are other than the Self. Even the ego shares the attribute of being objective and hence it is also classed as the non-self and that it also presupposes the transcendent witness is made out. This is pointed out now:

56. Just as the objects like a jar become ultimately inferential clues to the ego through the several links leading up to the latter, even the ego, being an object of experience, becomes an inferential clue to the witnessing Self.

ननु द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यानां जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्तेष्वागमापायदर्शनाद्यत्साक्षिकौ तेषामा-  
गमापायौ स आगमापायविभागरहित आत्मा यथा यस्मिन्बन्धनौ जगतः प्रकाशा-  
प्रकाशौ स प्रकाशाप्रकाशविभागरहितः सूर्य इति । यदा चेवं तदा वाक्यावगम्यस्यार्थ-

स्यानुदितानस्तमितविज्ञानमात्रस्वभावस्यानुमानेनैव प्रतिपन्नत्वात्पुनरपि वाक्यस्य निर्विषयत्वप्रसङ्गः । नैष दोषः । लिङ्गव्यवधानेन तत्प्रतिपत्तेः । ननु साक्षाद-  
परोक्षादात्मस्वभावेनानात्मनो हानोपादानयोः संबन्धग्रहणात्कमतिशयं वाक्यं कुर्यात् ।  
मैवं बोधः । लिङ्गाधीनत्वात्तत्प्रतिपत्तेः । न हि लिङ्गव्यवधानेनात्मप्रतिपत्तिः साक्षा-  
त्प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति "यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्यः" इति श्रुतेः । अत आह ।

**लिङ्गमस्ति त्वनिष्ठत्वाच्च स्याद्वाक्यार्थबोधकम् ।**

**सदसव्युत्थितात्माऽयमतो वाक्यात्प्रतीयते ॥ ५७ ॥**

The following objection may be raised: The sun illumines the world and the setting of the sun plunges the world in darkness. Still in the sun itself there is no transformation by way of losing luminosity and gaining it. In the same way the objects of experience seen by the seer, appear and disappear in the course of the three states of waking, dream and sleep and he who witnesses their coming into being and cessation does not undergo changes by way of coming into being and cessation. When this is comprehended, we realize, that the import of the Vedāntic propositions, namely, the Self of the nature of pure consciousness, subject to no beginning and no termination is understood by reasoning itself and there is no matter for the Vedāntic proposition to convey.

We reply that this position is untenable. The understanding of the Self in the manner described is through the mediation of inferential ground.

But the connection between the Self, of the nature of immediacy and the objects, the objector continues, appropriated and rejected, is directly and immediately grasped. What more can Vedāntic proposition accomplish?

Do not say so. The apprehension of the Self by way of reasoning is dependent on the inferential ground. Surely apprehension through the mediation of the inferential ground cannot be direct apprehension and the śruti says 'This self reveals its nature to him' (K.U. I. ii. 32). Therefore it follows:

**57. As the inferential ground rests on (empirical) existence, it cannot convey the meaning of the pro-**

position. This Self going beyond existence and non-existence is, therefore, grasped through the proposition.

ननु यदि व्यावृत्तसदसद्विकल्पजालं-वस्त्वभीष्टं वाक्याद्भवतस्तथापि तूत्सार्यते वाक्यविषया तृष्णा—यस्मादन्तरेणापि वाक्यश्रवणं निरस्ताशेषविकल्पमागोपाला-विपालपण्डितं सुषुप्ते वस्तु सिद्धमतो नार्थो वाक्यश्रवणेन । नैतदेवम् । किं कारणम् । सर्वानर्थबीजस्यात्मानवबोधस्य सुषुप्ते संभवात् । यदि हि सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानं नाभविष्य-दन्तरेणापि वेदान्तवाक्यश्रवणमनननिविध्यासनान्यहं ब्रह्मास्मीत्यध्यवसायात्सर्वप्राण-भूतामपि स्वरसत एव सुषुप्तप्रतिपत्तेः सकलसंसारोच्छित्तिप्रसङ्गः । न च कैवल्या-त्युत्कृष्टानं न्याय्यमनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गात् । न चान्य एव सुषुप्तोऽन्य एवोत्थित इति शक्यं वक्तुं नाद्राक्षमहं सुषुप्तेऽन्यत्किंचिदपीत्युत्थितस्य प्रत्यभिज्ञादर्शनात् । तस्मा-दवश्यं सुषुप्तेऽज्ञानमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । ननु यदि तत्राज्ञानमभविष्यद्रागद्वेषघटाज्ञानादि-वत्प्रत्यक्षमभविष्यद्यथेह लोके घटं न जानामीत्यज्ञानमव्यवहितं प्रत्यक्षम् । अत्रोच्यते । न । अभिव्यञ्जकाभावात् । कथमभिव्यञ्जकाभाव इति चेच्छृणु ।

बाह्यां वृत्तिमनुत्पाद्य व्यक्तिः स्यान्नाहमो यथा ।

नतःस्तःकरणं तद्वद्वान्तस्य व्यक्तिराञ्जसी ॥ ५८ ॥

If you desire to know through the proposition the reality bereft of all determinations of the form of existence and non-existence, even then the inclination to seek it through the proposition ought to cease. Quite independently of all propositions, reality bereft of all determinations presents itself to every one, be he a fool or a sage, in the state of dreamless sleep.

This objection cannot stand to reason. In sleep there obtains the non-apprehension of the Self, which is the root-cause of all evil. If there were no ignorance in sleep, then it should follow that the experience 'I am Brahman' must occur independent of the hearing of Vedānta, reflection and meditation on it and the bondage of all creatures must stand destroyed, for all creatures enjoy sleep as a matter of natural law. When once perfection is thus attained, there should have been no waking up from sleep, for that would mean that there is no final deliverance. It is not possible to say that one person goes to sleep and another person wakes up, for the man who wakes up recognizes his identity with the subject of sleep

in the experience 'I saw nothing else while asleep'. Therefore the existence of ignorance in sleep must be necessarily admitted.

But, it may be argued, if there were ignorance in sleep it should have been a matter of perception like the ignorance of desire, hatred and of things like a jar in waking life. In ordinary experience, ignorance of the form 'I do not know the jar' is a case of immediate perception.

To this we reply that there is no perception of ignorance in sleep itself, because, the conditions needed for manifesting perceptual experience are absent in sleep. If you ask how the conditions are absent then, we give the following explanation:

58. The ego does not manifest itself without generating the awareness of external objects. In the same way, in the absence of the internal sense, the mind, ignorance does not enjoy the status of a perceptual object.

कश्चिदतिक्रान्तं प्रतिस्मृत्य "दृश्यत्वादहमप्येवं लिङ्गं स्याद्दुरात्मनः" इति निर्युक्तिकमभिहितमित्याह । किं कारणम् । अहंतज्ज्ञात्रोविवेकाप्रसिद्धेः । यथेह घटदेवदत्तयोर्ग्राह्याहकत्वेन स्फुटतरो विभागः प्रसिद्धो लोके न तथेहाहंकारतज्ज्ञात्रोविभागोऽस्तीति तस्मादसाध्वेतदभिहितमिति । अत्रोच्यते ।

दाह्यादाहकतैकत्र यथा स्याद्वह्निदारुणोः ।

ज्ञेयज्ञातृकतैवं स्यादहंज्ञात्रोः परस्परम् ॥ ५९ ॥

Some one remembering what has gone before, objects to the statement that 'the ego also being an object becomes an inferential clue to the witnessing Self' (56) as illogical. On what grounds? Because the distinction between the ego and the knower of the ego is not a wellknown fact. We know clearly that the jar and Deva-datta who knows it are mutually different, one being the object seen and the other its seer. The same is not the case with the ego and its seer. Hence the statement referred to is untrue. We say the following in reply:

59. The object being burnt and the agency that burns co-exist in the fire and fuel. In the same way, the property of being the knower and that of being the object known co-exist in the knower and the ego.

एवं तावदविद्योत्थस्यान्तःकरणस्य बाह्यविषयनिमित्तरूपावच्छेदायाहंवृत्तिर्व्या-  
प्रियते । तयावच्छिन्नं सत्कूटस्थप्रत्यगात्मोपादानावबोधरूपस्याव्यवधानतया विषय-  
भावं प्रतिपद्यते इति । तत्र तयोर्ज्ञात्रिहंतारूपयोरवभासकावभास्यसंबन्धव्यतिरेकेण  
नान्यत्संबन्धान्तरमुपपद्यते । अहंतारूपं त्वात्मसात्कृत्वाऽहंकञ्चुकं परिधायोपकार्य-  
त्वोपकारकत्वक्षमः सन् बाह्यविषयेणोपकारिणापकारिणा वात्मात्मीयं संबन्धं प्रति-  
पद्यते । तदभिधीयते ।

इदं ज्ञानं भवेज्ज्ञातुर्ममज्ञानं तथाहमः ।

अज्ञानोपाधिनेदं स्याद्विक्रियातोऽहमो मम ॥ ६० ॥

Thus, the modification of the nature of the ego comes into being in the mind, which is a product of nescience, for determining the specific form of it induced by the external object. That modification of the mind becomes directly the object of an awareness which is a product of the eternal Self. Between the knowing Self and the ego, there can be no relation other than that of the illuminer and the illumined. Appropriating the ego to itself and putting on the coat of the ego, the Self assumes the forms of the helped and helper. In connection with external objects, favourable and adverse, it attributes to itself appropriate relations towards them. This is brought out now:

60. The knowledge of 'This' arises in the knower and the knowledge of 'Mine' arises in the ego. 'This' is a product of ignorance and 'Mine' is a product of the modification of the nature of the ego thereof.

एकस्यैव ज्ञातुरन्तर्बाह्यनिमित्तभेदाद्विभिन्नेऽपि विषय इदं ममेति ज्ञानं द्वैरूप्यं  
जायत इत्युक्तम् । अत्रोपक्रियमाणापक्रियमाणस्यैव ज्ञातुर्विषये ममप्रत्ययो भवति

विपर्यये चेदंप्रत्यय इति कथमवगम्यते । अवगम्यतामन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् ।  
तत्कथमित्याह ।

अनुपक्रियमाणत्वान्न ज्ञातुः स्यादहं मम ।

घटादिवदिदं तु स्यान्मोहमात्रव्यपाश्रयात् ॥ ६१ ॥

In the same knower, two units of knowledge with regard to the object arise as 'This' and as 'Mine', owing to the differences of causes internal and external. The object is known as 'Mine' in relation to the knower supposed to be helped or injured by the object. In the absence of that relation of help and injury it is simply felt as 'This'. How is this construed? This is construed by rational discrimination. It is this way:

61. The ego never presents itself as 'Mine' to the knower for the pure knower is neither helped nor injured by anything. Since he is covered by ignorance only, it appears as 'This'.

मोहतत्कार्याश्रयत्वाज्ज्ञातृत्वविक्रिययोः पूर्वत्रेदंमज्ञानान्वयः प्रदर्शितः । अथा-  
धुना तद्व्यतिरेकेण व्यतिरेकप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

विक्रियाज्ञानशून्यत्वाच्चेदं न च ममात्मनः ।

उत्थितस्य सतोऽज्ञानं नाहमज्ञासिषं यतः ॥ ६२ ॥

It was shown earlier that the knower and the ego, owing to ignorance and the (resulting) modifications come to be associated with 'This' and 'Mine' respectively in their knowledge. Now the contrary is pointed out:

62. In sleep, as the Self is without ignorance and modifications, there is neither 'This' nor 'Mine'. After one wakes up he reasons out the presence of ignorance on the basis of the fact that he knew nothing in that state.

आत्मानात्मविवेकस्येयत्ताप्रदर्शनार्थमाह ।

वाक्यप्रत्यक्षमानाभ्यामियानर्थः प्रतीयते ।

अनर्थकृत्तमोहानिर्वाक्यादेव सदात्मनः ॥ ६३ ॥

The culmination of the discrimination between the Self and the non-self is brought out:

63. Through scriptural statements (not mahāvāk-  
yas) and perceptual evidence this much is known.  
The Self is distinguished from all else. But the ignor-  
ance of the real Self, which is the source of all evil,  
is destroyed only by the Vedāntic proposition.

द्वितीयाध्यायादौ श्रोतृचतुष्टयमुपन्यस्तम् । तत्र कृत्स्नानात्मनिवृत्तौ सत्यां यः  
प्रत्यगात्मन्यवाक्यार्थतां प्रतिपद्यते स क्षपिताशेषान्तरायहेतुरिति न तं प्रति वक्तव्यं  
किंचिदप्यवशिष्यते । योऽपि वाक्यश्रवणमात्रादेव प्रतिपद्यते तस्याप्यतीन्द्रियशक्तिमत्-  
त्वाच्च किंचिदप्यपेक्षितव्यमस्ति । यश्च श्राविततत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यः स्वयमेवान्वयव्यतिरेकौ  
कृत्वा तदवसान एव वाक्यार्थं प्रतिपद्यतेऽसावपि यथार्थं प्रतिपन्न इति पूर्ववदेषोपेक्षि-  
तव्यः । यः पुनरन्वयव्यतिरेकौ कारयित्वापि पुनःपुनर्वाक्यं श्राव्यते यथाभूतार्थप्रति-  
पत्तये तस्य कृतान्वयव्यतिरेकस्य सतः कथं वाक्यं श्राव्यत इति । उच्यते ।

नवसंख्याहृतज्ञानो दशमो विभ्रमाद्यथा ।

न वेत्ति दशमोऽस्मीति वीक्षमाणोऽपि तान्नव ॥ ६४ ॥

At the commencement of the second chapter four classes of pupils were mentioned. Among them he who comprehends the inmost Self, the entire world of non-Self having disappeared for him, has no trace of the cause of evil still remaining. Nothing more need be said about him. He who, on hearing the scriptural statement, understands reality at once has supersensible power and therefore is in need of nothing more. He who is instructed by a preceptor in the texts like 'That thou art' and engages in rational discrimination by himself, understands the import of the proposition as the discriminative process reaches its culmination in him. He understands it aright and there is no more concern about him.



But he, who is conducted through the discriminative process and is made to listen to the proposition again and again, for being induced to the apprehension of truth, occasions further enquiry. He has already gone through the rational process of discrimination. How is he taught the proposition? The question is answered:

64. It is similar to the case of the tenth man, who, counting only the other nine men, does not count himself as the tenth in sheer delusion, though he is looking round carefully on the nine others.

अथ दृष्टान्तगतमर्थं दार्ष्टान्तिकार्थे समर्पयिष्यन्नाह ।

अपविद्धद्वयोऽप्येवं तत्त्वमस्यादिना विना ।

वेत्ति नैकलमात्मानं नान्वेष्यं चात्र कारणम् ॥ ६५ ॥

The point of the analogy is exhibited in the present case:

65. Though the Self is without a second, one does not understand this single Self, without the help of the texts like 'That thou art'. There is no need to search for the cause of this situation.

नान्वेष्यं चात्र कारणमित्युक्तं तत्कस्मादिति चोदिते प्रत्याहान्वेषणासहिष्णु-  
त्वात् । तत्कथमित्याह ।

सेयं भ्रान्तिनिरालम्बा सर्वन्यायविरोधिनी ।

सहते न विचारं सा तमो यद्वद्दिवाकरम् ॥ ६६ ॥

That 'There is no need to search for the cause of this' has been asserted because the matter cannot bear investigation. How?

66. This illusion is baseless and is opposed to all logic. It cannot endure inquiry even as darkness cannot endure the sun.

तस्याः खल्वस्या अविद्याया भ्रान्तेः सम्यग्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिद्वारेण निवृत्तिः ।

बुभुत्सोच्छेदिनी चास्य सदसीत्यादिना दृढम् ।

प्रतीचि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यान्नासौ मानान्तराद्भवेत् ॥ ६७ ॥

This illusion of the nature of nescience is put an end to by the rise of perfect knowledge.:

67. Concerning the inmost Self knowledge arises firmly from the text, 'Thou art that Being' which extinguishes all further enquiry. This knowledge cannot come from other sources of knowledge.

कथं पुनर्वाक्यं प्रतिपादयत्येवेति चेद् दृष्टान्तोक्तिः ।

जिज्ञासोर्दशमं यद्वन्नवातिक्रम्य ताम्यतः ।

त्वमेव दशमोऽसीति कुर्यादेवं प्रमां वचः ॥ ६८ ॥

How is it to be made out that the text positively brings about this knowledge? To explain this, an analogy is advanced:

68. To one who after counting nine persons torments himself searching for the tenth man, the proposition, 'You are yourself the tenth man' does bring correct understanding.

सा च तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यश्रवणजा प्रमोत्पन्नत्वादेव । न च नैवमिति प्रत्य-  
यान्तरं जायते । तदेतद्दृष्टान्तेन प्रतिपादयति ।

दशमोऽसीति वाक्योत्था न धीरस्य विहन्यते ।

आदिमध्यावसानेषु न नवस्वस्य संशयः ॥ ६९ ॥

एवं तत्त्वमसीत्यस्माद्वैतनुत्प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

सम्यग्ज्ञातत्वमर्थस्य जायेतैव प्रमा दृढा ॥ ७० ॥

Now this knowledge arising from 'That thou art' is valid merely by virtue of its origination. No knowledge arises afterwards to the effect 'It is not so'. This is explained through the analogy.

69-70. The understanding born of the statement 'You are the tenth man' is not stultified. At no time, in the beginning, middle and end, is there any doubt that there are nine persons already. Similarly, in one, who has perfectly understood already the import of 'Thou' unshakable knowledge about the inmost Self positively arises from the proposition 'That thou art', which dispels all duality.

प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रमोपजायत इत्युक्तं तत्र चोद्यते । किं यथा घटादिप्रमेयविषया प्रमा कर्त्रादिकारकभेदानपह्लवेन जायते तथैवोताशेषकारकग्रामोपमर्देन कर्तुः प्रत्यगात्मनीति । उच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्तास्य स्वतोरूपं निष्क्रियाकारकाफलम् ।

अद्वितीयं तदिद्धा धीः प्रत्यगात्मेव लक्ष्यते ॥ ७१ ॥

That 'Knowledge arises about the inmost Self' has been said. Does this arise like the knowledge about a jar etc. without cancelling the diversity of factors involved in action? Or does it arise by destroying all such plurality of causal factors in the agent, i.e., the Self? The question is answered in the next verse:

71. Immediate self-awareness is the intrinsic nature of the Self. It is without action, the factors of action and the fruits of action. It is without a second. This intellect ignited by it, as it were, appears as the inner Self.

यस्मादेवम् ।

विपश्चित्तोऽप्यतस्तस्यामात्मभावं वितन्वते ।

द्वीयस्त्विन्द्रियार्थेषु क्षीयते ह्युत्तरोत्तरम् ॥ ७२ ॥

Hence:

72. Even the wise man sees sometimes the Self in the intellect. For him phenomena like the senses

and their objects, remote in varying degrees from this inner sense, lose their claim to be the Self in accordance with their distance from it.

आह । यदि वाक्यमेव यथाभूतार्थविबोधकमथ कस्य हेतोरविद्योत्थापितस्य कर्तृत्वादेरुपदेश इत्युक्ते प्रतिविधीयते ।

भ्रान्तिप्रसिद्धचानूद्यार्थं तत्तत्त्वं भ्रान्तिबाधया ।

अयं नेत्युपदिश्येत तथैवं तत्त्वमित्यपि ॥ ७३ ॥

An objection is raised here: 'If the proposition itself teaches the truth, why, then, is the Self taught as having agency etc. which are all attributes brought about by nescience?' This is answered now:

73. When something is the object of an illusory apprehension, it is first of all referred to as it is known under the illusion and then its real nature is taught by the removal of the illusion by saying 'This is not so'. So is the case in 'That thou art' also.

इममर्थं दृष्टान्तेन बुद्धावारोहयति ।

स्थाणुः स्थाणुरितीवोक्तिर्न नृबुद्धिं निरस्यति ।

व्यनुवादात्तथैवोक्तिर्भ्रान्तिं पुंसो न बाधते ॥ ७४ ॥

This principle is brought home through an analogy:

74. If a man merely repeats 'This is a post, this is a post' without reference to the fact that it has been mistaken for a man so far, he does not succeed in removing the illusion that it is a man. Similarly if it is simply said 'You are that' without referring to what the subject is taken to be in illusion, that illusion about the Self does not get removed.

यस्माच्छ्रोतृप्रसिद्धानुवाद्येव त्वमितिपदं तस्मादुद्दिश्यमानस्थत्वाद्दुःखित्वादेर-  
विवक्षितत्वमेव । विधीयमानत्वे हि सति विरोधप्रसङ्गो न तु विधीयमानानूद्य-  
मानयोरिति । स्वप्रधानयोर्हि पदयोर्विरोधाशङ्का सामान्यालिङ्गितत्वात्तयोर्न  
विपर्यये ।

अनालिङ्गितसामान्यौ न जिहासितवादिनौ ।

व्युत्थितौ तत्त्वमौ तस्मादन्योन्याभिसमीक्षणौ ॥ ७५ ॥

Since the term 'Thou' merely recalls what the subject is ordinarily taken to be, the subjection to suffering etc. are parts of the connotation of the subject, and they are not intended to be affirmed. Only if they also were predicated there would be contradiction between them and the new predication embodied in 'Thou art that'. There can be no conflict between what is simply referred to as connotation of the subject and what is predicated anew. Only between principal factors there could be a contradiction, as they are universal in their significance and not when they are not so:

75. Therefore the terms 'That' and 'Thou' put in apposition in the proposition give up their normal meanings and do not signify anything contrary to the intended unitary purport and thus are divested of their mutually conflicting general connotations being mutually conditioned.

अपास्तसामान्यार्थत्वादनुवादस्थत्वाद्विधीयमानेन च सह विरोधाद्दुःखित्वा-  
देरस्तु कामं जिहासितार्थयोरसंसर्गो यथोपन्यस्तदोषविरहात्तत्त्वमर्थयोः संसर्गोऽस्तु  
नीलोत्पलवदिति चेन्नैवमन्युपपद्यते । तस्मात् ।

तदर्थयोस्तु निष्ठात्मा द्वयपारोक्ष्यवर्जितः ।

नाद्वितीयं विनात्मानं नात्मा नित्यदृशा विना ॥ ७६ ॥

Let the terms 'That' and 'Thou' be interpreted this way as not meaning a complex of many items, for avoiding the difficulty specified, on the ground that they signify no universals as usual and that the connotation of subjection to misery etc. carried by

the term 'Thou' is simply for reference and is in conflict with what is predicated by the term 'That'. But the signification of a complex whole may still be admitted on the part of their implied meanings as in the case of the term 'Blue lotus'. We reply that this is not tenable:

76. The two terms have as their final import the Self which is at once without a second and is immediately revealed. To be without a second is not possible without identity with the Self and being the Self is impossible without identity with the eternal consciousness.

अत्राह । किमिह जिह्वासितं किं वोपावित्सितमिति । उच्यते । प्रत्यगात्मार्या-  
भिषायिनस्त्वंपदादुभयं प्रतीयतेऽहं दुःखी प्रत्यगात्मा च । तत्र च प्रत्यगात्मनोऽहं  
दुःखीत्यनेनाभिसंबन्ध आत्मयाथात्म्यानवबोधहेतुक एव । अतोऽहमर्थोऽनर्थोऽपसृष्टत्वाव-  
ज्ञानोत्पत्त्वाच्च हेय इति प्रत्यक्षतोवसीयते । तदर्थे किं हेयं किं वोपादेयमिति नाव-  
धियते । तत इदमभिधीयते ।

पारोक्ष्यं यत्तदर्थं स्यात्तद्वेद्यमहमर्थवत् ।

प्रतीचेवाहमोऽभेदः पारोक्ष्येणात्मनोऽपि मे ॥ ७७ ॥

It is to be decided as to what aspects of the meanings of the two terms 'Thou' and 'That' are to be rejected and what are to be taken up. By the term 'Thou' reference is made to the fact that the subject is in misery and that it is the immediate Self. The connection of the immediate Self with misery is only due to the non-apprehension of the real nature of the Self. Therefore by perception itself it is established that the ego must be discarded, as evil enters into its being and as it arises from ignorance. What is to be accepted and what is rejected in the import of 'That' is not determined. Hence the next statement:

77. The mediacy, or not being the object of direct experience, which is a part of the meaning of 'That' must be discarded like the ego in the meaning

of 'Thou'. The connection of mediacy with the supreme Self is similar to that of the ego with the immediate Self.

कथं पुनस्तदर्थोऽद्वितीयलक्षणः प्रत्यगात्मोपाश्रयं सद्वितीयत्वं दुःखित्वं निरन्वय-  
मपनुदतीति । उच्यते । न चैतयोनिवर्तकनिवर्त्यभावं वयं ब्रूमः । कथं तर्हि ।  
त्वमर्थे प्रत्यगात्मनि प्रागनवबुद्धाद्वितीयता सानेनावबोध्यते । अतोऽनवबोधनिरासेन  
तदुत्थस्य सद्वितीयत्वस्य त्वमर्थस्थस्य परोक्षत्वस्य च तदर्थस्थस्य निरसनात्त वैयधि-  
करण्यादिचोद्यस्यावसरोऽस्तीति । तद्विदमभिधीयते ।

तत्त्वमर्थेन संपृक्तो नानात्वं विनिवर्तयेत् ।

नापरित्यक्तपारोक्ष्यं त्वं तदर्थं सिसृप्सति ॥ ७८ ॥

How can the idea of being without a second conveyed by the term 'That' cancel without residue the connotation of having a second and being miserable that is embodied in the term 'Thou'? It is explained this way. We do not assert that the meanings of the two terms stand in the relation of the sublator and the sublated. How else then? In relation to the Self signified by 'Thou', the term 'That' intimates that it is secondless, a fact not apprehended before. By this removal of the basal non-apprehension, the two consequences of that non-apprehension, namely, the sense of not being one without a second in the case of 'Thou' and of not being immediate in the case of 'That' stand negated. Hence objections like this one, urging diversity in the imports of the two terms, do not apply at all. This is explained:

78. The meaning of 'That' predicated of the meaning of 'Thou' negates all plurality. Similarly the meaning of 'Thou' does not relate itself to the meaning of 'That', if the latter is not divested of the connotation of mediacy.

कस्मात्पुनः कारणात्तदर्थोऽद्वितीयलक्षणस्त्वमर्थेन प्रत्यगात्मना पृथगर्थः सन्न-  
विद्योत्थं सद्वितीयत्वं निहन्तीति । उच्यते । विरोधात् । तदुच्यते ।

संसारिताद्वितीयेन पारोक्ष्यं चात्मना सह ।

प्रासङ्गिकं विरुद्धत्वात्तत्त्वम्भ्यां बाधनं तयोः ॥ ७९ ॥

How does it happen that the significance of being one without a second carried by 'That', which is other than the Self signified by 'Thou' puts an end to the appearance of having a second born of nescience? We reply it does so because of contradiction. It is explained in the next verse.

79. Being in bondage is contradicted by being one without a second. Being mediate and indirectly presented is contradicted by self-hood. The two terms 'That' and 'Thou' intending a unitary import sublate by implication these contradicted meanings.

तत्त्वमर्थयोस्तु बाधकत्वेऽन्यदपि कारणमुच्यते ।

अज्ञातपुरुषार्थत्वाच्छ्रौतत्वात्तत्त्वमर्थयोः ।

स्वमर्थमपरित्यज्य बाधकौ स्तां विरुद्धयोः ॥ ८० ॥

A further reason supporting the sublating power of the meanings of 'That' and 'Thou' is offered.

80. The meanings of 'That' and 'Thou' are not given in normal experience, and with them is associated the highest end of human life. Hence they are given in śruti. Therefore, they do sublate what contradicts them in the apparent meanings of both, without giving up their intrinsic meanings.

एवं तावद्यथोपक्रान्तेन प्रक्रियावर्त्मना न प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरैर्विरोधगन्धोऽपि संभाव्यते । यदा पुनः सर्वप्रकारेणापि यतमाना नैवेमं वाक्यार्थं संभावयामः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरविरोधत एव तस्मिन्नपि पक्ष उच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धं चेद्वाक्यमर्थं वदेत्क्वचित् ।

स्यात्तु तद्दृष्टिविध्यर्थं योषाग्निवदसंशयम् ॥ ८१ ॥



Thus, according to the line of inquiry instituted, it has been demonstrated that the thesis propounded has no shadow of contradiction with other means of knowledge like perception. When, with the best of efforts, the import of the proposition is not grasped owing to contradiction with other means of knowledge, the course to be taken is considered:

81. In case the proposition says what is contradictory of perception etc., it has to be construed as inculcating a certain manner of looking at things as the statement 'Woman is fire'.

यदा तु तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं सर्वप्रकारेणापि विचार्यमाणं न क्रियां कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते तदा प्रसंख्यानादिव्यापारो वुस्संभाव्य इति । तदुच्यते ।

वस्त्वेकनिष्ठं वाक्यं चेन्न तस्य स्यात्क्रियार्थता ।

वस्तुनो ह्येकरूपत्वाद्विकल्पस्याप्यसंभवः ॥ ८२ ॥

But when a proposition like 'That thou art', however variously considered, does not connect itself with action in any way, it is impossible to construe it as inculcating endeavours like meditation. This is explained now:

82. If a proposition signifies only actual reality, it is not for inculcating action. Reality is determinately of one nature and so does not permit alternative possibilities as required in relation to the import of injunctions.

भिन्नविषयत्वाच्च न प्रमाणान्तरविरोधः । कथम् । उच्यते ।

अपूर्वाधिगमं कुर्वत्प्रमाणं स्यान्न चेन्न तत् ।

न विरोधस्ततो युक्तो विभिन्नार्थावबोधिनोः ॥ ८३ ॥

As there is separation of spheres of application there is no conflict between śruti and other means of knowledge. This is explained.

83. Knowledge is cognizing what is not known before. If a means of knowledge does not fulfil this condition, it is no means of knowledge at all. Therefore no conflict is conceivable between śruti and other sources of knowledge as they relate to mutually distinct spheres.

य एवमपि भिन्नविषयाणां विरोधं वक्ति सोऽत्रापि विरोधं ब्रूयात् ।

नायं शब्दः कुतो यस्माद्रूपं पश्यामि चक्षुषा ।

इति यद्वत्तथैवायं विरोधोऽक्षजवाक्ययोः ॥ ८४ ॥

If one still speaks of conflict here, let him argue as follows:

84. 'This is no sound, for with my eyes I am seeing colour.' If this argument is sound, then possibly there is a conflict between perception and Vedāntic proposition.

प्रमाणानां सतां न विरोधः श्रोत्रादीनामिव भिन्नविषयत्वात् । ययोश्चाभिन्न-  
विषयत्वं तयोराखुनकुलयोरिव प्रतिनियत एव बाध्यबाधकभावः स्यात् ।  
अतस्तदुच्यते ।

प्रत्यक्षां चेन्न शाब्दं स्याच्छाब्दं चेदक्षजं कथम् ।

प्रत्यक्षाभासः प्रत्यक्षे ह्यागमाभास आगमे ॥ ८५ ॥

Two valid sources of knowledge can never be contradictory of each other, as they relate to different spheres, like the senses. If they relate to the same subject-matter and there is a conflict between them, only one of them can sublate and thus be a source of valid knowledge and the other which is sublated is no source of valid knowledge at all. This principle is stated now:

85. What is perceptual is not given by verbal testimony. How can that given by verbal testimony be perceptual ? In case of definite conflict, what is

supposed to be perception may be illusory perception and what is supposed to be verbal testimony may be false testimony.

न च प्रतिज्ञाहेतुदृष्टान्तन्याय इह संभवति शब्दादीनां प्रत्येकं प्रमाणत्वात्त आह ।

स्वमहिम्ना प्रमाणानि कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम् ।

इतरेतरसाचिष्ये प्रामाण्यं नेष्यते स्वतः ॥ ८६ ॥

The sources of knowledge like verbal testimony are independent and hence mutual supplementation required of the different propositions of a syllogism cannot be required of the various sources of knowledge in general:

86. Each source of knowledge reveals reality by its own inherent power. If the several sources are to be mutually dependent and supporting, the principle of intrinsic validity must be abandoned.

न च सुखदुःखादिसंबन्धोऽवगत्यात्मनः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैर्गृह्यते येन विरोधः प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणैरुद्घाट्यते । कथम् । शृणु ।

दुःखितावगतिश्चेत्स्यान्न प्रमीयेत सात्मवत् ।

कर्मण्येव प्रमा न्याय्या न तु कर्तर्यपि क्वचित् ॥ ८७ ॥

Association with pleasure and pain is not known of the Self, of the nature of consciousness, by perception or such other sources of knowledge. If that were known, then only there would have been a conflict between the scripture and the other sources. This is explained further:

87. If the fact of being miserable etc. were of the very nature of ultimate consciousness, it cannot be open to any mode of knowledge even as the Self is not so open. These modes of knowledge like perception are directed to revealing the object and not the subject.

अभ्युपगमेऽपि च प्रसंख्यानशतेनापि नैव त्वं संभावितदोषान्मुच्यसे । अत आह ।

प्रमाणबद्धमूलत्वाद्दुःखित्वं केन वार्यते ।

अग्न्युष्णवन्निवृत्तिश्चेन्नैरात्म्यं ह्येति सौगतम् ॥ ८८ ॥

If the fact of misery etc. are admitted to be established by other means of knowledge, a hundred meditations even cannot bring about emancipation from evil. Therefore, it follows:

88. If the subjection to misery etc. are taken as belonging to the Self and are, as supposed, established firmly by means of valid knowledge, how can they be ever removed? If they can be somehow removed, that would amount to an extinction of the Self as in the philosophy of the Buddhists.

अथ मतम् ।

निराकुर्यात्प्रसंख्यानं दुःखित्वं चेत्स्वनुष्ठितम् ।

प्रत्यक्षादिविरुद्धत्वात्कथमुत्पादयेत्प्रमाम् ॥ ८९ ॥

Or, consider the other alternative:

89. If meditation well-performed is taken as putting an end to misery, we ask how can it generate valid cognition while it is opposed to other sources of valid knowledge like perception?

ननु प्रसंख्यानं नाम तत्त्वमस्यादिशब्दार्थान्वयव्यतिरेकयुक्तिविषयबुद्ध्याग्नेड-  
नमभिधीयते तच्चानुष्ठेयमानं प्रमितिवर्धनया परिपूर्णां प्रमितिं जनयति न पुन-  
रैकाग्र्यवर्धनयेति । यथाशेषाशुचिनीडे स्त्रीकृणपे कामिनीति निर्वस्तुकः पुरुषाया-  
समाव्रजनिः प्रत्यय इति । तन्न । यतः ।

अभ्यासोपचयाद्बुद्धेर्यत्स्यादैकाग्र्यमेव तत् ।

न हि प्रमाणान्यभ्यासात्कुर्वन्त्यर्थावबोधनम् ॥ ९० ॥

अभ्यासोपचिता कृत्स्नं भावना चेन्निवर्तयेत् ।

नैकान्तिकी निवृत्तिस्स्याद्भावनाजं हि तत्फलम् ॥ ९१ ॥

The following may be said by way of objection: Meditation means repeatedly dwelling in thought on what is proclaimed by texts like 'That thou art' and is settled intellectually by rational discrimination. When practised this generates complete knowledge by progressively increasing the measure of right knowledge and not by simply increasing concentration of mind. It is unlike the spurious confidence born merely of masculine imagination in the beauty of a woman's body which in reality is a corpse full of filth. We deny this.:

90-91. By cumulative repetition of thought only concentration comes about. The modes of knowledge like perception do not reveal their objects as a result of such repetition. If the imagination induced by repetition does remove all error, the removal cannot be final. After all it is a result of mere imagination.

अपि चाह ।

दुःख्यस्मीत्यपि चेद्वृत्ता कल्पकोट्युपबृंहिता ।

स्वल्पीयोऽभ्यासजा स्थासवी भावनेत्यत्र का प्रमा ॥ ९२ ॥

Further:

92. If the impression that one is miserable, which is produced by the experiences of countless lives can be removed, what evidence is there for holding that an imagination born of meditation of such a short duration will be everlasting?

ननु शास्त्रात्स्यास्तुत्वं भविष्यति । नैवम् । यथावस्थितवस्तुयाथात्म्यावबोधमात्रकारित्वाच्छास्त्रस्य । न हि पदार्थशक्त्याधानकृच्छास्त्रम् । प्रसिद्धं च लोके ।

भावनाजं फलं यत्स्याद्यच्च स्यात्कर्मणः फलम् ।

न तत्स्थान्निवति मन्तव्यं द्रविडेण्विव सङ्गतम् ॥ ९३ ॥

It may be said, 'The scripture says that it will be everlasting'. We deny this. The scripture can only produce understanding of reality as such. It cannot confer new powers on anything. The point is so familiar to common sense:

93. It should never be thought that the result of imagination and that of action will be lasting. It is like friendship with the Dravidians.

यद्यपि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणोपात्तमात्मनो दुःखित्वम् । तथापि तत्त्वमस्यादि-  
वाक्योत्थप्रत्यय एव बलीयानिति निश्चयोऽव्यभिचारिप्रामाण्यवाक्योपात्तत्वात्प्रमेयस्य  
च स्वत एव निर्दुःखित्वसिद्धेः । प्रत्यक्षादेस्तु व्यभिचारित्वात्संभावनायाश्च पुरुष-  
परिकल्पनामात्रावष्टम्भत्वाच्चेति ।

निर्दुःखित्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं प्रत्यक्षादेश्च दुःखिता ।

को ह्यात्मानमनादृत्य विश्वसेद्वाह्यमानतः ॥ ९४ ॥

Even if the experience of misery on the part of the Self were to be established by perception etc., still the understanding produced by texts like 'That thou art' is greater in force. This certainty of its greater force is based on the fact that the text has validity that is beyond contradiction and the subject-matter of the text, namely, the Self is intrinsically free from misery. But sources of knowledge like perception are known to go wrong sometimes and misery is conjured up by mere human imagination.

94. Freedom from misery is self-established. Subjection to misery is established by perception etc. Who can disregard the revelation of the Self and repose confidence in the deliverance of means of knowledge external to the Self?

संबन्धार्थ एव ।

अपि प्रत्यक्षबाधेन प्रवृत्तिः प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

“पराञ्चि खानि” त्येतस्माद्वचसो गम्यते श्रुतेः ॥ ९५ ॥

The explanation is supported by the following:

95. That the śruti approaches the Self by negating perception is evidenced by the passage speaking of withdrawal from sense-knowledge of the external world for realizing the Self.

अभ्युपगम्यैवमुच्यते न तु प्रमाणं सत्प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यत इत्यसकृदवोचाम ।  
यत्रापि वाक्यप्रत्यक्षयोर्विरोधाशङ्का तत्रापि पुरुषमोहवशादेव सा जायते न तु  
परमार्थत इति । अत आह ।

प्रमां चेज्जनयेद्वाक्यं प्रत्यक्षादिविरोधिनीम् ।

गौणीं प्रत्यक्षतां ब्रूयान्मुख्यार्थासंभवादुधः ॥ ९६ ॥

This has been said admitting provisionally that there is a conflict between perception and śruti. In reality, as we have pointed out again and again, one source of valid knowledge does not clash with another. Where there appears to be a conflict between perception and śruti, it is due merely to man's error. The conflict is not genuine. Hence the following:

96. If the Vedāntic proposition were to give rise to a right knowledge that goes against perception etc., a wise man should construe the perception as secondary for it cannot have primary validity.

तस्यार्थस्थ सुखप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमुदाहरणम् ।

अग्निस्सम्यगधीतेऽसौ जहासोच्चैश्च मञ्चकः ।

यथा तद्वदहंवृत्त्या लक्ष्यतेऽनर्हयापि सः ॥ ९७ ॥

To make this principle easily understood, the following illustrations are adduced:

97. Just as we say, 'The fire studies well, the cots laughed aloud', the Self is secondarily indicated by the ego-sense, though the latter is unfit to indicate it.

कस्मात्पुनः कारणात्साक्षादेवात्मा नाभिधीयते किमनया कल्पनयेति तत्राह ।

त्वमित्येतद्विहायान्यन्न वत्मात्मावबोधने ।

समस्तीह त्वमर्थोऽपि गुणलेशेन वर्तते ॥ ९८ ॥

Why is not the Self directly named? Why this secondary mode of indication? It is said in reply:

98. There is no way of pointing to the Self except through the meaning of 'Thou'. And even the meaning of 'Thou' signifies the Self through a partial attributive affinity.

कस्मात्पुनर्हेतोर्हामित्येतदपि गुणलेशेन वर्तते न पुनः साक्षादेवेति । विधूत-  
सर्वकल्पनाकारणत्वाभावादात्मनः अत आह ।

व्योम्नि धूमतुषाराभ्रमलिनानीव दुर्धियः ।

कल्पयेयुस्तथा मूढाः संसारं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ ९९ ॥

Why is not the Self directly signified by the concept 'I'? Why is it said that even that concept applies to the Self secondarily through partial attributive affinity? The answer is that the position is due to the fact that the Self is without the characteristics that could justify the application of the categories of human thought. Hence the conclusion:

99. Just as fools imagine smoke, fog, cloud and dirt as belonging to the pure sky, even so fools attribute to the inner self the phenomenon of transmutatory existence.

ननु सर्वकल्पनानामप्यात्मन्यत्यन्तातंभवे समानेऽहंवृत्तौ कः पक्षपाते हेतुर्येन  
वृत्त्यन्तराणि विधूयाहंवृत्त्यैवात्मोपलक्ष्यत इति । उच्यते ।



चिन्निभेयमहंवृत्तिः प्रतीचीवात्मनोऽन्यतः ।

पूर्वोक्तेभ्यश्च हेतुभ्यस्तस्मादात्मानयोच्यते ॥ १०० ॥

But if the Self has no characteristics justifying the application of any concepts, what is the reason for this partiality? Why are all other concepts rejected and the Self is said to be indicated through the secondary signification of only the concept of the ego? The reply is as follows:

100. The ego is filled with consciousness. It is inmost in comparison with everything other than the Self. For the reason already stated, the Self is indicated through the concept of the ego.

वृत्तिभिर्युष्मदर्थभिर्लक्ष्यते चेद्दृशिः परः ।

अनात्मत्वं भवेत्तस्य वितथं च वचः श्रुतेः ॥ १०१ ॥

101. If the supreme consciousness were to be approached through anything other than the ego-consciousness, it would be reduced to the status of a non-Self and the words of the śruti would be futile.

यथोक्तेन ।

अनेन गुणलेशेन ह्यत्यहंकर्तृकर्मया ।

लक्ष्यतेऽसावहंवृत्त्या नाञ्जसात्राभिधीयते ॥ १०२ ॥

As stated before—

102. Through partial attributive affinity, the Self is indicated secondarily by the concept of the ego, which is at once the subject and object of the ego-consciousness and is not named by primary signification.

नाञ्जसात्राभिधीयत इति को हेतुरिति चेत् ।

षष्ठीगुणक्रियाजातिरूढयः शब्दहेतवः ।

नात्मन्यन्यतमोऽमीषां तेनात्मा नाभिधीयते ॥ १०३ ॥

Why is it not named by primary signification?

103. The necessary grounds for applying terms to things are relation, quality, action, genus and convention. The Self is divested of all of them and hence is not directly signified.

यदि शब्दोऽभिधानाभिधेयत्वसंबन्धाङ्गीकारेण नात्मनि वर्तते कथं शब्दादहं ब्रह्मास्मीति सम्यग्बोधोत्पत्तिः । उच्यते ।

असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा निरुपायमुपेयते ।

आत्मत्वकारणाद्विद्वो गुणवृत्त्या विबोधिताः ॥ १०४ ॥

If words do not refer to the Self, through the relation of the name and the named, how can words 'I am Brahman' give rise to perfect knowledge? We Explain as follows:

104. Through a means that is unreal, the Self, which can be approached through no means whatever, is realized. The Self is self-evident by its very nature and hence is signified by the secondary implication of the category of the ego. Thus we understand it.

कथं पुनरभिधानमभिधेयनानभिसंबद्धं सत्त्वनिवेदयेद्ब्रह्मं ज्ञानवतीति । कृणु  
अभिधानमभिसंबद्धमव्ययमभिधेयं विद्वान्निराकारणमुखेन बोधयतीत्याह ।

ज्ञानानां प्रायशी लौकिके बोध्यमानाः स्वनामभिः ।

सहस्रैव प्रबुध्यन्ते यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि ॥ १०५ ॥

न हि नाम्नास्ति संबन्धो व्युत्थितस्य शरीरतः ।

तथापि बुध्यते तेन यथैवं तत्त्वमित्यतः ॥ १०६ ॥

How can a name unrelated to what is named produce right knowledge about what cannot be named? Listen to this example in which words independent of the said relation do remove ignorance and produce right knowledge about what cannot be named:

105-106. Just as men who are asleep get up generally at once, when called by their names, the inner Self is comprehended through words. Indeed there is no relation between the name and the individual self which has risen beyond the body in deep sleep. But still the individual is awakened by the name; so is the efficacy of the words 'That thou art'.

यथा च ।

बोधाबोधौ नभोऽस्पृष्टा कृष्णधीनीडगौ यथा ।

बाध्येतरात्मकौ स्यातां तथेहात्मनि गम्यताम् ॥ १०७ ॥

107. With regard to the sky we get the impression that it is dark and also the impression that it is pure and colourless. Neither of these cause any change in the sky as such. One of them is cancelled by the other impression which is true. Similar is the situation with regard to the Self and the right and wrong conceptions about it.

"असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा" इत्युपश्रुत्यातिविस्मितो महता संभ्रमेण कश्चिन्नोवमति ।

नासत्तुपाद्यो लोकेऽस्ति परमार्थबिनिश्चये ।

नासत्तिल्लगाद्धि लाण्यदेः कश्चिदपि प्रवृत्तते ॥ १०८ ॥

Hearing the assertion 'Through a means that is unreal, the Self . . . is realised' some one is exceedingly surprised and objects in great gusto:

108. What is unreal cannot be a means in the world for the determination of what is real. By seeing one in tears one may wrongly imagine smoke. On the basis of that smoke, which is non-existent, he cannot validly infer the existence of fire.

इत्येवं चोदयेद्योऽपि जोषयेत्तं घटादिना ।

सदसद्भूतानां विभक्तोऽसौ पर्यायश्च न चानयोः ॥ १०९ ॥

109. The objector is to be given satisfaction by examples such as a jar. It is distinct from both the ultimately real and the absolutely non-existent. There can be no successive possession of the qualities of being and non-being either.

एवं कुचोद्यमुन्मूल्याथेदानीं प्रकृतमभिधीयते । प्रकृतं चानभिधेये कथमभिधा-  
श्रुतिरविद्याध्वंस्यात्मनि ज्ञानं जनयतीति । तत्रैव कारणान्तरमुच्यते ।

अतिदुस्स्थोऽप्रबोधोऽत्र ह्यात्मैवास्य प्रबुद्धता ।

निमित्तमात्राव्येत्येषा नासाग्रे बदरं यथा ॥ ११० ॥

Thus, after uprooting the ill-conceived objection, the question on hand is taken up. It is as to how the assertive śruti texts can be destructive of nescience and produce right knowledge about the Self. On this, a further reason is added:

110. The ignorance concerning the Self exists very precariously. Indeed the Self is of the very essence of awareness. On some slight disturbance, the ignorance drops off, like a small fruit balanced on the nose.

अनुदितानस्तमितकूटस्थबोधमात्रस्वाभाव्यावात्मनो दुस्संभाव्योऽविद्यासद्भाव  
इति चेन्न । अविद्याप्रसिद्धयेव तत्सद्भावसिद्धेरलूकनिशावदित्यत इदमुच्यते ।

अहो धाष्टर्चमविद्याया न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ।

प्रमाणं वस्त्वनादृत्य परमात्मेव तिष्ठति ॥ १११ ॥

If it is said that the existence of nescience is inconceivable, as the Self is of the nature of eternal and unchanging consciousness, we deny the objection. The existence of nescience is proved

by the mere experience of it. It is like the night that an owl experiences at day-time. Therefore the following:

111. Look at the audacity of nescience. No one is beyond it. It disregards truth and reality and settles itself in existence as if it were the ultimate reality.

यस्मादविद्याप्रसिद्धयैवाविद्यासद्भावसिद्धिरत आत्मवस्तुवृत्तानुरोधेन न कथं-  
चनापि तत्संभावनाप्यस्ति यत आह ।

ज्ञानं यस्य निजं रूपं क्रियाकारकवर्जितम् ।

संभावनाप्यविद्यायास्तत्र स्यात्केन हेतुना ॥ ११२ ॥

As the existence of nescience is established by the experience of it, if we consider the fundamental nature of the Self, even its possibility would be inconceivable. So it is said:

112. In him, whose intrinsic nature is knowledge and who is devoid of action and factors of action, how can nescience be even conceived as a possibility?

सोऽयमेवमनुदितानस्तमितावगतिमात्रशरीर आत्मापि सन्नविचारितप्रसिद्धा-  
विद्यामात्रव्यवहित एवातथैवेक्ष्यते यतोऽतः ।

अनुमानादयं भावाव्यावृत्तोऽभावमाश्रितः ।

ततोऽप्यस्य निवृत्तिः स्याद्वाक्यादेव बुभुत्सतः ॥ ११३ ॥

This Self consisting of eternal consciousness as its sole being, seems as if covered by nescience which obtains in experience through the absence of due inquiry and appears different from what it is.

113. The Self is distinguished from all empirical existence through reasoning. It seems as if non-existent. Then the Vedāntic proposition rescues it from the realm of non-existence for one who seeks to know the Self.

भाववदभावादपि निवृत्तिरनुमानादेव किमिति न भवतीति चेच्छृणु ।

न व्यावृत्तिर्यथा भावाद्भावेनैवाविशेषतः ।

अभावादप्यभावत्वाद्यावृत्तिर्न तथेष्ट्यते ॥ ११४ ॥

Why not this distinction from non-existence be also effected by reason itself as the distinction from empirical existence? Listen:

114. The Self is not distinguished from forms of empirical existence by virtue of what it is, for both would be of the nature of existence only but by virtue of what it is not. Similarly it cannot be distinguished from non-existence on the basis of its not being something. Only by virtue of what it positively is can the distinction from non-being be determined.

यतो नानुमानेन व्याविद्धाशेषक्रियाकारकफलात्मनि स्वाराज्येऽभिषेक्तुं शक्यते तस्मात् ।

अविद्यानिद्रया सोऽयं प्रसुप्तो दुर्विवेकया ।

भावाभावव्युदासिन्या श्रुत्यैव प्रतिबोध्यते ॥ ११५ ॥

As one cannot be installed in the Kingdom of Self-sovereignty in which all distinctions of the nature of action, factors of action and the fruits of action have been eliminated by the agency of reason, therefore it follows:

115. This being who has been laid to sleep by this nescience, not liable to removal by any other means, is made to wake up by śruti alone, which discards both existence and non-existence.

अत्राहानुदितानस्तमितविज्ञानात्ममात्रस्वरूपत्वाद्दुस्संभाव्या अविद्येति । नैत-  
देवम् । कुतः । यत आह ।

कुतो अविद्येति चोद्यं स्यान्नैव प्राग्घेत्वसंभवात् ।

कालत्रयापरिच्छित्तेन चोर्ध्वं चोद्यसंभवः ॥ ११६ ॥

It may be said in this connection that this nescience is impossible as the fundamental nature of the Self consists solely of unoriginated and indestructible knowledge. We deny this because:

116. Before the rise of knowledge, the question 'How can nescience arise?' cannot be asked, for the nature of the Self supposed to be incompatible with nescience is not yet known then. After the rise of knowledge, the question cannot be asked, for knowledge has made it clear that there was, is and will be no nescience whatever.

यस्मात्तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमेवात्मनोऽज्ञेषामविद्यां निरन्वयामपनुदति तस्मात् ।

अद्धातममनादृत्य प्रमाणं सदसीति ये ।

बुभुत्सन्तेऽन्यतः कुर्युस्तेऽक्षणापि रसवेदनम् ॥ ११७ ॥

Therefore the propositions like 'That thou art' destroy without residue the whole of nescience. Hence:

117. Those who ignore the fully established authority which declares 'Thou art that being' and seek knowledge elsewhere may as well ascertain tastes through sight.

एवमप्रतिहतामहं ब्रह्मेति प्रमां तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यं कुर्वदपि न प्रतिपादयतीति चेदभिमतं न कुतश्चनापि प्रतिपत्तिः स्यादत आह ।

इदं चेदनृतं ब्रूयात्सत्यामवगतावपि ।

न चान्यत्रापि विश्वासो ह्यवगत्यविशेषतः ॥ ११८ ॥

If it is maintained that the propositions like 'That thou art' though producing right knowledge free from all contradiction do not reveal truth, then faith can be reposed in nothing. It is said therefore:

118. If this proposition, though producing knowledge, is false, we can believe in no other authority, for that also must be some form of knowledge after all.

न चोपादित्तिताद्वाक्यार्थाद्वाक्यार्थान्तरं कल्पयितुं युक्तम् । यस्मात् ।

न चेदनुभवोऽस्तः स्यात्पदार्थावगतावपि ।

कल्प्यं विध्यन्तरं तत्र न ह्यन्योऽर्थोऽवगम्यते ॥ ११९ ॥

From the import of a given proposition, we are not to jump to the import of another proposition. Therefore:

119. If understanding does not arise out of a given proposition inspite of our understanding the meaning of the terms then it is proper to construe the proposition as an injunction. Here no such alien purport is hinted.

न च यथाभिमतोऽर्थो यथोक्तेन न्यायेन नावसीयते । कोऽसौ न्याय इत्याह ।

नामादिभ्यो निराकृत्य त्वमर्थं निष्परिग्रहः ।

निस्स्पृहो युष्मदर्थेभ्यः शमादिविधिचोदितः ॥ १२० ॥

भङ्क्त्वा चान्नमयादींस्तान्पञ्चानात्मतयार्गलान् ।

अहं ब्रह्मेति वाक्यार्थं वेत्ति चेन्नार्थ ईहया ॥ १२१ ॥

It is not that the desired import cannot be determined in the present case in accordance with the procedure formulated. What is that procedure?

120-121. The import of 'thou' must be determined by distinguishing it from phenomenal adjuncts beginning with name upto life-breath (as laid down in *Chândogya*) and one must cultivate non-acquisitiveness. He must renounce desires for things which



belong to the realm of the non-Self. He must submit to the disciplines like the control of the mind. He must cut asunder the fivefold sheaths of the nature of food, vital breath, etc. which impose themselves as the Self and obstruct his release. After this he comprehends the import of the proposition by way of experiencing 'I am Brahman'. When this is accomplished, there is nothing more to be accomplished.

न चेदेवमुपगम्यते वाक्यस्य प्रमाणस्य सतोऽप्रामाण्यं प्राप्नोति । तदाह ।

यदर्थं च प्रवृत्तं यद्वाक्यं तत्र न चेच्छ्रुतम् ।

प्रमामुत्पादयेत्तस्य प्रामाण्यं केन हेतुना ॥ १२२ ॥

If this is not admitted, the sound authority of the proposition is falsified:

122. If a proposition purporting to teach the the truth fails to cause right knowledge, inspite of fulfilling all requirements, why accord validity to it at all?

अथ मन्यसे ।

जानीयाच्चेत्प्रसंख्यानाच्छब्दस्सत्यवचाः कथम् ।

पारोक्ष्यं शब्दो नः प्राह प्रसंख्यानात्त्वसंशयम् ॥ १२३ ॥

You may think on this line:

123. Knowledge arises from meditation. In that case we may ask how can verbal testimony be true? Verbal testimony produces mediate understanding. But certainty of conviction by direct experience arises from meditation.

न च युक्तिशब्दावृत्तिलक्षणात्प्रसंख्यानद्यथावत्प्रतिपत्तिर्भविष्यतीति संभाव-  
यामः । यस्मात् ।

युक्तिशब्दौ पुराप्यस्य न चेदकुरुतां प्रमाम् ।

साक्षादावर्तनात्ताभ्यां किमपूर्वं फलिष्यति ॥ १२४ ॥

We cannot conceive that meditation of the nature of the re-  
petition of reasoning and the texts will produce right knowledge  
of the desired type. Why?

124. If reasoning and texts do not give rise to  
direct apprehension of reality previously, how can  
this unprecedented result issue from their mere  
repetition?

अथैवमपि प्रसंख्यानमन्तरेण प्राणान्धारयितुं न शक्नोषीति चेच्छ्रवणादावेव  
संपादयिष्यामः । कथम् ।

प्रसंख्याने श्रुतावस्य न्यायोऽस्त्वाम्रेडनात्मकः ।

ईषच्छ्रुतं सामिश्रुतं सम्यक्श्रुत्वावगच्छति ॥ १२५ ॥

If you cannot live without meditation, we will provide you  
scope for it in relation to the preliminary processes like the hearing  
of the sacred texts etc. How?

125. Meditation defined as repetition is certainly  
useful if we have heard the scripture only a little or  
half and half. By repetition the hearing is perfected  
and then comprehension of import will come about.

ननु प्रसंख्यानविधिमनभ्युपगच्छतः पारमहंसी चर्या बौद्धादिचर्यावदशास्त्रपूर्विका  
प्राप्नोति ततश्चारुढपतितत्त्वं न स्यादशेषकर्मणां च निवृत्तिर्न प्राप्नोतीति । उच्यते ।

त्वमर्थस्यावबोधाय विधिरप्याश्रितो यतः ।

तमन्तरेण ये दोषास्तेऽपि नायान्त्यहेतवः ॥ १२६ ॥

This may be said in objection: If the injunction about meditation is not admitted, the aspirant's life of renunciation, not being according to the scripture, will be like that of the Buddhists. Hence he will be one who has fallen after some ascent. If on the other hand, he adheres to the śāstraic rules of conduct, he has not realized completely the ideal of the renunciation of action. The objection is answered in the following:

126. The injunction is admitted for the sake of understanding the significance of 'Thou'. The lapses that would follow the non-observance of that injunction do not arise now, because the cause that could bring them about is not there.

## चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

पूर्वाध्यायेषु यद्वस्तु विस्तरेणोदितं स्फुटम् ।  
संक्षेपतोऽधुना वक्ष्ये तदेव सुखवित्तये ॥ १ ॥

### CHAPTER IV

1. Now I will restate briefly, to facilitate easy comprehension, what has been worked out elaborately and clearly in the previous chapters.

संक्षेपविस्तराभ्यां हि मन्दोत्तमधियां नृणाम् ।  
वस्तुच्यमानमेत्यन्तःकरणं तेन भण्यते ॥ २ ॥

2. The theme enters the minds of both the dull-witted and the competent if presented both briefly and extensively. Hence this effort.

आत्मानात्मा च लोकेऽस्मिन्प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणतः ।  
सिद्धस्तयोरनात्मा तु सर्वत्रैवात्मपूर्वकः ॥ ३ ॥

3. In our ordinary experience, two principles, the Self and the non-Self, stand established by perception and other sources of knowledge. Between the two the non-Self invariably presupposes the Self.

अनात्मत्वं स्वतस्सिद्धं देहाद्भिन्नस्य वस्तुनः ।  
ज्ञातुरप्यात्मता तद्वन्मध्ये संशयदर्शनम् ॥ ४ ॥

4. That objects external to our bodies are other than the Self is self-evident. That the knower is the

Self is also equally self-evident. There is uncertainty only with regard to what lies between the two.

असाधारणास्तयोर्धर्मान् ज्ञात्वा धूमाग्निवद्बुधः ।

अनात्मनोऽथ बुद्ध्यन्तान् जानीयादनुमानतः ॥ ५ ॥

5. A wise man should determine precisely the distinctive characteristics of the Self and the non-Self. On that basis he must understand through inference that all the factors up to the intellect are of the nature of the non-Self.

इदमित्येव बाह्येऽर्थे ह्यहमित्येव बोद्धरि ।

द्वयं दृष्टं यतो देहे तेनायं मुह्यते जनः ॥ ६ ॥

6. The external objects are identified only as 'This'. The knower is identified only as 'I'. But the body is regarded both ways. Hence people are deluded.

केन पुनर्न्यायेनात्मानात्मनोरश्वमहिषयोरिव विभागः क्रियत इति । उच्यते ।

न्यायः पुरोदितोऽस्माभिरात्मानात्मविभागकृत् ।

तेनेदमर्थमुत्सार्य ह्यहमित्यत्र यो भवेत् ॥ ७ ॥

विद्यात्तत्त्वमसीत्यस्माद्भावाभावदृशं सदा ।

अनन्तरमबाह्यार्थं प्रत्यक्स्थं मुनिरञ्जसा ॥ ८ ॥

On what grounds is the distinction drawn between the Self and the non-Self so sharply as between a horse and a buffalo? We explain:

7-8. The ground for discriminating the Self and the non-Self has already been stated by us. A man of thought must take his stand on that ground and discard the objective element in the ego also as non-Self

and understand the non-objective element in the ego, which witnesses eternally all being and non-being, which is neither internal object nor external object and is the inmost Self, through the dictum 'That thou art'.

उच्यतां तर्हि कया तु परिपाद्या वाक्यार्थं वेत्तीति । उच्यते । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् ।

त्यक्तकृत्स्नेदमर्थत्वात्त्यक्तोऽहमिति मन्यते ।

नावगच्छाम्यहं यस्मान्निजात्मानमनात्मनः ॥ ९ ॥

Then let the procedure in understanding the proposition 'That thou art' be stated. Yes, it is explained as consisting of discrimination on the basis of agreement and difference:

9. As the whole realm of the non-Self representing 'This' is eliminated, man thinks that he himself, his self, has been eliminated. He thinks 'I do not understand my real self apart from the non-self'.

अथ शरीरादिबुद्धिपर्यन्तः स सर्वोऽनात्मवेति प्रमाणाद्विनिश्चित्य किमिति बुभुत्सातो नोपरमते । शृणु ।

अनुच्छिन्नबुभुत्सश्च प्रत्यग्घेतोरनात्मनः ।

दोलायमानचित्तोऽयं मुह्यते भौतवन्नरः ॥ १० ॥

It may be asked: After understanding through the various sources of valid knowledge that all factors from the body upto the intellect are of the nature of non-Self, why does a man not terminate his inquiry. Listen:

10. Because he seeks to know the Self apart from the non-Self a man's mind is vacillating and he is deluded like a man possessed.

अविलुप्तविज्ञानात्मन आत्मत्वादेव नित्यसामिध्याद्बुभुत्सुः किमिति न प्रतिपद्यत इति । यस्मात् ।

यैरद्राक्षीत्पुरात्मानं यमनात्मेति वीक्षते ।

दृष्टेर्द्रष्टारमात्मानं तैः प्रसिद्धैः प्रमित्सति ॥ ११ ॥

The Self of the nature of imperishable consciousness, being the very Self of the seeker, is ever present in utmost proximity. How is it that the enquirer does not find it? This is the reason:

11. Formerly he saw himself through the senses and such means of knowledge. Now he realizes that the Self he was seeing all along is really not the Self. But he continues to search for the Self, the inner witness of even the knower, through the very same means of knowledge. Hence his failure.

कस्मात्पुनर्हेतोः पराचीनाभिः शब्दाद्यवलेहिनीभिर्बुद्धिभिरात्मानमनात्मवन्न वीक्षत इति । उच्यते ।

चक्षुर्न वीक्षते शब्दमतदात्मत्वकारणात् ।

यथैवं भौतिकी दृष्टिर्नात्मानं परिपश्यति ॥ १२ ॥

Why is it that he does not discover the Self, as he does the non-Self, through the intellectual operations oriented outwards, capable of sensing external phenomena like sound?

12. Surely the eye cannot see sound. That is because it is not constituted of matter having the sound-quality. On the same principle, the physical eye, cannot perceive the super-physical Self.

प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणस्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन तावत्तददर्शनकारणमुक्तम् । अथ प्रमेय-स्वाभाव्यानुरोधेन प्रतिषेध उच्यते ।

धीविक्रियासहस्राणां हानोपादानधमिणाम् ।

सदा साक्षिणमात्मानं प्रत्यक्त्वान्नाहमीक्षते ॥ १३ ॥

By a consideration of the nature of perception etc. the reason for the non-perception of the Self has been stated. By a consideration of the nature of the reality to be cognized, the same conclusion is urged now:

13. The cognizing machinery cannot grasp the eternal witness who witnesses the thousand modifications of the mind, of both favourable and unfavourable kinds, just because he is more inward and fundamental than that machinery itself.

क्व पुनरियं विवेकबुद्धिः किमात्मन्युतानात्मनीति । किंचातः । यद्यात्मनि कूटस्थत्वव्याघातोऽनात्मदर्शित्वात् । अथानात्मनि तस्याप्यचैतन्यान् विवेकसंबन्ध इति । उच्यते । “दाह्यदाहकर्तृकत्र” इत्युक्तपरिहारात् ।

बुद्धावेव विवेकोऽयं यदनात्मतया भिदा ।

बुद्धिमेवोपमृदनाति कदलीं तत्फलं यथा ॥ १४ ॥

It may be asked: Where is this discrimination located? Is it in the Self or the non-Self? If it is in the Self, then it follows that the Self cannot be pure and unchanging for it is tainted by the perception of the non-Self. Nor can it be in the non-Self, for the non-Self is insentient and so cannot exercise discrimination. We answer as follows. The answer is already given in anticipation through the analogy of fire and fuel (III. 59):

14. In mind this discrimination occurs, the mind which is discriminated from the Self on the ground that it is non-Self. The discrimination puts an end to mind itself as the plantain fruit puts an end to the plantain-plant.

सोऽयमतत्त्वे तत्त्वदृक् ।

अनुमानप्रदीपेन हित्वा सर्वाननात्मनः ।

संसारैकावलम्बिन्या तदभावं धियेऽप्सति ॥ १५ ॥



He is seeing the unreal as if it were the reality:

15. He rejects all the non-Self through the lamp of reason and through an intelligence rooted in relative existence, he seeks its (non-Self's) unreality.

योऽयमन्वयव्यतिरेकजो विवेक आत्मानात्मविभागलक्षणोऽनात्मस्थः स्थाणौ संशयावबोधवत्प्रतिपत्तव्योऽयथावस्तुस्वाभाव्यान्मृगतृष्णिकोदकप्रबोधवदित्यत आह ।

संसारंबीजसंस्थोऽयं तद्विया मुक्तिमिच्छति ।

शशो निमीलनेनेव मृत्युं परिजिहीर्षति ॥ १६ ॥

This discrimination separating Self and non-Self is itself located in the non-Self. It does not go beyond the state of doubt as about a post whether it is a man or a post and the state of error as in conceiving the mirage as water.

16. The person enmeshed in relative existence seeking to achieve liberation through a discrimination falling within that existence is like a rabbit seeking to avoid death by shutting its eyes.

अस्यार्थस्य ब्रह्मिन्ने श्रुत्युदाहरणम् ।

इममर्थं पुरस्कृत्य श्रुत्या सम्यगुदाहृतम् ।

“यच्चक्षुषे” ति विल्लब्धं “न दृष्टे”रिति च स्फुटम् ॥१७॥

To confirm and strengthen this point śruti passages are adduced:

17. Pointing to this truth, the śruti declares rightly and clearly that it is ‘Not seen by the eyes’ (K.U.I.7) and that ‘You cannot see the seer of the seeing’ (B.U.III. iv. 2).

बुद्धयन्तमपविद्धयेवं को न्वहं स्यामितीक्षितुः ।

श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीत्याह सर्वमानातिगामिनी ॥ १८ ॥

18. He who has discarded all the non-Self up to the mind and asks 'Who am I?' is instructed by the śruti which transcends all other means of knowledge by the proposition 'That thou art'.

एष संक्षेपतः पूर्वाध्यायत्रयस्यार्थ उक्तः । सोऽयं न्याय्योऽपि वेदान्तार्थः शास्त्रा-  
चार्यप्रसादलभ्यांऽप्यनपेक्षितशास्त्राचार्यप्रसादोऽनन्यापेक्षसिद्धस्वभावत्वात्कैश्चिच्छ्रद्धा-  
नैर्न प्रतीयते । तेषां संग्रहार्थमभिमतप्रामाण्योदाहरणम् ।

भगवत्पूज्यपादैश्च उदाहार्यमेव तु ।

सुविस्पष्टोऽस्मदुक्तोऽर्थः सर्वभूतहितैषिभिः ॥ १९ ॥

Thus the teaching of the three earlier chapters has been summarized. This import of the Vedānta is in accordance with reason and being self-established does not stand in need of scripture and the grace of the preceptor. Still men given to faith do not give assent to it on the ground that it should be acquired through the scripture and the grace of the preceptor. Hence, to make them accept it, the desired authority is adduced now:

19. The blessed Saṅkara, a well-wisher of all beings, has laid down clearly what we have stated.

किं परमात्मन उपदेश उतापरमात्मन इति । किं चातः । यदि परमात्मनस्त-  
स्योपदेशमन्तरेणैव मुक्तत्वाग्निरर्थक उपदेशः । अथापरमात्मनस्तस्यापि स्वत एव  
संसारस्वभावत्वाग्निरुपदेशः । एवमुभयत्रापि दोषवत्त्वादत आह ।

“अविविच्योभयं वक्ति श्रुतिश्चेत्स्याद्ग्रहस्तथा” ।

इति पक्षमुपादाय पूर्वपक्षं निशात्य च ॥ २० ॥

Is this instruction addressed to the supreme Self or to the lower self? The instruction would be useless for the supreme Self, for it is emancipated by itself without any instruction. The lower self is by nature involved in transmigratory existence and in relation to it

also it is useless. Thus there is fault on either alternative. This dilemma is replied to in the following verse:

20. The *prima facie* view is refuted by the position that 'the śruti is addressed to one who does not distinguish between the Self and the non-Self and as addressed to such it is quite admissible' (U.S. XVIII. 78).

तच्चेदमविवेकात्स्वतो विविक्तात्मने तत्त्वमसीत्युपदिष्टम् ।

युष्मदस्मद्विभागज्ञे स्यादर्थवदिदं वचः ।

यतोऽनभिज्ञे वाक्यं स्याद्विधरेष्विव गायनम् ॥ २१ ॥

This teaching 'That thou art' is imparted to one who by himself has discriminated his Self from the non-Self but is still in the realm of ignorance:

21. This teaching is meaningful for one who has known the distinction between the 'I' and 'You'; for one who does not have this knowledge it is like music before a deaf person.

तस्य च युष्मदस्मद्विभागविज्ञानस्य का युक्तिरुपायभावं प्रतिपद्यते । शृणु ।

“अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ हि पदार्थस्य पदस्य च ।

स्यादेतदहमित्यत्र युक्तिरेवावधारणं” ॥ २२ ॥

What is the reasoning that brings about the understanding of the distinction between the 'I' and 'thou'? Listen:

22. The consideration of the presence and absence of factors in connection with the Self is the means whereby the terms and the meaning of terms are determined. In the discernment of what is involved in the ego also the same manner of analysis is to be adopted (U.S. XVIII. 96).

कथं तौ युक्तिरित्यत्राह ।

“नाद्राक्षमहमित्यस्मिन् सुषुप्तेऽन्यन्मनागपि ।

न वारयति दृष्टिं स्वां प्रत्ययं तु निषेधति” ॥ २३ ॥

How do presence and absence furnish the reason? It is explained:

23. ‘In deep sleep I saw nothing external’ is the form of the waking reference to deep sleep. This points to the absence of every mental function during sleep but does not deny the existence of consciousness at that state (U.S. XVIII. 97).

“एवं विज्ञातवाच्यार्थे श्रुतिलोकप्रसिद्धितः ।

श्रुतिस्तत्त्वमसीत्याह श्रोतुर्मोहापनुत्तये” ॥ २४ ॥

24. When the meaning of ‘Thou’ is thus gathered through ordinary experience and śruti, śruti comes in for the purpose dispelling delusion and teaches ‘That thou art’ (U.S. XVIII. 99).

तत्र त्वमिति पदं यत्र लक्षणया वर्तते सोऽर्थ उच्यते ।

“अहंशब्दस्य या निष्ठा ज्योतिषि प्रत्यगात्मनि ।

सैवोक्ता सदसीत्येवं फलं तत्र विमुक्तता” ॥ २५ ॥

That which is signified through secondary reference by the term ‘Thou’ is brought out now:

25. ‘Thou art that being’ is affirmed of the inner light of consciousness which is signified secondarily by the term ‘I’. The consummation of this teaching is liberation (U.S. XVIII. 101).

अन्यच्चान्वयव्यतिरेकोदाहरणम् । तथा ।

“छित्त्वा त्यक्तेन हस्तेन स्वयं नात्मा विशेष्यते ।

तथा शिष्टेन सर्वेण येनयेन विशेष्यते ॥ २६ ॥

विशेषणमिदं सर्वं साध्वलंकरणं यथा ।

अविद्याध्यस्तमतः सर्वं ज्ञात आत्मन्यसद्भवेत् ॥ २७ ॥

Another instance of argument by presence and absence is also given:

26-27. If an arm is cut off, the limb severed does not condition the Self. Similarly no other factor supposed to condition the Self does in reality do so. All this determination of the Self by conditions is mere ornamentation. It is all an imaginary superimposition through nescience. It becomes unreal when the Self is known (U.S. VI. 1. 3).

तस्मात्त्यक्तेन हस्तेन तुल्यं सर्वं विशेषणम् ।

अनात्मत्वेन तस्माज्ज्ञो मुक्तः सर्वविशेषणैः ॥ २८ ॥

28. So all the adjuncts are like the arm severed from the body, because they are all of the nature of the non-Self. Therefore the knowing Self is ever free from all the alleged conditions and qualifications (U.S. VI. 2).

ज्ञातैवात्मा सदा ग्राह्यो ज्ञेयमुत्सृज्य केवलः ।

अहमित्यपि यदाहं व्यपेताङ्गसमं हि तत्” ॥ २९ ॥

29. That the Self is the eternal knower and indivisibly one must be known after eliminating all objects of knowledge. What is apprehended as ‘I’ is also like the limb that is cut off (U.S. VI. 4).

“दृश्यत्वादहमित्येष नात्मधर्मो घटादिवत् ।  
तथान्ये प्रत्यया ज्ञेया दोषाश्चात्मामलो ह्यतः” ॥ ३० ॥

30. The ego also being an object of knowledge, like a jar, is not inherent to the Self. All other modifications of the mind are similarly alien to the Self. Propensities that are evil are also in the same position, for the Self is spotless and pure (U.S. XV. 16).

सर्वन्यायोपसंग्रहः ।

“नित्यमुक्तत्वविज्ञानं वाक्याद्भवति नान्यतः ।  
वाक्यार्थस्यापि विज्ञानं पदार्थस्मृतिपूर्वकम् ॥ ३१ ॥  
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां पदार्थस्मर्यते ध्रुवम् ।  
एवं निर्दुःखमात्मानमक्रियं प्रतिपद्यते ॥ ३२ ॥  
सदेवेत्यादिवाक्येभ्यः प्रमा स्फुटतरा भवेत् ।  
दशमस्त्वमसीत्यस्माद्यथैवं प्रत्यगात्मनि” ॥ ३३ ॥

Thus the entire reasoning on the matter is summed up:

31-33. That the Self is eternally free is understood through the scriptural texts and by no other resource. The import of the text is grasped by remembering the import of the terms. The import of terms is firmly apprehended through the adoption of the reasoning by presence and absence. Thus is the sorrowless and actionless Self attained. Even as the sentence ‘You are the tenth person’ produces knowledge, the propositions like ‘That thou art’ give rise to clear valid apprehension of the inmost Self (U.S. XVIII. 190-192).

वीक्षापन्नस्योदाहरणम् ।

“नवबुद्धचपहाराद्धि स्वात्मानं दशपूरणम् ।

अपश्यन् ज्ञातुमेवेच्छेत्स्वमात्मानं जनस्तथा ॥ ३४ ॥

अविद्याबद्धचक्षुष्टात्कामापहतधीः सदा ।

विविक्तं दृशिमात्मानं नेक्षते दशमं यथा” ॥ ३५ ॥

To the inquiring person, the following are also offered:

34-35. Just as a person engrossed in the nine other members and not counting himself as the tenth seeks the tenth man of the company, who in fact he himself is, the seeker with vision blinded by nescience and mind engrossed in desires does not see the real Self, which is of the nature of transcendent pure consciousness (U.S. XVIII. 174-175).

सोऽयमेवमविद्यापटलावगुण्ठितदृष्टिः सन् कथमुत्थाप्यत इत्याह ।

यथा स्वापनिमित्तेन स्वप्नहवप्रतिबोधितः ।

करणं कर्म कर्तारं स्वाप्नं नैवेक्षते स्वतः ॥ ३६ ॥

अनात्मज्ञस्तथैवायं सम्यक् श्रुत्यावबोधितः ।

गुरुं शास्त्रं तथा मूढं स्वात्मनोऽन्यं न पश्यति ॥ ३७ ॥

How is this person whose vision is veiled by nescience to be aroused?

36-37. Just as a dreamer aroused from sleep does not see the dream-object, the dream-instrument and the dream-agent, the man ignorant of the Self, when enlightened perfectly by the śruti, sees nothing other than his Self, such as the preceptor, the scripture and the unenlightened.

स किं सकलसंसारप्रविविक्तमात्मानं वाक्यात्प्रतिपद्यत उत नेतीति । अत्र  
भूमः । कूटस्थावगतिशेषमात्रत्वात्प्रतिपत्तेरेत आह ।

दण्डावसाननिष्ठस्यादण्डसर्पो यथा तथा ।

नित्यावगतिनिष्ठं स्याद्वाक्याज्जगदसंशयम् ॥ ३८ ॥

Does the man of this realization see through the Vedāntic proposition the Self as transcending the entire world of relativity or does he not? We reply that his realization leaves him the unchanging and pure consciousness alone:

38. Just as the snake wrongly seen in the stick ends in the stick when correct perception comes about, the phenomenal world culminates undoubtedly in the eternal consciousness through the knowledge of the proposition.

कुत एतत् । यस्मात् ।

पश्यन्निति यदाहोच्चैः प्रत्यक्त्वमजमव्ययम् ।

अपूर्वानपरानन्तं त्वमा तदुपलक्ष्यते ॥ ३९ ॥

How is this? It is so because:

39. The śruti declares aloud that the seer sees nothing; but the seeing consciousness remains extinguishable. The inner principle of consciousness not subject to time is signified through secondary reference by the term 'Thou'.

तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्योत्थविज्ञानेनैव बाध्यते । यस्मात् ।

अस्माद्यदपरं रूपं नास्तीत्येव निरूप्यते ।

अन्यथाग्रहणाभावाद्बीजं तत्त्वप्रबोधयोः ॥ ४० ॥



The phenomenal world is sublated only by the comprehension issuing from the Vedāntic proposition:

40. In deep sleep nothing other than the Self exists because in that state misapprehension does not exist. But that state contains within itself the seed of dream and waking.

अस्थार्यस्य ब्रह्मिन् उदाहरणम् ।

“कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।

प्राज्ञः कारणबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः” ॥ ४१ ॥

To strengthen this position, the following is added:

41. The waking self and dream self are bound by both the cause and effect. The self of deep sleep is bound by only the cause. In the fourth state neither of these fetters exist (*M.K. I. 11*).

“अन्यथागूहणतः स्वप्नो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।

विपर्यसि तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमश्नुते” ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Dream occurs to one who misapprehends. Sleep occurs to one who does not apprehend. When both this misapprehension and non-apprehension are dispelled, the fourth status is attained (*M.K. I. 15*).

तथा भगवत्पादोयमुदाहरणम् ।

“सुषुप्ताख्यं तमोज्ञानं बीजं स्वप्नप्रबोधयोः ।

आत्मबोधप्रदग्धं स्याद्बीजं दग्धं यथाभवम्” ॥ ४३ ॥

To the same effect are the words of the blessed teacher:

43. Darkness of the nature of ignorance is called sleep and it is the seed of dream and waking. When

it is burnt up by the realization of the Self, like a roasted seed it cannot sprout into dream and waking (U.S.XVII. 26).

एवं गौडैर्द्राविडैर्नः पूज्यैरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः ।

अज्ञानमात्रोपाधिस्सन्नहमादिहृगीश्वरः ॥ ४४ ॥

44. This teaching that the Lord Himself conditioned by ignorance becomes the witness of phenomena like the ego comes to us from the two teachers, one a Gauḍa and another a Drāviḍa, both of whom are venerated by us.

तत्रान्यथाग्रहणवदन्यथाग्रहणबीजमग्रहणमनात्मधर्म एवेत्याह ।

इदं ज्ञानमहं ज्ञाता ज्ञेयमेतदिति त्रयम् ।

योऽविकारो विजानाति परागेवास्य तत्तमः ॥ ४५ ॥

Like misapprehension, the non-apprehension that brings about misapprehension is also not an attribute of the Self:

45. The darkness of ignorance is external to this unchanging Self, who cognizes this knowledge, the knowing ego and the world of objects that is known.

यत एतदेवमतस्तस्यैव बीजात्मनस्तमसश्चित्तधर्मविशिष्टस्य स्वकार्यद्वितीयाभिसंबन्धो न त्वविकारिण आत्मन इत्याह दृष्टान्तेन ।

रूपप्रकाशयोर्यद्वत्संगतिर्विक्रियावतः ।

सुखदुःखादिसंबन्धश्चित्तस्यैवं विकारिणः ॥ ४६ ॥

This being the case, it is only this causal ignorance qualified by the traits of the mind, that is associated with the non-Self set up by ignorance itself. The unchanging Self is not so associated. This is brought out with an analogy:

46. Just as colour and light, both subject to change, enter into mutual relation, pleasures and pains are associated only with the mind subject to change.

तदेतदन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां दर्शयिष्यन्नाह ।

संप्रसादेऽविकारित्वादस्तं याते विकारिणि ।

पश्यतो नात्मनः किञ्चिद्वितीयं स्पृशतेऽण्वपि ॥ ४७ ॥

This is demonstrated through the method of presence and absence:

47. In the state of sleep, the changing mind subsides and the Self, being changeless, continues to be the seer; in that state nothing external to the Self affects it in the least.

सोऽयं कूटस्थज्ञानमूर्तिरात्मा ।

यथा प्राज्ञे तथैवायं स्वप्नजागरितान्तयोः ।

पश्यन्नप्यविकारित्वाद्वितीयं नैव पश्यति ॥ ४८ ॥

This Self is constituted of unchanging knowledge:

48. As in sleep, in dream and waking states also, the seeing Self, being changeless, sees no other in reality.

एवं ज्ञानवतो नास्ति ममाहंमतिसंश्रयः ।

भास्वत्प्रदीपहस्तस्य ह्यन्धकार इवाग्रतः ॥ ४९ ॥

49. For one who has understood this truth there is no 'I' and 'mine', even as there is no darkness for one who is holding a lighted lamp in his hand.

तत्र दृष्टान्तः ।

आ प्रबोधाद्यथासिद्धिर्द्वैतादन्यस्य वस्तुनः ।

बोधादेवमसिद्धत्वं बुद्ध्यादेः प्रत्यगात्मनः ॥ ५० ॥

Here is an analogy for this:

50. Just as the non-dual Self is as if non-existent before enlightenment, the factors like the mind become non-existent after enlightenment.

स एष विद्वान्हानोपादानशून्यमात्मानमात्मनि पश्यन् ।

सर्वमेवानुजानाति सर्वमेव निषेधति ।

भेदात्मलाभोऽनुज्ञा स्यान्निषेधोऽतस्त्वभावतः ॥ ५१ ॥

This man of enlightenment seeing within himself the Self not to be appropriated or rejected—

51. Accepts everything and denies everything. Acceptance in this case is the admission of the world of duality from the empirical point of view and denial is the supercession of that world from the standpoint of ultimate reality.

सर्वस्योक्तत्वादुपसंहारः ।

परमार्थात्मनिष्ठं यत्सर्ववेदान्तनिश्चितम् ।

तमोपनुद्धियां ज्ञानं तदेतत्कथितं मया ॥ ५२ ॥

As the whole theme is elucidated, the conclusion emerges:

52. This knowledge established in the ultimate Self, settled by the whole realm of Vedānta and destructive of the darkness of human intelligence has been expounded by me.

एतावद्विहोक्तम् ।

नेहात्मविन्मदन्योऽस्ति न मत्तोऽज्ञोऽस्ति कश्चन ।

इत्यजानन्विजानाति यस्स ब्रह्मविदुत्तमः ॥ ५३ ॥

To this point we have arrived:

53. 'There is no one other than me who knows the Self. There is no one other than me who is ignorant of the Self.' He who knows this unknowingly is the best of those who know Brahman.

एवमात्मानं ज्ञात्वा किं प्रवर्तितव्यमुत निवर्तितव्यमाहोस्विन्मुक्तप्रग्रहतेति । उच्यते ।

ज्ञेयाभिन्नमिदं यस्माज्ज्ञेयवस्त्वनुसार्यतः ।

न प्रवृत्तिं निवृत्तिं वा कटाक्षेणापि वीक्षते ॥ ५४ ॥

After knowing the Self in this fashion, is there anything which the man of knowledge should do or anything from which he has to abstain or can he live as he pleases without these fetters of imperatives and prohibitions?

54. This condition of enlightenment is not different from the nature of the object known and therefore it is in conformity with that object. As the object is free from action and withdrawal from action the man of knowledge does not even cast a glance at actions or abstinences from actions.

कुत एतज्ज्ञेयाभिन्नमिति । यतः ।

प्रागात्मबोधाद्बोधोऽयं बाह्यवस्तुपसर्जनः ।

प्रध्वस्ताखिलसंसार आत्मैकालम्बनः श्रुतेः ॥ ५५ ॥

How is it not different from the object of knowledge?

55. Prior to knowledge of the Self, the intelligence is conjoined to external objects. But when the Self is

known according to the śruti, knowledge destroys all relative existence and merges in the Self alone.

एवमवगतपरमार्थतत्त्वस्य न शेषशेषिभावस्तत्कारणस्योत्सारितत्वादित्याह ।

वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेन निरुणद्धि यतो भवम् ।

निवृत्तिमपि मृदनाति सम्यग्बोधः प्रवृत्तिवत् ॥ ५६ ॥

Therefore one who has understood the highest Reality is not subservient to any higher imperative, for the ground of such a relation of being subservient to a higher end stands cancelled by knowledge:

56. As perfect enlightenment destroys in reality the life of transmigratory existence, it eliminates prohibitions even as it does injunctions to actions.

सकृदात्मप्रसूत्यैव निरुणद्धचखिलं भवम् ।

ध्वान्तमात्रनिरासेन न ततोऽन्यान्यथामतिः ॥ ५७ ॥

57. By merely coming into being once knowledge removes the whole of bondage. When the root-ignorance is removed, misconception arising from that ignorance does not abide apart.

देशकालाद्यसंबद्धाद्देशादेर्मोहकार्यतः ।

नानुत्पन्नमदगर्थं वा ज्ञानमज्ञानमस्त्यतः ॥ ५८ ॥

58. Time and space are effects of delusion and therefore the Self is not related to them. Hence when the Self is known, there is no knowledge yet to be acquired and there is no ignorance yet to be destroyed.

सम्यग्ज्ञानशिखिप्लुष्टमोहतकार्यरूपिणः ।

सकृन्निवृत्तेर्बाध्यस्य किं कार्यमवशिष्यते ॥ ५९ ॥

59. When the Self has all the delusion and its effects burnt up by perfect knowledge and when everything to be sublated stands eliminated instantaneously, what duty yet remains to be performed?

वास्तवेनैव वृत्तेनाविद्यायाः प्रध्वस्तत्वात् किञ्चिदवशिष्यत इत्युक्तः परिहारः ।  
अथापरस्साम्प्रदायिकः परिहारः।

निवृत्तसर्पस्सर्पोत्थं यथा कम्पं न मुञ्चति ।

विध्वस्ताखिलमोहोऽपि मोहकार्यं तथात्मवित् ॥ ६० ॥

In reality nescience has been annihilated and nothing more remains to be done. This is the answer to the question. There is another traditional point of view also:

60. The illusion of the snake may have been corrected. But still the trembling born of the fear of the snake may linger a little while. In the same way, even after the delusion is destroyed, the effects of delusion may persist a little for the knower of the Self.

यतः प्रवृत्तिबीजमुच्छिन्नं तस्मात् ।

तरोरुत्खातमूलस्य शोषेणैव यथा क्षयः ।

तथा बुद्धात्मतत्त्वस्य निवृत्त्यैव तनुक्षयः ॥ ६१ ॥

The seed of further action has been destroyed. Therefore:

61. Just as an uprooted tree perishes by withering away and drying up, the man who has known the Self lives till the cessation of his body is effectuated by the

exhaustion of the actions that have begun to yield their effects.

अथालेपकपक्षनिरासार्थमाह ।

बुद्धाद्वैतसतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं यदि ।

शुनां तत्त्वहशां चैव को भेदोऽशुचिभक्षणे ॥ ६२ ॥

Now the view of those who hold that the ascetic is free from evil even if he does evil is refuted:

62. If the man who has awakened to the non-dual Reality behaves as he likes, what then is the difference between a dog and a man of knowledge in the matter of eating prohibited food?

कस्मान्न भवति । यस्मात् ।

अधर्मज्जायतेऽज्ञानं यथेष्टाचरणं ततः ।

धर्मकार्ये कथं तत्स्याद्यत्र धर्मोऽपि नेष्यते ॥ ६३ ॥

Why is it that licentious conduct is said to be impossible in a man of knowledge?

63. From vice arises ignorance. From ignorance arises licentious conduct. How can there be licentious conduct in a state which is the result of utmost virtue in the past and in which there is no motivation for even virtuous actions?

प्रत्याचक्षाण आहातो यथेष्टाचरणं हरिः ।

“यस्य सर्वे समारम्भाः” “प्रकाशं चे” ति सर्वहृक् ॥ ६४ ॥

64. The all-seeing Hari has repudiated licentious conduct by saying that ‘All his endeavours are free from the taint of desire and personal interest’ (*Gītā*, iv. 19),



and that: 'He does not desire the illumination etc. tainted by the three *gunas*' (*Gītā*, XIV. 22).

तिष्ठतु तावत्सर्वप्रवृत्तिबीजघस्मरं ज्ञानं मुमुक्षुवस्थायामपि न संभवति यथेष्टा-  
चरणम् । तदाह ।

“यो हि यत्र विरक्तः स्यान्नासौ तस्मै प्रवर्तते ।

लोकत्रयविरक्तत्वान्मुमुक्षुः किमितीहते” ॥ ६५ ॥

Let alone the state of knowledge destructive of all the motives for action. Even in the state of aspiration for release there could be no licentious conduct. This is set forth now:

65. He who is not attached to something, does not engage in action for its sake. The aspirant after release is free from attachment to the three worlds. How can he engage in worldly action? (*U.S. XVIII. 231*)

तत्र दृष्टान्तः ।

“क्षुधया पीड्यमानोऽपि न विषं ह्यत्तुमिच्छति ।

मिष्टान्नध्वस्ततृड् ज्ञानन्नामूढस्तज्जिघत्सति” ॥ ६६ ॥

The following analogy explains the position:

66. A man, even if tormented by hunger, does not like to eat poison. If his hunger has been appeased by excellent food, is there any chance of his eating poison, knowing it to be such, unless he is an utter idiot? (*U.S. XVIII. 232*)

यतोऽवगतपरमार्थतत्त्वस्य यथेष्टाचरणं न मनागपि घटते मुमुक्षुत्वेऽपि च तस्मात् ।

रागो लिङ्गमबोधस्य चित्तव्यायामभूमिषु ।

कुतः शाड्वलता तस्य यस्याग्निः कोटरे तरोः ॥ ६७ ॥

As licentious conduct is impossible even for the aspirant, there is no shadow of its possibility in the man of realization:

67. Passion is the index of ignorance in the several planes of mental life. How can the tree, having fire in the cavity of its trunk, grow rich foliage?

सकलपुरुषार्थसमाप्तिकारिणोऽस्यात्मावबोधस्य कुतः प्रसूतिरिति । उच्यते ।

अमानित्वादिनिष्ठो यो यश्चाद्वेष्टादिसाधनः ।

ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तस्य न बहिर्मुखचेतसः ॥ ६८ ॥

Whence does this knowledge of the Self capable of completing the entire fulfilment of life originate?

68. He who is established in virtues like freedom from conceit and practises virtues like non-hatred will have knowledge originating within himself and not he whose mind is turned outwards.

उत्पन्न आत्मविज्ञाने किमविद्याकार्यत्वात्प्रवृत्तिवन्निवृत्त्यात्मकामानित्वादयो निवर्तन्त उत नेति । नेति ब्रूमः । किं कारणम् । निवृत्तिशास्त्राविरुद्धस्वाभाव्या-  
त्परमात्मनो न तु नियोगवशात् । कथं तर्हि । शृणु ।

उत्पन्नात्मप्रबोधस्य त्वद्वेष्टृत्वादयो गुणाः ।

अयत्नतो भवन्त्यस्य न तु साधनरूपिणः ॥ ६९ ॥

When Self-knowledge arises, do the negative virtues like freedom from conceit cease like the positive ones, being equally the products of nescience? We answer in the negative. Why? Not because of obedience to the prohibitions of the scriptures, but because the supreme Self is not opposed to the scriptural texts that enjoin renunciation. How does it happen? Listen:

69. In a person of Self-knowledge virtues like non-hatred establish themselves without any effort on his part. They are not of the nature of means to him.

यत एतदेवमतः ।

इमं ग्रन्थमुपादित्सुरमानित्वादिसाधनः ।

यत्नतः स्यान्न दुर्वृत्तः प्रत्यग्धर्मानुगो ह्ययम् ॥ ७० ॥

This being so, it follows:

70. As this work conforms to the nature of the inmost Self, he who endeavours to study it must cultivate with effort virtues like non-conceit and non-hatred and let him not be of bad character.

न दातव्यश्चायं ग्रन्थः ।

नाविरक्ताय संसारान्नानिरस्तैषणाय च ।

न चायमवते देयं वेदान्तार्थप्रवेशनम् ॥ ७१ ॥

This work is not to be imparted to all:

71. The introduction to the import of Vedānta is not to be given to one who has not renounced the life of bondage, who has not given up desire and who has not practised self-control.

ज्ञात्वा यथोदितं सम्यग्ज्ञातव्यं नावशिष्यते ।

न चानिरस्तकर्मदं जानीयादञ्जसा ततः ॥ ७२ ॥

72. When this is understood, nothing remains there to be understood. Hence, one who has not renounced actions, cannot understand it directly.

निरस्तसर्वकर्माणिः प्रत्यक्प्रवणबुद्धयः ।

निष्कामा यतयः शान्ता जानन्तीदं यथोदितम् ॥ ७३ ॥

73. Those who have renounced actions, who are drawn towards the inmost Self, whose desires are quell-

ed and who are tranquil ascetics comprehend this as expounded.

श्रीमच्छङ्करपादपद्मयुगलं संसेव्य लब्ध्वोचिवान्

ज्ञानं पारमहंस्यमेतदमलं स्वान्तान्धकारापनुत् ।

मा भूदत्र विरोधिनी मतिरतः सद्भिः परीक्ष्यं बुधैः

सर्वत्रैव विशुद्धये मतमिदं सन्तः परं कारणम् ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Having served with reverence the feet of the blessed Saṅkara, and obtaining from him this pure knowledge pertaining to the highest ascetics and capable of destroying the inner darkness in oneself, I have spoken. Let there be no contrary spirit. Let this be examined by good and wisemen. This theory is for purification all-round. The exalted ones are the ultimate authority.

सुभाषितं चार्वापि नामहात्मनां

दिवाकरो नक्तहशामिवामलः ।

प्रभाति भात्येव विशुद्धचेतसां

निधिर्यथापास्ततृषां महाधनः ॥ ७५ ॥

75. Even what is charming and well-spoken does not commend itself to persons with no greatness of soul, even as the pure sun does not appeal to creatures that move about at night. But it does manifest itself in all its splendour to men of pure minds just as buried treasure is sighted by those who have conquered the desire for wealth.

विष्णोः पादानुगां यां निखिलमवनुदं शंकरोऽवाप योगात्

सर्वज्ञं ब्रह्मसंस्थं मुनिगणसहितं सम्यगभ्यर्च्य भक्त्या ।

विद्यां गङ्गामिवाहं प्रवरगुणनिधेः प्राप्य वेदान्तदीप्तां  
कारुण्यात्तामवोचं जनिमृतिनिवहध्वस्तये दुःखितेभ्यः ॥ ७६ ॥

76. The great Saṅkara acquired through his yoga this science, which destroys bondage, and which emanates from the foot of the all-pervading Viṣṇu. I worshipped with great devotion that omniscient preceptor established in Brahman in the company of sages. From him, a treasure of exalted qualities, I obtained the science illumined by Vedānta, even as Bhagīratha obtained the sacred Gaṅgā from Śiva. I have declared it out of compassion towards creatures lost in misery, so that their transmigratory existence may be terminated.

वेदान्तोदरवर्ति भास्वदमलं ध्वान्तच्छिदस्मद्वियो  
दिव्यं ज्ञानमतीन्द्रियेऽपि विषये व्याहन्यते न क्वचित् ।  
यो नो न्यायशलाकयैव निखिलं संसारबीजं तमः  
प्रोत्सार्याविरकार्षीद्गुरुगुरुः पूज्याय तस्मै नमः ॥ ७७ ॥

77. I offer adoration to the venerable teacher of teachers who by the rod of reason removed ignorance which is the seed of all bondage, and who revealed to us this divine knowledge, which abides in the heart of Vedānta, which is luminous and pure, which annihilates the darkness of our intellect and which, though dealing with super-sensible Reality, is not stultified at any point.

संबन्धोक्तिरियं साध्वी प्रतिश्लोकमुदाहृता ।  
नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धेर्ज्ञात्वेमां व्याख्यातासौ भवेद्भुवम् ॥ ७८ ॥

78. This connecting elucidation is good and is attached to every verse. After studying it, may one become a commentator of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*.

## NOTES

*(The numbers indicate both the verses and the prose prefaces to the verses.)*

### CHAPTER I

1. The prose introduction to the opening verse sums up in a masterly way the causal machinery bringing about the phenomenon of evil, for the eradication of which every living being is said to have a natural urge. By implication it outlines the exact method of its eradication.

Evil understood as suffering is due to the fact of embodiment. The Self gets embodied owing to the previous deeds, good and bad. The deeds themselves spring from desires and aversions. The desires are due to a twofold ignorance: (1) The Self is all-perfect and is of the nature of absolute bliss. This fact is obscured through ignorance. (2) There is nothing beside the Self in reality. But ignorance in its positive or misconstruing aspect posits the world of non-Self and distinguishes within it things and situations as desirable and undesirable. Ultimately, therefore, this ignorance in its privative and projective aspects is the root of all suffering. It follows that the elimination of ignorance through Vedāntic enlightenment is the supreme remedy for the ills of life. Hence, it is said, this exposition of the fundamentals of Vedānta is undertaken.

The invocatory verse brings out that Hari or the Supreme Being is the substratum of the universe and that the latter is only an illusory superstructure. It makes clear that this supreme principle is one with the inmost witness in the individual soul. Thus the three eternal verities of the Advaitic theory, 'Brahman alone is real, the world is unreal and Brahman and ātman are one in substance', are set forth in the verse. That the adored principle dispells the darkness of ignorance is mentioned here to indicate the final good aimed at by this inquiry.

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2. That affixes indicative of unsurpassed excellence fulfil themselves in signifying the preceptor is an oblique way of affirming his unsurpassed excellence.

3. That the treatise on hand was expressly composed in obedience to the preceptor's instruction is mentioned here.

4. The fundamental subject-matter of the inquiry is the ultimate Self, which is self-revealing and needs no objectifying process of cognition for its establishment. It is pre-supposed by everything else that may present itself as real and in its non-existence—even if such non-existence were conceivable—nothing would present itself as real. The Self is a self-certifying reality and the presentation of everything else is by virtue of its presence to the Self. What is termed 'Ego-centric predicament' is merely a disparaging rendering of this situation.

The commentator interprets the word 'clearly' to mean that what is expounded in a diffuse manner in other voluminous treatises is given a compact and pointed form here.

5. No claim to being superior or equal to the preceptor is put forward.

6. The motive of the composition is to invite correction and purification of the author's own understanding of the saving knowledge. No love of gain or fame has lured him into authorship.

Let us sum up the causes mentioned for writing the work.

(a) The preceptor's instruction to this effect.

(b) The need for a clear and compact presentation.

(c) The purification of the author's own understanding.

(d) As it is going to be said at the conclusion, the compassion towards the mortals caught up in the meshes of ignorance is also a motive.

7-8. In these two verses four principles are enunciated somewhat analogous to the four Noble Truths of Buddhism and a similar formulation in Patañjali's *Yogasūtras*.

(a) Anartha—evil—saṃsāra or life of suffering.

(b) Anartha-hetu—the cause of evil—the non-comprehension of the unity of the Self.

(c) Puruṣārtha—the final good—release or mukti.

(d) *Puruṣārtha-hetu*—the means leading to the final good-right comprehension of the import of the propositions of Vedānta such as 'Tattvamasī'.

9. From verse 9 to verse 21 there is the statement of the *prima facie* view of the Mīmāṃsaka. Its main contention is that karma or action prescribed by the Vedas, ritualistic as well as ethical is the way to release and not knowledge as mentioned in verse 8.

10-13. Avoidance of prohibited actions prevents undesirable re-embodiment. Avoidance of action advocated for realising certain desired states of life prevents re-embodiment in such states. Performance of unconditionally obligatory actions prevents re-embodiment to work out the results of the sin of their omission. The actions that have begun to produce their results already are to be liquidated through the experience of their results in life. By thus exhausting past karma and not forging fetters for the future by commissions and omissions one transcends the sphere of the machinery that binds the soul. Such a wise manipulation of karma itself effects liberation and there is no need for knowledge for that purpose.

14-16. Supra-mundane ends are to be achieved through conformity to scriptural injunctions and all scriptural imperatives inculcate action. There is no imperative to knowledge in the Vedas.

17. Jaimini is a revered authority and a master of the Vedic lore. He explicitly lays down that the Vedic scripture commands action and that whatever is unrelated to action in the body of revealed texts is useless.

18. There is a specific hymn in the *Īsopaniṣad* saying that a man should engage in action all his life, even if he were to live for a hundred years.

19. Scripture consists of sentences. A sentence is a group of words organised into a meaningful whole by a verb. The verb stands for action.

There are no scriptural sentences which are verbless and could thus inculcate knowledge as such.

20. Even if knowledge is admitted as having some efficacy in relation to release, it may be construed as having that efficacy in combination with action, either on a footing of equality with it or as its means or end. Admission of knowledge in the scheme

of the discipline for release does not abolish action in any way.

21. Thus in all stages of life proper performance of scripturally enjoined actions is essential for attaining salvation.

22. From this verse to the end of the first Chapter this view is refuted and it is argued that knowledge is the only means of release. Some views seeking to interpret knowledge as meditation and not mere comprehension are also countered. But the general tenor of the polemic is to maintain the sole efficacy of knowledge.

Perhaps this is the proper place to comment upon the title of the work which is specially appropriate and justified in view of the first chapter.

Naiṣkarmya means a state of being in which the effect of action has disappeared. In that sense it signifies simply mokṣa, a state transcending the realm of karma.

The simplest definition of bondage is a condition of life brought about by karma and subject to it. Life going beyond the realm of karma is mukti. Thus the word is properly applied to release.

It also means knowledge. Just as avidyā or negation of vidyā is identified with karma in *Īśopaniṣad* niṣkarma may be interpreted in a positive way as signifying knowledge.

It may also mean the fundamental nature of the ātman. The ātman is not an agent and is not subject to mutations entailed by agency in actions.

It is possible to see all these three meanings in the term *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*. It would mean the realization of the ideal of freedom from action brought about by the knowledge of the ātman, who is in reality beyond all association with action.

23. A leisurely and methodical criticism is promised. The commentator sees a hint that no mere sophistry for confounding the opponent somehow is intended to be perpetrated.

24. The four effects of action are:

- (a) Origination
- (b) Modification
- (c) Purification or improvement
- (d) Attainment.

See verse 53 also.

The main point is atonce stated. If the explanation of bondage as due to ignorance is admitted, there is no way of escaping the conclusion that knowledge alone can effect emancipation from bondage.

25. There are various types of action. In the scripture, each type is associated with some specific result. Are we to construe that some one kind of action leads to release or are we to regard that all actions together lead to this goal? If only one type has this efficacy the others are to be pronounced useless. If all are to be looked upon as emancipating, the classification of actions into distinct types on the basis of the results they produce would be invalid. The classification is the work of the scripture itself.

26-27. The scripture advocates two kinds of action, *nitya* or obligatory and *kāmya* or optional. The first is supposed to be curative of demerits or sins. The second is for securing desired objectives like life in *svarga*. There is no mention of any action as instrumental to the attainment of release. In this super-mundane matter we have no source of authority other than scripture and the scripture is silent on releasing actions.

28. Really the opponent who advocates action, is advocating no action as leading to release. He himself advocates renunciation of prohibited and optional actions. He acknowledges that obligatory action has no positive results. He is with us in upholding the renunciation of actions. Only he objects to our favouring the path of renunciation.

The allusion is to a familiar story. The mother-in-law objects to the daughter-in-law refusing to give alms to a beggar and calls the beggar back and exercises the right of refusing herself. The point is that in reality the *Mīmāṃsaka* provides no better place for karma in the scheme of spiritual discipline for *mokṣa* than the *Vedāntin*. It is an opposition without any substantial difference of principle.

29. The prose portion may be summed as follows:

- Worldly actions proceed from a wrong conception of values and are based upon unenlightened commonsense. Now the question is whether scripturally ordained action is also the product of such poor knowledge or is it based upon a proper insight into reality. If proper insight is the source of ordained action, the way of re-

nunciation is wrong whether it is promulgated by the Mīmāṃsaka or by the Vedāntin. If on the contrary it proceeds from popular and unenlightened understanding the case for advocating actions becomes absurd.

The verse states an important principle. We have wrongly formed notions of what is good and bad for us. Scripture comes in at this stage and prescribes methods of procuring the former and avoiding the latter. The objects of desire and aversion are framed by our delusions. Scripture only offers the plan of action. It does not propose the ends, it only prescribes the means.

30. The Self is the absolute good in itself. Evil is ultimately unreal. The ignorance of this actual state of affairs is what sets up the delusion that certain things other than the Self are good and that evil is something real. It is this delusion that prompts desires and aversions and the consequent exertions. The scripture does not cause desires or prompt actions. It merely reveals the means for the desired ends and the means for escaping from what is disliked. In fact desires and aversions are instinctive and proceed from the animal nature of man. They are common to him and the lower creation.

31-32. Four situations are distinguished here:

- (a) Some objects are held to be unattained through ignorance.
- (b) Certain things evil in nature are wrongly held to be real and are sought to be eliminated even though they are non-existent.

In both these cases ignorance and error are operative and thus what is real is obscured and what is unreal is fancied to be real.

- (c) Actually real evil is to be eliminated.
- (d) Really unattained good yet to be realised.

33-34. The scripture prescribes the right means in relation to (c) and (d). In regard to (a) and (b) no action or adoption of means is required. What is required is simple understanding of the facts.

35. Action is itself a product of ignorance and error. How can it destroy its own source? Only enlightenment could do that.

36. The point of the objection is this: Knowledge also arises

through the operation of favourable conditions of life. It is a product of life. If life is vitiated by a basic ignorance, the knowledge that arises out of it cannot remain uncontaminated. The answer makes out two points. (a) Knowledge concerns the ātman that is beyond all ignorance. It is really a product of what is beyond ignorance. (b) The moment illumination happens ignorance is dispelled and the conditions that bring about illumination are not needed any further. But action for its full fruition requires the persistence of factors till the actual fruition which is separated in time from the initiation of action. Knowledge has instantaneous efficacy while that of action is delayed. Knowledge is the necessary and sufficient means for destroying ignorance and it needs no supporting factor for this fruition.

38. Even if misconceptions are removed by knowledge the traces of the misconceptions might remain. Are they not capable of generating the old misconceptions again and thus put an end to the correcting knowledge? The answer is interpreted in two ways. Of the two the correct way seems to be this: Knowledge also gives rise to its own traces. The traces of knowledge revive knowledge and destroy the misconceptions that may be revived by the traces of the older misconception.

39-40. A man engages in actions appropriate to his caste and order of life. But the sense of caste and order of life presuppose the identification of his self with the body. If a man fully gets over this identification he transcends the specific conditions as appropriate to which he has to engage in actions. The verse 40 is quoted by Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers such as Yāmuna, Sudarśana-sūrin and Vedāntadeśika. It is clearly alluded to by Rāmānuja also. See verses 54 to 62.

41-42. Conditioned by ignorance and identifying oneself with the body, a man indulges in good and bad actions. They lead to his embodiment in a good or bad or mixed realms of retribution. Thus an individual affected by ignorance comes to entertain desires for fancied objects and the desires prompt him to actions good and bad. The actions bind him to appropriate retributions by way of pleasures and pains. Avidyā-kāma-karma constitute the causal chain of evil.

43-44. The śruti and Bhagavān Vyāsa repeatedly maintain that desire is the root of all evil. It is so through its effect, action and it is itself the effect of ignorance. Its eradication is to be worked out through the eradication of its cause, namely, avidyā or ignorance.

45-52. It has been pointed out so far that action is not the proximate or ultimate means of release. It has also been explained how prompted by desires which are bred by ignorance it is the cause of bondage. From verse 45 to verse 52 the indirect or mediate or remote way in which action can be helpful to the aspirant after liberation is explained. Performance of puṇya-karma or meritorious optional action prompted by desires other than the urge for release purifies the mind. Such a purified mind inclines the agent to a disinterested performance of obligatory actions. Performance of obligatory actions in a spirit of dedication to God gives rise to the highest type of renunciation. A mind blessed with such renunciation naturally longs for the realization of the inmost Self. Then the comprehension of the Vedāntic Truth of 'Tattvamasi' dawns which terminates the original ignorance responsible for all the evils of life, and establishes the Self in its inherent purity and bliss.

53. This is the traditional classification of all the effects of action and its claim to exhaustiveness is implied throughout. Release or freedom is the very nature of the ātman. As the ātman is not to be produced, never unattained, being perfect needs no improvement and is utterly unchangeable, action can play no part in realizing it. Only ignorance concerning it has to be set aside.

54-62. In verse 20 it was stated by the pūrvapakṣin that knowledge combined with action can constitute the means of release and never knowledge by itself. In verse 54 it is urged that action is the means for knowledge and as such they cannot be simultaneously operative. The means must be complete before the end emerges into being. In the verses 55 and 56 their mutual incompatibility is shown as ruling out their combination. Action is embedded in avidyā and vidyā or knowledge is its natural antithesis. How is the sun to be combined with the darkness of the night?

From 57 to 62 the same incompatibility is elaborated. The fundamental point of incompatibility is that the scripture prescribes actions relative to varṇa, vāśrama, etc., and the agent seeking to



obey the injunctions must ascribe to himself varṇa, āśrama, etc. Such ascription involves the identification of the pure ātman with the body. But the whole endeavour of Vedāntic knowledge is to destroy such false identifications. How can knowledge that cancels the body-soul identification be combined with actions that are founded on precisely that identification? Combination of the two as equal factors in a common plan or one as subsidiary to another is thus ruled out. While lower forms of knowledge not effecting such drastic elimination of avidyā can very well enter into combination with action, the highest form of knowledge can never be so associated with action.

66. The cause, nature and effect of jñāna and karma are diametrically opposed. Jñāna is produced by a valid source of knowledge, its nature is to reveal reality and its effect is the termination of ignorance. Karma is produced by ignorance and desire. Its nature is to cover up the soul through embodiment. Its effect is either production or change or improvement or attainment. Two factors so thoroughly opposed to each other can never be operated together.

67. The prose section introducing the verse 67 refers to two views and the verse rejects both and expresses the author's conclusion.

(a) The liberating knowledge does not consist of the mere comprehension of the import of statements such as 'I am Brahman', however thorough such comprehension may be. This comprehension must issue in meditation and it is prolonged and intense meditation that finally removes the basic ignorance. This view is ascribed to Brahmadatta, an old Vedāntic thinker.

(b) The second view is ascribed to Maṇḍana, a more recent and a very much better-known Vedāntin. According to this also the meditation following from the comprehension of texts is important. But this by itself does not annihilate ignorance. Out of prolonged and intense meditation a new integral insight or vision is generated and it is this final non-verbal and integral knowledge gained through meditation that really puts an end to the binding ignorance.

The author's view elevates the role and status of the text-comprehension itself and it holds that when comprehension is perfect no further process like meditation and no new insight born of that meditation are really necessary or possible. All other aids are

simply subsidiary to the understanding of the mahāvākyas and that is the final releasing knowledge. Āgama-jñāna is all-sufficient by itself when properly construed.

68-79. The combination theory has been refuted taking for granted that Brahman and ātman are absolutely one without a shadow of any duality. Now it is going to be argued that a combination of jñāna and karma is inadmissible even if such an uncompromising non-dualism is not accepted. There are three alternative philosophical possibilities: (a) Brahman and ātman may be looked upon as absolutely identical, or (b) they may be considered as both identical and different, or (c) they may be taken as wholly different entities.

(a) This view has already been shown to exclude action and the combination of knowledge and action. Realization of Brahman is release and since the ātman is Brahman itself all that is required is the removal of the illusion that it is different therefrom. There is no scope for any action here.

(b) This view, if true, may promote the disputed combination. But it is fundamentally self-contradictory as it posits both unity and its antithesis. There is no use in considering what would have been plausible if this view were true. It is an impossible synthesis of utter incompatibilities.

(c) If difference is absolute, there is no question of attaining mokṣa understood as identity with Brahman. Neither jñāna nor karma nor both in combination can bring about a fusion of ātman and Brahman without destroying their intrinsically separate essences. Either no mokṣa is possible or it consists of the annihilation of the essential being of the ātman. It is possible to re-define the nature of mokṣa consistently with dualism. Then the nature of the jñāna necessary for mokṣa would have also to be radically re-defined and then the present controversy whether monistic knowledge and karma can go together does not arise at all. The verse 72 is not quite clear in its import and the commentator's guidance does not resolve the uncertainty.

80. From this verse onwards the several points of the pūrvapakṣa are countered in detail. Though the position has been re-

futed in a fundamental manner, the author feels the necessity to reply point-by-point.

81-84. The prose preface to verse 81 is a general criticism. It is also a direct challenge to what has been outlined in verses 10 to 13.

It may be remembered that the renunciation of optional and prohibited actions has been advocated and the performance of obligatory actions recommended. Only past deeds which have begun to yield their results are to be exhausted through an experience of their results in life. This scheme is criticized on the following grounds:

(a) How are the deeds whose results have not yet begun to appear to be liquidated? Only philosophical enlightenment could destroy them but it is not admitted by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

(b) A complete abandonment of optional and prohibited action has not been possible even for the wisest of men.

(c) There is no possibility of working out all the past karma through an experience of its results, for as *saṁsāra* has been beginningless this process of expiation will be endless.

(d) Nor can past karma be neutralized by a performance of optional and prohibited actions now. The new actions not being qualitatively superior to the past actions cannot be really curative of their results.

(e) Nor can obligatory actions be considered as expiatory of all past karma, firstly because there is no specific scriptural statement to this effect and secondly because obligatory actions are said to be effectless and the motive mentioned for their performance is only the avoidance of the effects of their non-performance.

85-86. These two verses answer the point raised in verse 14.

87. This is an answer to verse 15.

88. Here a new objection is mentioned and answered. When the Upaniṣads inculcate knowledge of *ātman* they seem to take the form of an imperative. The response to an imperative is of the nature of action. In this case are we not to construe that mental action of the form of meditation is enjoined here? It is replied that the *ātman* is not to be brought into the field of mental

vision afresh. It is ever present in consciousness. The injunction is negative in nature and the Upaniṣads ask us to exclude preoccupation with the non-Self.

89. This is a direct reply to verse 15.

90. This is a direct reply to verse 16.

91. This considers the point raised in verse 17.

There is a difficulty here. The author seems to ascribe the *Brahmasūtras* to Jaimini. Philosophically there is no specific difficulty. This is only a disturbing anomaly for the historian of Vedānta. Indirectly it lends support to the view that Pūrvamīmāṃsa and Vedānta are not so divergent or opposed as some later Vedāntins are apt to assert. Even Śaṅkara countenances this supposition in his *Sūtrabhāṣya* once (III. iii. 53).

92-95. When one does not seek lower ends like svarga, and is in his spiritual essence the ultimate Self divested of all non-Self and cognizable only through the analysis of Self-consciousness, and is unrelated to empirical phenomena like the objects, body and even pleasure and pain, what sense could be there in enjoining on such a person to do any action? Action must be for attainment of objects that bring pleasure and the agent should act through the body and experience the rewards in the embodied condition. What is out of all relation to these factors can never be an agent of any obligatory action.

96. This verse answers the point of the verse 18 and interprets the *Īśopaniṣad* passage as addressed to the lower and ignorant aspirant.

97. This answers the point of verse 19. Verbs may be necessary in sentences. But there are verbs signifying being and not becoming. In 'Thou art That' the verb 'art' signifies existence and no performance to be undertaken.

98-100. The whole discussion is concluded.

## CHAPTER II

1. It has been brought home that the way to achieve the highest good is knowledge and the knowledge required for this purpose is to be acquired through the understanding of the Vedāntic texts like 'Tattvamasi'. If a person does not comprehend the meaning of 'That thou art' it must be due to his not having understood the meaning of 'Thou'. In other words Self-knowledge is the prerequisite for comprehending the identity of the Self with Brahman. This Chapter is said by the author to be aiming at the clear determination of the nature of the Self.

2-4. Four classes of seekers are mentioned here:

(a) There are persons who are freed from the illusion of the non-Self completely and to them the joy of enlightenment occurs spontaneously and naturally.

(b) There is a class of persons who study Vedānta and reflect on its import by themselves and arrive at the final truth by themselves.

(c) The third class is conducted to realization by the instruction of the preceptor who imparts the texts to them repeatedly and induces in them reflection conducive to realization.

(d) There may be a person who has undergone much preparatory discipline and done the study of the Vedānta in a former life and thus his mind may be quite ready and mature for the final illumination. If such a spiritually ripe seeker happens to come across the revealing Vedāntic text even by chance, he is thrown by force as it were into the state of realisation.

The author insists that in all these cases the primal factor productive of the saving knowledge is the text of Vedānta and nothing else.

5. The identification of 'Thou' with 'That' ought to cause no difficulty whatever. 'That' signifies Brahman and 'Thou' stands for the individual. In the individual there is the inmost ātman and its empirical adjuncts. If by 'Thou' the adjuncts are meant, the assertion of their identity with Brahman is not meant here and the con-

tradition that would arise if that assertion were to be made is not there to be faced. If by 'Thou' the pure inward Self is meant, there is no contradiction either, for that Self is free from all features that could come in the way of its identity with the ultimate Brahman.

6-10. The steps are as follows:

The spirit of renunciation gives rise to a keen urge to give up all objects of mundane desire. This leads to the desire for release. The aspirant after release approaches a proper preceptor, from him he hears the words of the scripture 'That thou art'. The import of the proposition as a whole requires a prior understanding of the import of the terms 'Thou' and 'That'. That understanding of the meaning of terms involves the exercise of reason. Without such reasoning the import of the proposition cannot be grasped and without comprehension of that import ignorance cannot be removed. If ignorance is not removed the supreme end of life cannot be realized. Hence the treatise will now deal with the rational discernment of the meaning of 'Thou'.

11-18. These verses appeal to common sense and urge in a popular manner that a clear distinction must be made between the Self and the body.

19. This verse formulates the fundamental argument for the said distinction. It consists of two ideas:

(a) The body is an object of perceptual cognition and is open to observation through the same senses through which the external physical objects are perceived. The external objects are undoubtedly other than the perceiving Self. Even so the body must be other than the Self. The root of the argument lies in the fact that the Self is the self-revealing subject not depending on anything else for its cognitive revelation while objects come to be revealed when brought into a particular relation with the perceiver. They, being objective, are cognized by another while the Self is self-luminous as it were and needs no such alien aid for its cognitive presence. In it *being* and *revelation of being* are identical while the objects have been waiting to be revealed by the touch of the Self's consciousness.

(b) There are states of existence like dream and dreamless sleep during which the self-manifestation of the Self is there, but there is

no awareness of the body. This amount of separation in experience is enough to demonstrate the distinction of the Self from the body.

21-22. So far the Self is shown to be different from the gross physical body. The same argument is extended to what is termed the subtle body consisting of the entire psychical machinery and its functions like the ego, the sense of mine, volition, desire. They are also objective and are known to be suspended in certain states like deep sleep, when the Self continues to be irrepressibly present. Their suspension would not be a matter of experience if the experiencer were also suspended. Awareness of the being or the non-being of every thing implies the uninterrupted being of the principle of awareness itself.

23-33. These verses introduce a new and revolutionary consideration. The Self is sought to be distinguished from the ego or 'aham'.

The ego or the category signified by 'I' has as its distinctive character self-cognition. In it the knower and the known, the subject and object are fused into one. The Self knowing itself is the 'I' or ego. According to the discussion here this is a self-contradictory category because the agent and the object can never be one. The Self is without parts or aspects. It is indivisible and integral and transcends all objectivity. Its knowing itself is a pure impossibility. Hence the ego is also an object present as such to the Self and is not to be identified with the Self. It is a self-contradictory blend of the pure Self and the phenomenal internal sense. In addition it is not co-terminous with the Self, for, it is also suspended in deep sleep and in the state of mukti while the Self abides in these states. It is objective and separable and hence must be distinguished from the pure subject.

The author ascribes to the Mīmāṃsaka philosophers the view that the Self-conscious ego is the real Self. 'Self-consciousness' in this context does not mean *the consciousness constitutive of the Self* but '*the Self's consciousness of itself*'. We know that Advaitic tradition ascribed a similar view of self-consciousness to some schools of Buddhism (Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasri* XVI. 14 *Citsukhi*) The Advaitic writers consistently reject this possibility of the Self being both the subject and object in the same act of con-

sciousness. The word used in this connection is 'svātmani-kriyāvirodha'. Śaṅkara criticises this view severely in several places. Only one instance may suffice. Śaṅkara's commentary on the first anuvāka of the Chapter II of *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* is a very good instance. While our author is directly following Śaṅkara in this argument, credit must be given to his strong and extensive defence of the position.

There are some interesting analogies to the Advaitic position in modern Western thought. Bradley classed the self as an appearance and one of his fundamental arguments attempts to expose what he considers to be the fallacy in the notion of self-consciousness. He urges that the whole self can never be objectified and placed before consciousness as an object. Something in the 'Felt Background' of the self escapes this objectification. A more recent writer with an entirely different orientation and motive, speaks of the systematic elusiveness of the 'I'. Professor Gilbert Ryle, to whom we owe this telling expression says 'Nor can a missile be its own target' and also 'The fishing net cannot be reduced to one of the fishes which it itself catches' (*The Concept of Mind*, page 187, 197).

The verse 32 is quoted by Yāmuna in his *Ātmasiddhi*.

34-36. Either the Ego must persist in all states and even in the state of release or it must be understood as other than the self.

Here is a new line of thought suggested and repudiated. Why not hold that though the Self is enduring and immutable, it is the substratum of changing properties like the sense of ego and other psychic operations? This possibility is rejected on the ground that substantive changelessness conjoined with adjectival modifications is impossible. Change of properties is bound to infect the substratum also with change.

'If the evidences support the concept of a changing self, what can be done in the matter? We have to accept the position as true.' Such a counter-argument is also noticed. It is answered by the fundamental principle that the Self must be an unchanging spectator; otherwise both recognition and awareness of change itself become impossible.

37-43. These verses repeat and elaborate a little the judgement concerning the character of the ego as non-Self.



44-45. Here we have the conclusion of the argument and a further step of great importance is also taken.

The distinction between the Self and the non-Self is established and it is also shown that factors usually mistaken for the Self, namely, the gross and subtle bodies are quite other than it. Now, what is the ontological status of the non-Self? Does it constitute an independent sphere of reality, though it should not be confounded with the sphere of the Self? Is the dualism of the Self and non-Self final? In answer to this query, our treatise takes the next revolutionary and drastic step. The non-Self demonstrated to be clearly other than the self is declared to be: (a) Mithyā-siddha, (b) anāt-maka, (c) mohamūla, and (d) sudurbodha. The terms may be interpreted as follows in accordance with the commentary:

- (a) Illusory or wrongly imagined to exist.
- (b) Devoid of being.
- (c) Born of delusion.
- (d) Not amenable to ascertainment from evidence and not yielding to rational discernment.

The upshot is that the non-Self is not merely different from the Self but lacks reality and being. It is shadowy and illusory. Its existence is posited by error and it is further superposed on the Self. *Its being the Self and its being as such* are both to be disallowed from the true philosophical point of view. The beginning of Vedāntic inquiry is apparently dualistic for it seeks to mark off the Self from the non-Self but its conclusion is monistic as it eventually dismisses the claim of the non-Self to be real.

The verse 45 states the cardinal argument in favour of this idealistic or spiritual monism. *The non-Self is never experienced out of relation to the Self and it is not capable of being identified with the Self.* What is neither the Self nor independent of the Self is verily nothing.

The ego is analogous to a mirror. The Self is analogous to a face reflected in it. The external objects correspond to some strongly coloured material also reflected in the mirror. The effect is that the external world and the Self appear blended even as the reflected face

acquires the reflected colour of the coloured material. It is thus that the Self presents itself distorted to empirical consciousness.

47-49. It is this distorted presentation of the Self that lends support to the illusion of a plurality of selves, owing to a plurality of distorting adjuncts. Ultimately there is only one Self.

50. Divergent and incompatible attributes are predicated of the Self in illusion while the real Self is untouched by such misconstructions.

51. Somaśarma's father: This is an allusion to the popular story of a beggar who named his dream-son Somaśarma and lost the day's alms in his attempt to punish his careless dream-wife.

53. The external world presents itself as an object only to the ego in which the power to cognize arises owing to the light of the inner Self reflected in it. Thus both the dualism of the Self and the non-Self and the plurality of selves are illusory presentations set up by the ego. Destruction of the ego ushers in the realization of undistorted non-dualism. The ego is the meeting ground of the inner reality and the outer presentations.

54-57. What has been already considered by verses 28 and 29 is brought up again here and explained more fully. This is in answer to a pertinent objection. In the proposition 'I am Brahman', the ego signified by 'I' is identified with Brahman. How can it be unreal or other than the real Self? It is answered on these lines:

(a) In 'I am Brahman', the apparent identification is for effecting the sublation of the 'I'. It is similar to saying, 'The man we see is nothing but the stump of a tree, or 'The snake is only a rope'. It cancels the 'I' and enthrones Brahman in its place.

(b) The term 'I' has two secondary meanings based on similarity and association and one direct meaning. In the identity proposition, it is the secondary meaning of 'I' based on association that is operative. The Self shines through the 'I' and hence by 'I' only the spiritual substratum is signified. Such an interpretation does in no way contradict the conception of the ego as a phenomenal and hybrid factor.

58. In the preface to verse 53, it was said that the ego is the root of all evil, that it is the locus of the mutual superimposition of Self and non-Self, and that the pure Self is not the bearer of avidyā. Here it is urged that the pure Self cannot even be termed the witness of the phenomenal universe. To be an observer of changing phenomena may imply some change in the observer also and that is repudiated hereby. From the point of view of change it is as if the Self is not the witness, though the phenomenal world would be nothing apart from its presence to an observing consciousness. The paradoxical truth is that the Self observes without observing. It observes, in the sense that its light of consciousness throws the objects into presentational being, the only being they have, and it does not observe in the sense that it undergoes no modification for the sake of or as a consequence of this observation.

59. This prose section and the verse following deal with a general principle of importance. 'Each system of speculative philosophy seems reasonable from its own point of view but untenable from that of another. There is no single doctrine commanding universal acceptance and capable of repelling all attacks. Hence how can we repose confidence in any system of philosophy?' This is the sceptical trend very well stated here and it is met by an equally fine line of reasoning. It is argued that all schools of thought, whatever be their speculative constructions, must ultimately appeal to experience for their validation. This court of final appeal is universal and it is surely unassailable from the standpoint of relativistic scepticism.

60-66. This appeal to experience, it is pointed out, does not resolve all difficulties. Experience itself poses a dilemma. When experiences and thoughts arise, do they make a difference to the ultimate self or do they not? If they do, the Self is to be taken as a changing principle. If they do not, the Self could not have been the subject of those experiences or the thinker of those thoughts. The sunshine and rains affect the skin of creatures and not the space in which they take place. If the Self is like the skin, it has to be regarded as subject to change and if it corresponds to space, it is as good as non-existent in the context and cannot be the subject of the processes in question. This dilemma is rebutted by a consideration of three other instances.

(a) When a column of smoke ascends towards the sky, does it introduce a division in the continuum of space? It would be absurd to say so. But it does ascend alright. We have to think of space as providing the field for the process though not affected by it. In the same way, the Self is as substratum of experiences without being altered by them.

(b) When a person is moving in a boat he mistakes the trees to be moving even though they are stationary. It is a case of illusion. This possibility is not ruled out in the present case. It is the essence of an illusion that it rests on reality and does not affect it.

(c) An ever-radiant precious stone or mineral lights up things brought near it and does not do so when they are withdrawn beyond the range of its illumination. Here there are changes brought about by changes in proximity and the luminous substance is the cause of them but still it remains ever the same without any change. In the same way the ātman may be regarded as the unchanging cause of change.

The conclusion is irresistible that the final substratum of mental processes can be quite changeless.

67. When we say that the sun illumines an object, we do not mean that the sun performs a new act of illumination then. It is ever shining. Only now the object approaches the sun to receive the benefit of its ever-present illumination. It is not an act, but the abiding nature of the sun. There is production of an effect without any fresh act on the part of the agent. Similarly the Self lights up the flux of mental life.

68-69. It may occur that this account of the mechanism of knowledge is nothing but a re-edition of the Sāṅkhya theory. The impression is at once corrected. The objective world on this view is no independent system of being. It falls within the being of the spirit. Its history of appearance and disappearance is an incident in the life of the ātman. But it being no ontological verity, makes no mark on the pure and changeless substratum.

70. The Self is timeless consciousness while the mental processes of experiencing and thinking are governed by time and are successive.

71-75. The role of the Self and that of the mind are described with a flourish and a great number of illustrations.

76-77. The consequence of this position is that the eternal consciousness that witnesses and actuates by its presence all the mental operations is free from suffering and suffering is what happens in the mind and is hence an item in the sphere of objects.

78. It is reiterated that the Self is invariable and everything else is subject to variation.

78-87. The same matter is elaborated and the idea gains impressiveness thereby.

88-89. The eternal witnessing consciousness is one and indivisible and the plurality of selves is a fiction set up by the plurality of alien adjuncts or minds.

90. A subtle point is made here. If the Self is one, should there not be in it an unbearable confluence of all the sufferings of all the creatures? This consequence does not follow. In the stage prior to enlightenment, there is division of experiences owing to the diversity of minds. After enlightenment one's own suffering is eliminated, owing to the realisation of the transcendent Self. How can there be subjection to others' suffering? In neither state is a confluence of sufferings possible.

91-94. The conclusion is re-inforced with the support of some important passages of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*.

95-96. The ātman is of the nature of consciousness. The entire world of non-Self along with the ego or the false self to which that world appears is an unreal presentation because it is subject to beginning and end. The discrimination between the Self and non-Self is pushed to the final non-dualistic point that the non-Self is unreal.

We have already come across one argument in support of the unreality of the non-Self. It can neither be placed in the Self nor placed outside the Self even as the imagined snake is neither one with nor independent of the rope (45). Here we are told that temporality is another mark of the unreal.

97. The old fear dispelled so often already is repeated again that this theory is only a restatement of the Sāṅkhya position. The old reply that the non-Self is phenomenal presentation within the Self and not an independent reality is offered again. It is supported

by a new argument. We know instances of ideas with no objective counter-parts to them. But we know of no object without the corresponding idea, for, we can know of it only through ideas. The epistemological conceivability of the subject without an object and the inconceivability of an object without a subject is used here to support the ontological thesis of the sole reality of the subject.

98-99. A new thought of great importance is introduced here and it gives powerful support to the thesis of the unreality of the non-Self.

Commonsense and popular philosophy make the assumption that what is accessible to the means of knowledge like perception and inference is real and what is not knowable is non-existent. Here the reverse is sought to be established.

The ātman is no object and hence it is unknowable. But it is self-evident and makes possible whatever knowledge is there and hence our certainty about it is not secured by our knowledge about it. It is immediately and indubitably established for us and no means of knowledge has to prove its being for us. Even though unknowable it is more real than what is positively known. The non-Self or object, however clearly known, is mediately known to us. It comes to our vision, as it were, through the body, the senses and mind. There is every possibility of these mediating links distorting what they present to consciousness. Moreover the links cannot be operated without a prior identification of the Self with them and such identification is not possible without the ignorance of the Self. Hence a radical flaw lies at the root of our knowledge of external objects. However much the non-Self may be known, it can be only a phenomenal and not ultimate Reality. Only the Self is certain through an awareness at once immediate and not involving falsifying instruments. So the Self, though unknowable is real and the non-Self though knowable and even known is phenomenal.

What is said here becomes clearer if read along with what Śaṅkara says in *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* about the pramāṇas being vitiated by a basal avidyā.

100-102. The fact of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the non-self is presented and it is shown through the two analogies that the mind's attributes are wrongly predicated of the Self

and the Self's character of consciousness is equally wrongly ascribed to the mind. This is the root of all evil.

103-104. This ignorance and error constitutive of the original nescience is removable by Vedāntic knowledge. That knowledge cancels error is a well-known principle.

105. How is knowledge of the ātman to be attained when it is unknowable being irrepressibly self-revealing? This is a clear enough difficulty. Vedāntic knowledge does not signify the knowledge of what is previously unknown. It simply means the eradication of avidyā.

106-111. In these verses nothing new is added. They reiterate clearly how the unchanging ātmān lies at the back of the ego, the act of knowing and the object known and how it transcends them. It is the unaffected medium of their presentation. It is Self-luminous while they are illumined by it.

112. The world of duality constitutive of the non-Self is unreal because it cannot be determined to be a diversity by itself apart from consciousness, nor can it be so determined as a part of consciousness, nor can both the alternatives be combined. It is illusory and by its elimination through knowledge the non-dual spiritual reality stands radiant and supreme.

In the prose preface to the verse there is a reference according to the commentator to the argument against the concept of difference formulated by Maṇḍanamiśra in his *Brahmasiddhi*.

A and B must be known as different before we can discern their differences. Their mutual differences must have been known before we could initially know them as different. There is a vicious circle here.

114. The non-Self comes to be recognised as virtually non-existent the moment we succeed in seeing it as not the same as the self. Discrimination from the Self ends in its annulment.

115. This repeats the point of the verse 98.

116. The argument against the reality of the non-Self is concluded.

118. The man of realisation laments his prior ignorance and neglect of the saving words of the śruti to this effect.

### CHAPTER III

1. The nature of the changeless and non-dual ātman has been brought out in the previous chapter. The phenomenal world consisting of the varied agents, instruments, acts and objects of knowledge is falsely superimposed on this transcendent and pure principle. Such an 'illegitimate transference' could not arise without a radical and original ignorance or nescience.

Now this ignorance is not something that can exist by itself; it requires both a locus or support and an object. All ignorance is of the nature of a handicap in some *subject* of knowledge and blocks the understanding of that subject concerning some *object*. So ignorance is a relational item subsisting in a subject and pertaining to some object. It is *in* something and *about* something.

Now two categories have been distinguished, the Self and non-Self. We have to specify the subject and object of ignorance between these two categories. There is not much difficulty in judging that the Self must be the locus of ignorance, for only what is capable of knowing can be liable to ignorance. It is further argued that the object of ignorance is also the Self. We can be sure that the non-apprehension of an object is not due to its non-existence only if its being is somehow certain and established. Such certitude is found only in the case of the Self, for our very self-consciousness is a revelation of its being. Hence only the Self can be the object of ignorance. In the case of the non-Self there is always the possibility that our ignorance about it may be a legitimate unawareness of the non-existent and our supposed knowledge of it may be merely a fictitious imagination. So both the locus and object of ignorance is the Self itself.

It may be objected how the pure Self can be thus doubly associated with ignorance, obviously incompatible with its self-effulgent nature. Being pure sentience how can it suffer ignorance and being self-luminous how can it permit ignorance about itself? The answer to this is rather very abridged and the explanation of the commentator is highly tangled. Perhaps the line of answer is this: We are



convinced that the Self is pure undivided spirit without a second; we are also familiar with the fact of the mutual superimposition of the Self and non-Self on each other. The Self being of such a nature and the superimposition being such a patent fact of experience, we are driven to acknowledge ignorance as a necessary presupposition. When we know that the object before us is only a rope and also note that we mistook it for a snake, it must be inevitably presumed that we must have missed the distinctive features of the rope in our initial perception of it. Ignorance is thus a necessary presupposition of ordinary experience. In its eradication lies our salvation. That has to be effected only through comprehension of the truth of 'Tattvamasi'. Hence the chapter purports to work out an interpretation of 'Tattvamasi'. The Second Chapter concentrated itself on the meaning of 'Thou', the nature of the *ātman*. It was largely a discussion in terms of free reason. This chapter concerns itself with the total import of 'That thou art', the identification of *ātman* and Brahman and contains a good deal of exegetical matter required for elucidating the text 'Tattvamasi'. Both in intention and execution it represents the spirit of Vedāntic scholasticism. It fortifies itself by maintaining that the final enlightenment that could liberate the aspirant from ignorance is to be sought only from the *śruti* and that a rejection of *śruti* on the part of exclusive rationalism is ill-conceived and untenable. The grasp of the final significance of 'Tattvamasi' takes one to the consummation of all spiritual endeavour.

2. This verse puts in a nutshell the meaning of 'Tattvamasi'. The term '*tat*' stands for Brahman, the ground of the universe. The term '*tvam*' signifies the Self. The identification of the two, Brahman and *ātman*, serves to remove the supposition that Brahman is other than the Self and that the Self is finite and is subject to the evils incidental to finitude.

3. In the interpretation of the proposition there are three stages or three successive points to be considered:

I. The first is '*sāmānādhikarānya*' of the two terms '*tat*' and '*tvam*'. It is the equation or apposition of the two terms indicated by the identity of case-endings. Where the case-endings differ no identity or equation is meant. It is also necessary that the two terms must not be synonymous. To start with we must have two

terms with different imports. The proposition must assert their identity and the initial divergence of meanings must be overcome by fusion of significance effected by the unitary force of the proposition.

II. The second stage is 'viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva'. This refers not to the verbal side as the first stage. It is marked by the qualification of the meaning of 'Thou' by the meaning of the term 'That' and the qualification of the meaning of 'That' by the meaning of 'Thou'. To Brahman must be attributed selfhood and to the self must be attributed Brahman-hood.

III. If the meanings of the two terms are such that such a mutual qualification is impossible and that some contradiction is involved in the assertion of the identity, the literal imports of the two terms must be given up and on their basis an implied or an intended but not expressed meaning must be construed. In the present instance the implied but ultimate import is the absolute ātman and it is signified indirectly owing to the apparent incompatibility between finite selfhood signified by 'Thou' and the transcendent absoluteness signified by 'That'. This is lakṣaṇa or signification through implication and not through direct expression. Thus the terms have the relation of sāmānādhikarāṇya, their meanings have mutual viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha, and the meanings point by way of lakṣaṇa the ātman, which is the final import of the sentence.

4-5. A minor digression is introduced here. But it is a valuable clarification by itself. Is this process of understanding the Self a natural intellectual process or is it a spiritual fulfilment of an obligation imposed by the scripture? The latter alternative is accepted. The moral equipment for the pursuit of this knowledge is insisted upon. It is also pointed out that the crowning insight is imparted by the śruti, though as a preparation for this the discrimination of the Self from the non-Self must be won through the exercise of reason.

6. We have noticed that in the course of the Second Chapter several arguments were advanced to refute a possible Sāṅkhya suggestion that the position being upheld insisting upon the discrimination between the ātman and anātman was nothing but the Sāṅkhya theory itself. The main point of distinction vigorously urged was

that the realm of the non-Self was ultimately an appearance and that the Self was the sole reality according to the position maintained, while for the Sāṅkhya system the non-self was a genuine though separate realm of irreducible reality.

In the course of the present chapter, a similarly persistent sāṅkhya objection is raised in anticipation and answered. The objection is to the effect that the discrimination between the self and the non-self can be effected through reason itself and that there is no need to resort to Vedāntic texts for gaining knowledge. The reply repeatedly offered is that discriminative knowledge may be and is obtained through reason but this is not the final phase of the required knowledge. The final phase ought to consist of the knowledge of identity between the ātman so discriminated and the absolute principle *i.e.*, the Brahman. It is this unitive or integrative knowledge that forms the culmination of the understanding of reality. This is obtainable, it is contended, only from scripture. Reason is analytic, separating the Self and the non-Self, while the intuitive grasp of the central passages of the Upaniṣads is synthetic, unifying the Self with the infinite reality. Discrimination is a preliminary and subordinate stage of knowledge, however necessary it may be, and it has to merge in the unifying apprehension which is the real goal of the pursuit. This last phase lies in the grasp of 'Tattvamasī'. While the 'tvam' is ascertainable through reason, the 'tat' and the identity of 'tvam' with 'tat' are to be understood only from the śruti.

7-8. By ajñāna or avidyā what are we to understand? Is it error? Or is it simply a negation or absence of knowledge? The latter, though seemingly a more natural interpretation of the concept, gives rise to the objection that such a negation cannot be considered the cause of the phenomenal universe, which ajñāna is supposed to be on the theory advocated. Nothing can arise from non-being.

The resolution of this difficulty is not clear. The two verses present two ideas; (a) The object of ajñāna is one with pure undivided Being, the universal substratum of all determinate appearances; (b) This universal Being is of the nature of the principle of consciousness that shines forth in the subject of all knowing and all the acts of knowing in all occasions of inquiry. How these ideas

clear up the matter remains unsaid. The traditional commentary, *Candrikā*, amplifies what is stated and offers as the author's solution that ajñāna is something positive and that it covers up or conceals the universal ātman. This concealment is responsible for whatever negation of knowledge may be there, which in its turn renders misconstruction or superimposition possible. It is true that this amplification is questioned by some recent writers. But no better solution is forthcoming, although *Candrikā's* attempt is not supported by definite clue in the text. It is a pity that Prof. Hiriyanna does simply explain why ajñāna must be construed as positive and throws no further light on the issue. The traditional interpretation though not specifically emerging from the words of the text, seems to be justified by Śaṅkara's admission of a concealment of reality as basal to all ignorance, doubt and misconstruction of it.<sup>1</sup>

9. The view of Maṇḍana mentioned in the First Chapter 67, is brought in again and the old reply that the transcendent knowledge is directly attainable through the comprehension of the text 'Tattvamasi' is given again. The comprehension must pass through sāmānadhikarāṇya, viśeṣana-viśeṣya-bhāva and lakṣaṇa-lakṣya-sambandha as already pointed out (3).

10. The Self signified by 'Thou' is to be construed as free from suffering for it is identified with Brahman signified by 'That'. The remoteness or transcendence of Brahman signified by 'That' is to be given up because it is identified with the Self signified by 'Thou'. Thus a unitary import is conveyed by the two words though they are not synonymous and the contradictory aspects of the meanings of both are set aside.

11. The empirical Self is supposed to be the subject of knowledge and is looked upon as 'I'. But it is so by virtue of its substratum, the real Self, which is characterized by immutable consciousness and immediacy of Self-certitude. It is this real Self that is indicated by the process of lakṣaṇa by the term 'Thou'.

12-13. In the ego we have the co-inherence of both subjectivity and objectivity. But the Self is integral and is without such internal distinctions.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Gītābhāṣya* XIII 2.

14. Under no circumstance are consciousness and immediacy to be distinguished or separated.

15. The same Self is one without a second by virtue of being pure immutable consciousness and is directly and immediately given. It is through the influence of this Self that the mind can cognise though intrinsically the mind is subject to change.

16-17. The distinction between what is immutable and what undergoes change is elucidated. What abides in and through change of states is said to be 'pariṇāmi' or the changing being. What transcends altogether the phenomenon of modification or succession of states is said to be immutable.

18-19. The mind knows because in it lies the origin of acts of consciousness. The real Self is the knower by virtue of its intrinsic and ever-present consciousness. The mind is said to be the inner self in contrast to more external adjuncts like the body. But the Self is the inmost and immediate reality by its essential being. The Self is consciousness and immediately self-establishing, by its un-derived and unalterable nature.

20. The connection between the real Self and the empirical ego is nothing objective and real. It arises as an illegitimate transference of one over the other.

21. But why should we admit the immutable Self? Because nothing objective and nothing changing could ever be cognised without a subject and without an unchanging witness thereof.

22. By the simple criterion of subjection to origin and cessation, the non-Self in its totality can be distinguished and excluded from the Self and then the understanding of 'That thou art' expels all inner darkness of ignorance.

23-25. This is repeated again and again, for abridgement of statement may lead to defective and confused understanding.

In the proposition 'That Thou art', 'Thou' is the subject and 'That' is the predicate. 'Thou' signifies the self as the knowing subject and as associated with all the evils of life. 'That' signifies the ultimate Godhead, mediately known and hence problematic as regards reality. The equation embodied in the proposition serves to annul features of both blocking their identification. They are 'subjection to evil' associated with 'Thou' and mediateness or trans-

cendence associated with 'That'. The non-contradicting and actually inseparable connotations of both, namely, immediacy and ultimacy are admitted and fused together in the final import of the proposition and we have the resultant notion of the Self at once immediate and ultimate.

26. Thus we have interpretation of the text through lakṣaṇa and that gives us an integral meaning.

27. The ego is to the Self what the snake is to the rope falsely superposed on it. The rope stands revealed by the correction of the impression that it is a snake. Analogously here the annulment of the ego brings about the apprehension of the Self. This process of signification through the annulment of the direct meaning is the meaning by lakṣaṇa or implication.

28. But it is essential to remember that this final step in understanding 'Tattvamasi' can be taken only by him, who has already accomplished the discrimination between the Self and non-Self through the employment of reasoning.

As layer after layer of the non-Self is peeled off, the distance between the ātman and Brahman becomes shorter and shorter. When the non-Self is wholly peeled off, the Self shines as wholly one with Brahman.

29-31. Why should this be so? Avidyā consists of two aspects. In the first place it confounds the Self with the non-Self. In the second place it sets up the presentation of the non-Self as if it were a reality. Hence eradication of avidyā by the process of discrimination not only exposes the nature of the non-Self as such but also dissolves its being which is but an appearance. The consequence is that the Self shines as transcending all non-Self and also as one without a second thereby merging with Brahman, whose essential nature is to be one without a second.

The understanding of Brahman as something other than the Self is due to the confounding of the Self with the non-Self, for it is the confused ego that sees the non-Self as an actuality, sees itself as limited thereby and thus erects a barrier of difference between itself and the infinite Brahman. The removal of the confusion separates the non-Self from the Self and puts an end to its presentational being, leaving the Self as one without a second.

The Self so realised can no longer be other than Brahman. The transfigured manifestation of the Self as infinite is nothing but the transfigured manifestation of Godhead as the innermost Self.

32. The words by themselves have general connotations. But when brought together in meaningful sentences, they acquire determinate and unique significance.

33. It is to be realised that discrimination of the Self by reason is a preparation for the integral apprehension of the śruti text and can never itself constitute that apprehension.

34-46. On what ground can the authority of the śruti be rejected? There should be sufficient reason for rejecting a pramāṇa. The only sufficient reason for rejecting a pramāṇa is one or some or all of the following circumstances:

(a) If it repeats what is primarily conveyed by another pramāṇa.

(b) If it conveys what is contradictory of what is established by another pramāṇa.

(c) If it delivers something uncertain and doubtful.

(d) If it fails to convey any information whatever.

Now in the present case none of these circumstances is found:

(a) The śruti presents the pure and transcendent Self not cognisable by other means of knowledge.

(b) How could śruti's revelation be ever in conflict with other pramāṇas? They concern themselves with the external world and it concerns itself with the inner reality. If the meaning of 'I' is properly apprehended and the pure Self distinguished from all non-Self is ascertained, there is no possibility of the outward-directed pramāṇas running counter to the śruti's identification of the pure Self with Brahman (II, 5). There is no meeting ground between the śruti and other pramāṇas for any conflict to arise and the Self properly distinguished possesses no features resisting its identification with Brahman.

(c) The Self is such that it is indubitably established by self-consciousness and is untouched by any objective factor only about which doubts are possible.

(d) Its failure to convey any information is certainly due to the incorrigible stupidity of its recipients who are incapable of intuiting

what lies nearest to them being their very self. How to kindle such dead intellects?

Hence there is no valid reason for discarding śruti: The adjustment of reason and śruti is by way of preparation and fulfilment. Reason is our instrument for discriminating the Self from all non-Self. Śruti comes after this discrimination and identifies the Self so discerned with the highest principle, namely, Brahman. This procedure is illustrated by the Upaniṣads themselves. For instance, the determination of the nature of inner Self worked out by ratiocination by Prajāpati is really a preparation for the teaching of ātman-Brahman identity imparted by Uddālaḥa to Śvetaketu. In the same way Yājñavalkya's discourse in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* on ātman to Janaka is the logical preparation to the teaching of 'Aham Brāhm-āsmi' in the same Upaniṣad. The śruti itself has exemplified the adjustment of reason and śruti. While reason is essential, śruti is the source of the fullness of final knowledge.

47-48. An already mentioned Mīmāṃsaka view is reconsidered in relation to the present context. Śruti is autonomous when it issues imperatives. But when it asserts matters of fact, it usually depends upon confirmation from other sources of knowledge. If the śruti teaching 'Tattvamasi' is to be considered authoritative all by itself, it must be construed as formulating some imperative.

This proposal is rejected. Since the kind of śruti passages in question deals with the ātman, no such confirmation is either possible or necessary. It is analogous to words spoken in order to wake up a man in sleep. The ātman is eternal consciousness, does not require to be revealed by any other pramāṇa, has no qualities like sound or colour, rendering other pramāṇas like pratyakṣa possible, does not admit of doubt, is the inmost reality, is an end in itself and is essentially unknowable. Therefore, it is not accessible to other means of proof which are generally actuated by desires or utilitarian considerations.

49. Śruti itself affirms this fact. Only what is objective, limited, external and has qualities like colour is open to our empirical vision. But it cannot catch what is not an object, and is infinite, inward and qualityless.



50. Hence its declaration that the seer of the seeing cannot be seen is perfectly sound.

51. Further, perception is of external objects. It cannot establish any invariable relation between the Self and anything else, for the Self being the inner reality is imperceptible. In the absence of any such law of invariable concomitance, how can inference about the ātman be possible?

52. This applies practically to all pramāṇas because they are all oriented to external objects.

53. Therefore, the truth of 'Tattvamasi' is imparted only by śruti to one who has discerned the Self in its purity and distinction from all non-Self.

54. Reason performs the preliminary work of establishing the distinction of the Self as different from the non-Self by using as the marks of the non-Self objectivity and variation.

55. Just as the external objects bear marks of being different from the ego, the ego or 'I' itself bears the mark of the non-Self and leads upto the idea of the transcendent Self.

56-57. It is again objected that reason can establish the existence of the ātman. It is replied that reason can give rise only to mediate knowledge and not immediate apprehension. The knowledge sought here is direct experience. Śruti alone can bring about such experience.

58. A new objection is raised to the adoption of śruti for the knowledge in question.

In deep sleep we find ourselves lapsing into the Self in all its indeterminateness divorced from all association from the non-Self. Why resort to Śruti when such an easy and universal mode of access is there?

But in suṣupti ajñāna is still there. If it were not so spiritual discipline consisting of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana for realizing the ātman would not be necessary. And again one who goes to deep sleep would not return to the other states. If he did so, that deliverance is something final would not be true. It would not be that the individual that wakes up is different from him who went to sleep, for there is continuity of recollection and recognition. There-

fore the persistence of ignorance in deep sleep must be necessarily admitted. But, it may be argued, 'There is no direct perceptual awareness of ignorance in *suṣupti*'. The absence of such awareness it is replied is due to the absence then of the necessary instrument of such experience, namely, the mind. Ignorance is there, but there is no explicit perceptual experience of it.

59-62. There is digression to a point mentioned earlier. It has been said that the ego carries the marks of the non-Self and points to the Self transcending it (56). It is argued that the distinction between the Self and the ego is not so patent. The external object and the person dealing with it are clearly distinguishable even in the plane of common sense. But between the knowing Self and the ego the demarcation is not at all clear or established.

An analogy would meet this objection. The fuel that has caught fire becomes the agent that burns other things though in reality it is itself an object that is being burnt. In the same way, though the ego is an object distinct from the Self it derives from the Self the property of being the subject owing to great proximity. This does not alter the fact that it is set up by ignorance and is an object. But the other objects present themselves to the Self not merely covered by ignorance as the ego does but also by the ego. The ego causes pragmatic valuation of them as favourable, unfavourable or indifferent. It is this intermediate ego-engendered valuation that renders obvious the distinction of the other objects from the subject. In the case of the ego, owing to the absence of that valuation, the distinction is blurred greatly and hence the phenomenon of the ego manifesting itself as the Self more than any other objective factor. The distinction between the subject and the object is lost sight of when they are mediated by only ignorance but when they are mediated by ignorance and the ego it is glaring. In deep sleep the ego is suspended and ignorance is subtle and dormant as the mind is also suspended then, and so there is no awareness of anything either as 'mine' or 'this'. Awareness of 'this' presupposes ignorance and that of 'mine' presupposes both ignorance and the ego.

63. To resume the main argument, the other means of proof establish the Self as transcendent of the non-Self, while the knowledge that can destroy the fundamental ignorance responsible for all

the evils of life is to be acquired only from the propositions of the Upaniṣads such as 'Tattvamasi'.

64-67. In the Second Chapter four classes of spiritual aspirants were distinguished (II. 2-3); of these four, only those who reason about the Self and are made to listen to the words of Vedānta again and again are of importance for this discussion. All the other three are endowed with special ability and blessed with great merit born of past effort. How is this class of disciples enabled to see the truth?

The analogy of ten people who set out on a task and of whom each counting the members of the group on the way leaving out himself laments the loss of one member is given. Then some one comes their way and seeing their sad plight born of stupidity tells each one that he himself is the missing tenth man. They rejoice over the recovery of the lost man. In this case the words of the wise stranger causes them instantaneous enlightenment. Even so are the words of Vedānta. In reality the Self is the one absolute reality without a second, but imagination of duality creates all the affliction of life. The words 'That Thou Art' at once rescues the seeker from his delusion and distress and restores him to his supreme status. There is no acquisition of anything new; only there is a revolutionary annulment of the illusion of finitude. It is impossible to explain the phenomenon of this illusion.. Its very nature is precisely this, that it is wholly illogical and cannot withstand any kind of scrutiny. It is not a fact that yields its secrets to the inquiring intellect; it is a myth that dissolves into nothing under the sunshine of exploring reason. This much only can be said of it. It is terminable by enlightenment. That enlightenment arises positively from the Vedāntic words 'That thou art' and no other way of knowledge is of avail in this matter.

73-74. The śruti often refers to the individual self as associated with its empirical characteristics and function, even while purporting to teach its identity with Brahman. Why does it perpetuate the illusion of empirical individuality this way? It is for purposes of negating it. Just as 'neti, neti' negates the phenomenal encrustations covering the real, 'Tattvamasi' also negates the phenomenal adjuncts of the Self. What is to be negated must be explicitly restated as a preliminary to effective negation. Without this step errors do

not get cancelled at all. Hence the particular methodology of the śruti.

75-80. What 'Thou' ordinarily connotes gets critically revised in the light of 'That' which happens to be predicated of it here. In the same way the general connotation of 'That' gets revised in the light of 'Thou'. As a principle the general significance of terms is superseded and they are invested with determinate imports in the context of a proposition through the determining force of predication.

The final import of 'Thou' and 'That' lies in the ātman which is at once one without a second and is the inmost Self. As a matter of fact it could not be secondless if it were not the inmost Self and could not be the inmost Self if it were not one without a second. What excludes or is excluded by the Self would be limited by the Self and the Self that encounters an 'other' does so by virtue of its distorting veil of ignorance and the ego and is not therefore inward enough.

The essence of the matter is this: 'Thou' signifies the self and its subjection to evil. 'That' signifies the supreme Reality and its being other than the knowing subject. Their identification has the effect of eliminating the elements in the significance of both which come in the way of that identification. Thus subjection to evil and being other than the Self are both negated and the inwardness of the Self and the infinite unity of Brahman are both preserved and integrated into a single import. Śruti is valid when it conveys what is not conveyed by any other pramāṇa and when it promotes the realisation of the ultimate good. The import of 'Tattvamasi' fulfils both these conditions pre-eminently.

81-86. We are brought back to the old issue of possible conflict between śruti and the other pramāṇas. Some general points of resolution are outlined:

(a) If the scriptural testimony goes definitely against what is clearly established by perception and other means of knowledge, it must be taken in a figurative or secondary sense.

(b) For purposes of securing the undisturbed validity of the scripture, it is not a sound procedure to give it a practical or injunctive meaning. Its existential or metaphysical significance must be maintained.

(c) As a matter of fact, scripture, in so far as it is a *pramāṇa* proper, does convey knowledge not obtainable through other means of knowing and hence the feared conflict does not arise.

(d) In spite of this, if a conflict were to be noticed, it must be clearly due to the fact that either the *pratyakṣa* is a pseudo-*pratyakṣa* or the *śabda* is pseudo-*śabda*.

(e) The *pramāṇas* do not require mutual confirmation or supplementation. Otherwise they would lose their intrinsic validity or *svataḥ-prāmāṇya*.

87-88. If pleasures and pains are found through other *pramāṇas*, that is precisely the reason why they could not be intrinsic to the Self, for the Self is not accessible to the other *pramāṇas*. If on the other hand they really belong to the fundamental nature of the Self, when they are terminated in the state of release, the Self itself should be extinguished then. Moreover, their termination itself would be impossible. A thousand meditations cannot alter the fundamental constitution of things.

89-91. How can meditation remove the experience of suffering, if suffering is a fact of valid experience? Meditative concentration is no source of new knowledge. It just focuses intellectual energies. Imaginative experience born of meditation can be only subjective and cannot lead to permanent objective release from suffering.

92. Experience of suffering is deep-rooted and well-established through beginningless *samsāra*. Can it be terminated by the disposition and tendencies accumulated through meditation for a limited duration?

93-95. This potency cannot be asserted on the grounds of *śāstra*. *Śāstra* reveals truth and does not add powers and potencies to what is otherwise powerless.

In fact the results of action and meditative imagination are transitory for they are not born of the knowledge of reality.

Even if there were to be a conflict between perceptual experience and *śruti*, *śruti* must be recognised as more authoritative.

First, *śruti* being no composition of any human being is free from the defects to which human documents are liable.

Second, the Self in its inherent nature is untouched by empirical conditions like suffering. But perceptual experience is often found misleading, and it gets mixed up with human imagination prone to err. Perception is an external and mediate mode of cognition in contrast to the immediate self-revelation of the Self. Hence the superiority of the claim of śruti over perception.

Sometimes śruti actually stultifies perception and affirms the validity of itself. So conflict, if actual, damages perception and not śruti.

96-103. But, in reality, such conflicts do not arise if both the pramāṇas are properly understood and confine themselves to their respective spheres. Sometimes if the deliverance of śruti produces perfect conviction, the conflicting perception has to be explained away.

The situation is to be handled through a correct interpretation. The perceptual knowledge that the self is suffering really concerns the empirical self or the ego. The perfection and absolute freedom from evil and suffering that the śruti speaks of concerns the pure Self. Hence the conflict resolves itself. But the real difficulty lies in the fact that śruti uses terms applicable to the empirical self when it makes assertions about the real Self. This is inevitable, for the ego is, of all the empirical categories, the nearest to the Self. It is a non-Self but a non-Self fittest to represent the Self in the realm of phenomenal experience. This mode of indirect reference is necessitated by the fact that the real Self transcends all possibilities of direct reference.

104-107. By referring to what is not the real Self, the Self has to be indicated. If so how can the right knowledge of the form 'I am Brahman' arise at all?

Taking our stand on a means that is not real, we realise the real Self, for realizing which there is really no means. The ātman is ever-given and it is indirectly signified by the word 'I'.

How can such disparity between means and end from the standpoint of reality be admitted? An analogy will help us here. A man is asleep. In the condition of deep sleep he is really dissociated from the body. We wake him up by calling his name. Now the name applies to the embodied self. But by calling him by that

name, we reach his real disembodied Self and bring it back to the waking state. Similar is the efficacy of the statement 'That Thou art'. 'Thou' may signify the empirical self but through it the real Self's identity with Brahman may be set forth. The real ātman is utterly unaffected by our errors about it or by our correction of those errors.

108-109. If one still persists in the objection that what does not exist cannot lead to what exists, we can satisfy him by saying that the means adopted is neither existent nor non-existent like every other phenomenal object.

110. The ātman is knowledge itself. Ignorance about it has a very precarious existence. Hence it drops off at the slightest disturbance.

In other words ignorance stands eternally destroyed in the self-effulgent ātman. Philosophical enlightenment is just a 'nimitta' or pretext for the complete disclosure of its non-being.

111-112. How could there be this avidyā or ignorance in the presence of the eternal consciousness of the ātman? This avidyā is a matter of experience. But its nature is such that from the standpoint of the ātman, it ought not to be and cannot be there. It eludes inquiry and flourishes in its absence.

113-115. The old question whether mere reason cannot dispell avidyā is again mooted. We have seen that two considerations have been already urged in answer.

(a) Reason discriminates the Self and the non-Self but does not integrate the Self with the absolute Reality. It is merely analytic and not synthetic.

(b) Reason gives rise to mediate understanding of external objects and not to the immediate experience of the inmost Self.

(c) A third point is given here: Reason distinguishes the Self from the non-Self. It negates of the Self the being of the sheaths of empirical factors. Now this non-being attributed to the Self, namely, the non-being of the sheaths, must also be cancelled. That would be possible only through an affirmation that it is Brahman. The thesis that the self is the empirical body or mind is sublated by the antithesis that it transcends them. Now this anti-

thesis has to be sublated by a higher thesis that it is Brahman itself. From materialism the intellect passes into nihilism. The nihilism of the intellect must be annihilated by the absolutism of the śruti.

The Self as Brahman goes beyond both world-affirmation and world-negation and culminates in absolute self-affirmation.

116. An objection already noticed is finally answered very effectively. Whence this avidyā? How does it happen to be at all?

The question does not occur to the fool for he does not know the nature of the ātman incompatible with the existence of avidyā. It does not occur to the enlightened sage, for avidyā does not exist for him at all.

117-122. These verses record finally the position with regard to the power of the Vedāntic propositions such as 'Tattvamasi' to cause ultimate intuitive knowledge.

123-126. The old view that not the comprehension of the text but the meditation following it is the cause of the liberating experience is brought in again.

Two points are urged in reply:

(a) When the initial pramāṇa, *i.e.*, śruti, does not produce enlightenment and conviction, there is absolutely no chance of the meditation following it giving rise to them.

(b) If some kind of meditative practice is somehow wanted, it may be admitted as a repeated study of the texts, so that gaps in the study may be filled up.

Whatever undesirable consequences may be feared, if no meditative practice is admitted, are effectively warded off when once we admit the imperative to study and that to completion. Renunciation in a manner not sanctioned by the śāstra or continuance of the old ritualistic life (in the absence of the pre-occupation with meditation which would authorise renunciation and put an end to ritualism) are the consequences feared. But there are no causes for them to occur when study and repeated study become pre-occupations of the aspirant.



## CHAPTER IV

This chapter roughly consists of three stages of exposition. From the first verse to verse 18, it is intended as a recapitulation of what has been extensively set forth in the first three Chapters. From verse 19 to verse 53 the argument of the treatise is sought to be substantiated with statements to the same effect from Śaṅkara and Gauḍapāda. From verse 54 to verse 69 it speaks of the characteristics of the enlightened sage. The rest of the treatise from verse 70 to 78 winds up the work with tributes to the preceptor and a specification of the requirements of a proper disciple.

3-6. The distinction between the Self and non-Self is fairly well-known. It is also generally recognized that the non-Self presupposes the Self. The physical objects other than the body are easily distinguished from the Self. That the subject who knows them is the Self is also clear. There is uncertainty only with regard to the intermediate factor, namely, the body. Exercise of reason is called for here to determine that the body both gross and subtle belongs to the realm of the non-Self. External objects are cognized as 'this' and the knower thereof is taken as 'I'. But in connection with the body both the terms 'this' and 'I' are used in common parlance. Hence it has been an area of dispute and delusion.

7. The criterion to be applied for discriminating between the Self and the non-Self has already been formulated. In its light the status of the body as non-Self must be ascertained.

It is worthwhile noting here the fourfold criterion that the commentator mentions:

(a) The Self is the seer and the non-self is the seen.

(b) The Self is the witness and the non-Self is what is witnessed.

There is not much difference between the two. Prof. Hiriyanna points out that the second criterion helps us to distinguish the Self and the mental occurrences only while the first helps the discrimination of the Self from external objects as well as mental occurrences (253).

(c) The non-Self comes into being at some time and passes out of existence sometime later. The Self knows no beginning or end.

(d) The Self is abiding while the non-Self is variable.

Here also the distinction between the two modes of discrimination is not clear. Prof. Hiriyanna makes out that the former refers to change in time while the latter refers to change in space. But the basic principle of distinction is that the Self is immutable while the non-Self is subject to change.

Fundamentally the criterion seems to be only twofold. The Self is self-evident or Self-revealing and constitutes the principle of consciousness while the non-Self has to be cognised by the Self and is not Self-luminous. The Self is non-temporal and changeless while the non-Self, is subject to variation.

8. Through 'Tattvamasi' the Self must be rightly apprehended, which is the ultimate witness of all being and non-being, Self-luminous and bereft of all internal and external distinctions.

9-18. These verses traverse familiar ground. They describe the work of reason in discerning the Self and the work of śruti in bringing about the final knowledge or experience.

19. The prose preface is not free from verbal ambiguity. The *Candrikā* offers three alternative interpretations. But there are points common to all the interpretations and the essential thought is clear enough.

'The principles enunciated and developed command by themselves acceptance by reason. Since they simply explicate just the self-established truth of the ātman, they do not really stand in need of the authority of preceptors and the scriptures. But there are students of Vedānta who go by the authority of revered teachers and sacred texts. To produce conviction in them and win them over, the testimony of the revered preceptors of Vedānta is going to be adduced.' Such seems to be the burden of the passage in question.

The verse is just an introduction to the supporting passages from Śaṅkara to be given in the following sections and refers to him with great veneration and a tribute to his universal compassion.

20-40. These twenty-one verses along with their prefaces constitute a fairly long presentation of the statements of Śaṅkara in

support of the position taken by the author with appropriate connecting comments. Of these, sixteen verses are quoted from Śaṅkara's *Upadeśasāhasrī* and the rest are by way of supplement and elucidation.

These quotations cover the two major arguments of our treatise:

(a) The discrimination between the Self and the non-Self through reason, the non-Self being constituted of the objects, the gross physical body and the subtle psychical body, the latter including the ego or 'I' also.

(b) The identification of the Self so discriminated with the ultimate reality, namely, Brahman, through the comprehension of the import of the scriptural proposition 'That thou art'.

41-44. Here we have three verses from Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* and another from *Upadeśasāhasrī*.

Their theme is that (i) in both the waking and dream states Self is conditioned by ignorance in both its causal and effect forms, i.e., non-apprehension and misapprehension, (ii) in the state of dreamless sleep only the causal ignorance conditions the Self, and (iii) that in the fourth state of final enlightenment and release it is emancipated from both the forms of ignorance.

52. The author, as the treatise is practically coming to a close, defines its leading characteristics. Its theme is derived from the decisive teachings of the whole body of Vedānta, it concerns the ultimate Reality and it dispels all intellectual darkness.

53. The nature of one who knows Brahman best is described in brief. He is filled with the consciousness of the unity of spirit, he sees himself in all who know the ātman and also in all who are ignorant. This he realises not through discursive and analytical understanding but through superconscious immediate intuition.

54-59. A man of such supreme realisation becomes assimilated to the object of his pursuit and comes to partake of its perfection. He has become all that he had it in him to become and there are no more tasks for him to do or ideals to accomplish. The dualism of the 'is' and 'ought to be' is overcome and what ought to be has been actualised to completion.

66-69. It may be—this is a traditional point of view—that a man of this knowledge by realisation persists in the condition of embodiment till the *prārabdha* is liquidated. But he can indulge in no moral lapses. The roots of evil, ignorance and desire have been burnt up without residue. How can wickedness or licentiousness arise in such a state of purity? Even an aspirant shuns evil. How can the perfected sage, having become one with the very substance of Godhead, descend to evil. But his goodness and holiness are spontaneous, they are not maintained by struggle against evil, and are not of the nature of means. They are effortless expressions of his self-attainment.

70-73. The merits, moral, intellectual and spiritual, on the part of the worthy student of this treatise are enumerated.

74. That the source of this spiritual wisdom is the great Śaṅkara is proclaimed and that it is for the high-souled to adjudge the work is recorded with the humility of a real lover of truth.

75. The point in wanting that the high-souled should sit in judgment over the work is that petty minds miss even blazing greatness and that the noble and the pure can discover even hidden worth.


76-77. These two are grand stanzas, the first indicating the proper perspective in which the treatise is to be viewed and the second offering reverential devotion to the preceptor, Śaṅkara.

The sacred river Gaṅgā took its birth at the feet of Lord Viṣṇu. She was taken possession of by Lord Śivā. He was worshipped with great devotion and austerity by King Bhagīratha. The merciful Śivā was pleased and gave Gaṅgā to his custody. Bhagīratha brought her down to the earth and made her flood over the remains of the accursed descendants of the emperor Sagara. Thus they were sanctified and their souls were released from evil and ascended to heavenly peace and blessedness. Analogous to this ancient and revered story is the present achievement. 'Foot of Viṣṇu' is an old Vedic expression signifying the highest spiritual perfection or *mokṣa*. It may also mean the grace of the preceptor Vedavyāsa, an incarnation of Viṣṇu and the author of the *Vedāntasūtras*. Vedāntic knowledge leads to *mokṣa* and receives its final systematization at the hands of Vyāsa. So it resembles Gaṅgā in that it pertains to the 'Foot of Viṣṇu' and emanates from Viṣṇu. This Gaṅgā of know-

ledge was won by the blessed Śaṅkara, even as Śiva appropriated the river Gaṅgā, through great spiritual power. Śrī Surśevara says that, even as King Bhagīratha worshipped Śiva, he worshipped Śrī Śaṅkara properly, who was established in Brahman, was omniscient and surrounded by sages always. From that repository of perfections, thus propitiated, he obtained as a boon this Gaṅgā of spiritual science. In this work he has spoken out that supreme knowledge out of compassion towards the suffering mortals, so that their life of repeated births and deaths may be ended, even as Bhagīratha got Gaṅgā to sanctify and uplift the sons of Sagara. The sanctity of the knowledge in question, its doubly divine source, the devotion through which it was acquired and the motive for its promulgation are all brought out magnificently in this complete metaphor.

77. The knowledge enshrined in the work is again praised and the preceptor who dispelled inner darkness through philosophical reason and revealed that highest knowledge to the world is called the adorable preceptor of preceptors. To him the author offers his devotion and veneration.

78. The prose comments connecting and elucidating the verses are commended to the consideration of the would-be commentators of the work.



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*N. B.*—The letter (V) shows that the *Kārikā* is found in Suresvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Vārtika* also. The numbers indicate chapters and verses.

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